

The Security Society: On Power, Surveillance and Punishments

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Introduction

A couple of years ago, on a rainy Sunday afternoon, at 1:30 PM, I went to a Sparta Rotterdam football game. Never before had I felt so conscious of the security regimes that permeated my movement across the city. I've supported the Dutch football club Sparta Rotterdam for many decades—I'm a season ticket holder. Just as I was leaving for the Sunday game, a policeman patrolling the street by car told me that he was on the lookout for somebody who looked just like me—a handsome, dark haired guy with a slightly overdue shave. According to the Dutch predictive policing system, a data-driven system that predicts crimes through statistics based on different data sources, a number of burglars are active in my neighborhood. Convincing him that I wasn't the burglar he was looking for wasn't too hard, but the incident played on my mind as I made my way to the game. I started noticing the number of sound sensors and digital cameras put up by the local government in my neighborhood. I'd just read an article about the implementation of facial recognition systems, and I imagined the images of my face being processed by a databank and compared with the photos of thousands of criminals.

Around half past one, I went into the local shop to grab something to eat during the game. A sticker in the window told me that this shop participated in the Collective Shop Ban project—misbehave here (steal a candy bar, for example) and I'd be banned from the hundreds

of shops, banks, restaurants and cinemas participating in the project. Deciding which route to take, the navigation app on my smart phone advised me to use the subway instead of the bus to the stadium of Sparta Rotterdam. By taking this route, I avoid city areas that have high crime intensity and are identified as ‘hotspots’ or ‘hotspot areas’. As I walked to the nearby subway, I noticed the municipality installed bars across the middle of benches as a way to stop homeless people from sleeping on them.

By taking the subway, I entered another highly controlled zone. Rotterdam’s subway system requires passengers to use an electronic pass, preferably personalized (an anonymous one expires every year), which according to the promotion team is ‘easy, fast, and safe’. Rotterdam calls itself a smart city and in order to improve city services, it stores my travel movements in a central database. Having finally arrived at the stadium at 1:55 PM, I used my season ticket, also an electronic card, to enter via the automatic gates. Anyone committing an offense in the stadium can be barred, and stadium bans for up to a lifetime are one of the ways stewards try to keep order during the games. By the time the game began, in less than half an hour, I had crossed—at least—six totally different ‘spaces of security’.

In recent years, literature focusing on the issue of urban safety and the related issues of ‘policing’, ‘surveillance’ and ‘fear of crime’ have increasingly been discussed under the broader concept of ‘security’ (e.g. Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Loader & Walker, 2007; Zedner, 2009; Schuilenburg, 2015b; Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016; Dodsworth, 2019). Despite the fact that security has multiple meanings, and that it is used in a huge variety of contexts (Waldron, 2011; Hamilton, 2013), considerations of security have become increasingly about the attempt to control, avoid or prevent criminality and disorder in our urban environment. Jennifer Wood and Clifford Shearing claim that ‘it is the governance of security, *through crime*, that preoccupies most of our efforts’ (2007, p. 5). The focus on crime and disorder followed arguments on the limits of the sovereign state power to maintain public order and facilitate collective action (Beck, 1992; Castells, 1996; Bauman, 2000). The consequence of all this is that the police, which in the not so distant past were seen as the ‘sacred’ foundation of society (Banton, 1964), are only one of many security agents and that an increasing number of other players have assumed tasks and responsibilities relating to our security, from security guards protecting shopping malls and football stadiums to armed residents patrolling the streets of their neighborhood. The securitization of our society has been accompanied by a range of new (1) forms of surveillance,

(2) relations of power and (3) punishments. Therefore, it is important to look more closely at the complexity of what Michel Foucault called our ‘society of security’ (2009, p. 11) and to gain insight into the radical changes that are happening now in the governance of security in our urban environment.

The aim of this chapter is to explain the basis of present ‘security’ at the level of both discourse and practice by exploring the long-term process of transformation from a sovereign to a security society. The chapter starts with largely a schematic account of sovereign and disciplinary power that will be familiar to many readers of the French philosopher Foucault. In an extension on Foucault’s writings on power, the chapter deals with the way in which we are moving from a disciplinary society toward what Gilles Deleuze described as a control society. Writing in the early 1990s, prior to the hegemony of the Internet, Deleuze already told us that ‘information technology and computers’ (1995, p. 180) are a function of new power relations—and so are their effects. In the final part of this chapter, I introduce a new type of power: ‘psychopower’. By making use of the work of the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, I show how smart surveillance techniques, ranging from navigation apps to sound sensors, make it possible to channel our desires toward ‘normal’ social behavior, drawing a line between what is ‘acceptable’ and what is ‘unacceptable’. To purpose these tasks, I first deal with the sovereign character of power that gave rise to the most obvious security presence in our urban environment: the armed police.

Sovereign power

For many years now, critical scholars have drawn on Foucault’s work on relations of power to explore the historical basis of present securitization of society (e.g. Garland, 2001; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Wood & Shearing, 2007; Schuilenburg, 2015b). Foucault presents in his work a historical shift from what he called the sovereign society, the dominant form of rule in Europe from the Middle Ages up to the eighteenth century, and the disciplinary society, beginning after the French Revolution and extending into the earlier part of the twentieth century. Foucault saw sovereign power as centralized in a single person or institution. This was characterized by the absolute power of the monarch, which was implemented through the judicial system of the law. Foucault speaks of a juridical-political form of power, delineated by a ‘juridical sovereignty and the institution of the state’ (1980, p. 102; 2003, p. 34). In such a social order, a breach of the law was

regarded as an attack on the monarch in person. Foucault writes: ‘In every offence there was a *crimen majestatis* and in the least criminal a potential regicide’ (1977, p. 53).

Within Foucault’s conception of the sovereign power, an important place is assigned to Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (1651) and Beccaria’s *On Crimes and Punishments* (1764). Foucault identifies Hobbes and Beccaria as seminal judicial thinkers in the tradition of state-centered security provision, respectively by the theory of the social contract and the legalization of power in the *trias politica*. He speaks of ‘the Beccarian dynamic’ (2003, p. 129) with respect to the punitive power of the law and the role of legal reasoning in determining the binary distinction of legal and illegal. In his lecture series *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault considers the work of Hobbes (and Machiavelli’s *The Prince*) as a descendent of the juridical line of thinking by which politics begins when the war ends. In his classic work *Leviathan*, Hobbes claims that a given social order does not exist. There is a—hypothetical—natural state of universal violence and an unbridled pursuit of power. By means of a social contract, a governing body is created whose function is to put an end to this situation and to assume responsibility for the safety and protection of citizens. Therefore, the question of security is centrally a national issue of ‘law and order’, implying criminal justice and the public function of the institution of the police.

The Hobbesian conception of social order has been very important for the way in which public institutions as the police have been imagined, and for the way in which they have practiced policing. Hobbes argued that a functional system of social ordering would only be derived through a centralization of power and the establishment of a single authority. Without this consolidation of power, in the form of a single Leviathan, life would be intolerable. The world would come to a ‘war of all against all’ within which life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (1998, p. 84). As a consequence, police see themselves, and are seen, as the tool that the Leviathan (in the form of the modern state) uses to bring about security and to avoid the war of all against all. A famous Anglo-American metaphor used to express this is that police are the ‘thin blue line’ that separates order from anarchy. In *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society*, Egon Bittner speaks of the police in terms of a ‘non-negotiable force’ (1970, p. 46).

Several aspects of this sovereign conception of power are still central to the current concept of security. This is first and foremost because the associated ‘law-and-order’ politics is still an attractive option for the state and its uniformed police to maintain public order and security, using the framework of a ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric and a

focus on ‘law and order’ with its associated techniques as a ‘negative’ penal power (‘power over’). As such, the notion of security is most commonly associated with terms such as ‘fighting’, ‘combating’, ‘tackling’, ‘controlling’ and ‘punishing’ (Schuilenburg, Van Steden & Oude Breuil, 2014). In this approach, the emphasis lies on, what seventeenth-century Dutch philosopher Spinoza (1989) called ‘sad affects’ (*tristitia*) or ‘negative affects’, such as ‘fear’ of crime, with the state depicted as a ‘modern Leviathan focusing on combating all imaginable sources of harm’ (Ericson, 2007, p. 35; Hallsworth & Lea, 2011). This is done by a variety of surveillance techniques, ranging from patrolling the streets in marked police cars to the prediction of crime by data-driven systems, like predictive policing that certain neighborhood areas will experience, for example, burglaries during a certain time span. The latter, for example, is used by the Dutch police at a national level (‘Criminality Anticipation System’) to predict where and when criminal activity is likely to occur (Das & Schuilenburg, 2018; Rienks & Schuilenburg, 2020).

Disciplinary power

In the sovereign society, control took shape in the form of city walls and gatekeepers who checked everyone entering a city at specific points of entry. This fortified city functioned as a military model. According to the French cultural theorist and urbanist Paul Virilio: ‘Before it became the throne of totality, the Christian sanctuary was a stronghold, a bunker, a fortified church for those who remained within it; all their powers and capacities were deployed and strengthened in, through and as combat’ (1986, p. 38). The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the rise of a different type of power. In this society, the functioning of power moved away from a model of sovereignty, that is, away from a centralized, identifiable and vertical power (‘state apparatus’) that operates through law and coercion. This did not mean that sovereign power stopped to exist; it was rather superimposed by a new form of disciplinary power that was exercised within the spaces left by the juridical network, the so-called *hôpitaux généraux*, in order to make people, as Foucault remarked in *Discipline and Punish*, productive and efficient individuals.

Although Foucault does not anywhere define discipline succinctly, he understands it as a way of teaching people desired and appropriate behavior by a whole new arsenal of detailed and interchangeable techniques—classificatory tables, training exercises, exams, timetables, panoptic observation—that are applied behind the walls of closed and secluded institutions like schools, hospitals and prisons. On a more

theoretical level, Foucault shows that neither the autonomous subject ('the monarch') nor the political sovereignty of the state ('the police') provide an adequate starting point for speaking about disciplinary power. This means that the analysis of power ought to be independent of more everyday representations of power, and particularly of the legal-discursive and Marxist representation of power such as violence and suppression. Foucault claims: 'What we need is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the king's head' (1980, p. 121). This does not mean that the influence of the state has diminished, but it does mean that security issues can no longer be approached from the standpoint of the government's exclusive right to fight criminality and disorder. The government is slowly losing its (partly assumed) monopoly on security. Parties other than the police and the Department of Justice are becoming increasingly active in the market for security and the prevention of risk and crime. In other words: 'The king is dead, long live the extended royal family' (Burris, Kempa & Shearing, 2008).

Inasmuch as one may speak of partners in crime, citizens, football clubs, housing corporations, shopkeepers and community organizations now belong to the security family. In terms of disciplinary power, these parties fill the gap that the juridical network treats with indifference. Despite the differences in their mode of operation, each of these parties uses the norm rather than the law as a measurement and a means of producing a common standard. Although the influence of the norm is primarily local as it is attached to a specific member of the security family, it helps to produce the generalization of discipline in our security society. The norm, then, is opposed not to (inflexible) law itself but to what Foucault framed as 'the juridical': the institution of the law as the expression of a sovereign's power (Ewald, 1990; 2002). Take my favorite football club Sparta Rotterdam, for example. In addition to the law of the Dutch state, local stadium rules and regulations are also in force, including the prohibition of conduct such as the showing of offensive written banners, climbing of structures within the stadium and bringing in alcoholic drinks. By committing an offense, I can receive a sanction from the football club (e.g. a Stadium Ban) (Stott & Pearson, 2006; Hopkins, 2014). Here, one could speak of 'contractual governance' (Crawford, 2009), whereby local agreements function as instruments of social control, or of 'quasi-criminal law': the penalization and enforcement of classical offenses (discrimination, vandalism, drunkenness) through local agreements by parties other than the police and judicial authorities (Schuilenburg, 2011; 2015b, pp. 88–91).

The ‘responsibilization’ (Garland, 2001) of parties other than the police, from individuals and private tech companies to local communities, emanates from the insight that crime levels are and will probably remain high in an open and prosperous society, and that the criminal justice system of crime control, monopolized by the state and its uniformed police, has only limited possibilities to deal with this situation. Tasks in this domain are increasingly being transferred to other parties, which are increasingly being assigned ‘police-type’ duties, such as the protection of shopping malls, university campuses, airports, football stadiums and gated communities (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Wakefield, 2003). An example is the Collective Shop Ban, a measure taken in the Netherlands in an effort to make shops co-responsible for maintaining safety and security within the city-center. Depending on the severity of the conduct, an offender can be denied entry not only to the shop where the ban is imposed but also to all the shops that participate in the measure for a period of two years (Schuilenburg, 2015a; 2015b). The situation that an increasing number of people are being denied access to certain places and the corresponding facilities by banning orders occurs in several countries such as Australia (Palmer & Warren, 2014), the United Kingdom (Johnstone, 2016) and the United States (Beckett & Herbert, 2009, 2010).

In the case of the Collective Shop Ban, a relevant aspect is that an increasing number of shops are using facial recognition cameras to catch shoplifters before they steal and to identify offenders with a shopping ban. Many of these stores share a digital record of the faces of these people, meaning that if one store considers you a threat, every business in that network could come to the same conclusion. How can we think about the relationship between surveillance and power, then?

Control power

In an extension of Foucault’s work, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze developed Foucault’s notion of power into a broader theory of control. Focusing on the way our behavior is organized and influenced by technical objects, Deleuze states in his lecture ‘What is the creative act?’ at the FEMIS film school in 1987 and in his short article ‘Postscript on societies of control’ (1995) that the disciplinary society, with its closed structures, is losing its influence and is shifting toward a control society, a term he borrowed from the American novelist William Burroughs. In the disciplinary society, control found its specific power within the enclosed segments (walls, boundaries, enclosures); it was an element of the interior of fixed and closed spaces (like the fabric,

the hospital, and the prison) in themselves. In addition, the rule of the norm was attached to specific institutions and served a means of managing different populations (like scholars, the sick, and prisoners). In a control society, however, power is no longer exerted primarily within forms of enclosure as the traditional sites of confinement are in the midst of a general breakdown—a thesis that echoes Virilio's phrase of the 'exhaustion' of the physical.

The transition from a disciplinary society toward a control society is most obvious in the practice of the prison. By means of electronic monitoring, where the convict undergoes his punishment outside the walls of his cell, the inmate is put under surveillance at a distance (see for example Laurie & Maglione, 2019; Daems, 2020). In this context, Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon described electronic monitoring as a technique of the 'new penology' which 'can best be understood in terms of managing costs and controlling dangerous populations rather than social or personal transformation' (1992, p. 465). At the same time, through domestic care, the hospital relocates its activities to the living environment of the patient. Furthermore, education is no longer confined to schools. Nowadays, one must constantly be engaged in further education by means of training courses and study. The practice of work has also become diffuse. Work, the fabric for example, is no longer a place you leave behind after working hours. Employees take work home on the laptop so that they can work on the weekend to check their emails or finish an academic article.

These transitions make it clear that once-distinct and function-specific locations are now becoming increasingly interwoven. In this way, one can no longer speak of a fixed form with a separate 'inside' and 'outside'. Separated institutions are connected to one another so that they can subsequently function once again. Whereas Foucault talked about an internalized disciplinary view, Deleuze prefers to speak of a flexible control that works on the basis of 'modulation ... continually changing from one moment to the next' (1995, pp. 178–9). At the same time, it becomes clear that classic dichotomies such as 'public' and 'private' lose their meaning here. Power is no longer exerted primarily within forms of enclosure—the separate physical shells of the most important social institutions of modern society, such as schools, factories and prisons—but is superimposed through various forms of networks and an open-ended system of relatively decentralized 'smart' control, with Wi-Fi tracking, sound and traffic sensors, digital cameras with embedded capabilities (including people counting, detection of mood and walking patterns), the monitoring of internet content, and so on. Or, as Deleuze remarked in his lecture 'What is the creative act?': 'You don't confine

people with a highway. But by making highways, you multiply the means of control. I am not saying this is the only aim of highways, but people can travel infinitely and ‘freely’ without being confined while being perfectly controlled’ (2003, p. 300).

As panoptic dynamics of industrial capitalism have been disseminated and governed by the post-war information and communication infrastructure, surveillance by the use of smart technologies gets a whole new form and content. An important aim of these devices is making the future secure and certain by the exclusion or minimizing of potential risk factors (behavior, persons, objects, groups). On the basis of this orientation toward the future, smart security techniques, understood as the material dimension of control, are being applied worldwide to an ever-growing extent in our urban environment to create a risk-free environment without the danger of crime or disorder. A crucial element here is the category of ‘risk’ and it is essential to be more specific about the term. Risk is both an imaginary as well as a performative concept that creates its own reality. Risk and imagination share the characteristic that they bring into existence what is not there. Being inherently an imaginative and future-oriented concept, risk has enabled actuarial, pre-emptive and preventive forms of security governance (Pali & Schuilenburg, 2019). The sound sensors and digital cameras that track and monitor my journey to the Sparta Stadium are a fitting example here. These technologies have been implemented in very large numbers in public space and are connected into a centralized network, so that large quantities of collected data can be constantly analyzed for the purposes of prediction and prevention of risks, while—at the same time—the behavior of citizens is monitored and anticipated, and, where necessary, subjected to interventions.

The question becomes then: what type of interventions can we distinguish in a security society? In other words: What can we learn about our security society by approaching it in terms of forms of punishment?

Interventions: from exclusion to inclusion

The formation of a security society means in no way that the power of law and the power of discipline disappear. Practically speaking, control tends to be accompanied by forms of sovereign and disciplinary power, as my trip to the stadium of Sparta Rotterdam illustrates. This becomes evident when we look at the array of interventions we can attribute to the three distinguished forms of power: sovereign, disciplinary power

and control. While it is out of the scope of this chapter to make an exhaustive list of types of interventions, I focus in this paragraph on my personal example of my Sunday journey from home to the soccer game of Sparta Rotterdam.

Sovereign power

In the post 9/11 urban landscape, the governance of security clearly echoes a mere exclusive discourse, expressed by a growing tendency to remove everything that violates the social order of public space. The move towards ‘security-obsessed urbanism’ (Davis, 1992) becomes evident, on the one hand, in making parties other than the government responsible for security problems in public space, including mass private properties such as shopping centers and football stadiums. These parties, on the other hand, also apply various forms of punitive interventions, including banning orders (e.g. Collective Shop Ban and the Stadium Ban) by which offenders are denied access to different parts of the city and the corresponding local facilities. According to Foucault, the ‘power to banish’ was central to law enforcement, referring to the expulsion from any country, province or town by the authority of the state (by the judgment of a court or monarch). The etymology of the word holds certain surprises for our contemporary understanding as the term is closely linked to the Italian word ‘banditti’ or ‘bandito’, literally meaning an outlawed man or criminal who is banished from society at large. The Italian verb ‘bandire’ means ‘to banish or put to the ban’. Although shopkeepers and the security guards at the Sparta football stadium, for example, can be seen as ‘petty sovereigns’ or ‘quasi-kings’, refusing offenders access to these places, it may be more fitting here to speak of ‘selective exclusion’, as the latter term refers to the fact that there are all kinds of social and spatial divisions in the city that entail their own public and particular rules of behavior—creating fragmented security at micro-level in our urban environment (Schuilenburg, 2015a). In contrast to banishment, the emphasis by ‘selective exclusion’ lies not on the monopoly of the government, to implement punitive sanctions by means of the tools of public legislation, but on local security parties, which develop their own security program and refuse certain people access to distinct parts of urban space by giving football hooligans, for example, a Stadium Ban.

Disciplinary power

Alongside the power of individual human agents involved in the securitization of society, a common trend in Western cities is a kind

of disciplinary architecture, whose aim is to protect the public from unwanted behavior and undesirable people. The most well-known forms of this type of architecture are concrete barriers (obstacles, roadblocks) to prevent vehicle terror attacks, strips of spikes outside luxury houses, the use of ‘uncool’ classical music and opera at subway stations, neon pink lights at underpasses, and barrel-shaped benches (‘sadistic street furniture’) designed to deter young people and prevent certain groups from using them as a bed for the night, such as homeless people and beggars (Davis, 1992; Ferrell et al, 2008; Raymen, 2016). As crime and recidivism rates continued to rise throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these forms of ‘crime prevention through environmental design’ (Crowe, 2013) and their attempt to create a ‘defensible space’ (Newman, 1972) embedded themselves in the spatial environment, regulating indirectly the use made of public space by disciplining the behaviors within. The parallel between the Panopticon, in some sense the purest expression of the exercise of disciplinary techniques in the 18th century, as Foucault suggested in *Discipline and Punish*, and these objects in public space is obvious. The design of public space and the architecture of the prison are used to discipline the body and to encourage ‘proper’ conduct. In the case of the so-called bum-proof benches that I encountered during my journey to Sparta, this means: ‘Sitting yes, lying down no’. Although the design against unwanted behavior has been successful in reducing certain forms of criminality, for example burglary and shoplifting, the ‘designing out’ of unwanted people or unacceptable activities also has normative consequences that can scarcely be overestimated. The creation of sterile and homogenized environments leads to a different view on the function of public space and also put pressure on classical legal principles and social ideals. In sociological terms, for instance, public space is measured according to its openness and accessibility, inviting social mingling and chance encounters between people, without commercial motives or a profit-and-loss mentality being involved (Lofland, 1973; Sennett, 1977; Joseph, 1998). Although this sociological perspective on public space is an ideal-typical view, it stands in sharp contrast to the hostile and disciplinary architecture that aims to exclude certain uses, or certain groups of people, from using that space.

Control power

Much public space is designed in such a way that unexpected occurrences can be largely neutralized or prevented. In an attempt

to avoid or reduce risks and criminality, control techniques have been employed to identify likely targets and future criminals, such as facial recognition systems, advanced video monitoring and predictive policing. With enough ubiquitous surveillance, data and processing power, ‘the goal is to render the whole city—every place, every moment—knowable and controllable’ (Sadowski, 2019). Here, it is important to avoid confusion techniques of control and techniques of discipline, the latter described by Foucault as being methods concerned with the managing of individual bodies with the goal to make them productive, efficient, and obedient. The distinction lies in the fact that, due to their reflective nature, techniques of control explicitly point to the future, making it possible to predict crime and disorder and thus prevent them. In the case of predictive policing, it is possible to predict where, when and by whom crimes are more likely to be committed. In Chicago, for example, an algorithmically derived ‘heat list’ ranks people at risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of gun violence (e.g. Ferguson, 2017; Smith, 2018). The underlying assumption is that both crimes as criminal behavior are, to a large extent, predictable, because criminals with a distinguishable profile tend to commit the same type of crime, at roughly the same location and time of the day (Bennett Moses & Chan, 2016; Peeters & Schuilenburg, 2018). As a consequence, it is not the criminal but the future criminal who is the object of intervention. The implications of such developments are wide-ranging, especially considering that techniques of control no longer focus on the physical body of the individual. As Deleuze notes: ‘We’re no longer dealing with a duality of mass and individual. Individuals have become “*dividuals*”, and masses become samples, data, markets, or “*banks*”’. (1990, p. 180; see also Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 341, 483). This means that in our security society, the centrality of the physically embodied human subject is disappearing and is being substituted with data representations via techniques of control. As a consequence, the individual is the outcome of a process of collecting data and these data are used to target ‘risky’ persons who deviate from the expected and normal patterns.

Psychopower

On my afternoon trip from home to the soccer game of Sparta Rotterdam, I moved from one space of security to the next within no more than 25 minutes. In this way, I traveled through a rhizome of controls, in which diverse public and private parties are responsible

for the security of a part of the route to the stadium. What this example primarily shows is that in our urban environment there is a complex interplay of sovereign, disciplinary and control power. These forms of power operate distinctively through knowledge in the form of a range of security practices. At the same time, these practices employ technologies of surveillance, normalization, differentiation, categorization and calculation. Besides interventions such as (1) banning orders, (2) disciplinary architecture and (3) the filtering of potential (and not previously identified) suspects across very large data sets, I have pointed to another complex phenomenon: the navigation app on my iPhone that includes an ‘Avoid Dangerous Neighborhoods’ functionality. By means of which power relation does this app function?

Focusing on the way my behavior is organized and influenced by a variety of technical objects; there is a close connection here to what the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler called a psychopolitical perspective on the influence of technologies of control. In his work, Stiegler speaks of ‘psychopower’ (*psychopouvoir*) as ‘the systematic organization of the capture of attention made possible by the psychotechnologies that have developed with the radio (1920), with television (1950) and with digital technologies (1990), spreading all over the planet through various forms of networks, and resulting in a constant industrial canalization of attention’ (2006). Smart sensors and devices, for example, allow streetlights to dim or brighten automatically based on the activity on the streets, to ensure both efficiency and safety. At the same time, these sensors and devices help people to travel the most effective routes, avoiding noise and areas that have a high crime intensity. This is made possible by wearable technology like smart watches and smart glasses, wholly centered upon individual needs. In sharp contrast to Foucault’s notion of ‘bio-power’ (1998; 2008; 2009), which was above all a somatic matter, Stiegler considers psychopower not in terms of the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations by the state, but as the manipulation of our consciousness as a product of the economic marketplace.

As these sensors and devices take the step from tracking to shaping and intervening in behavior, Stiegler writes that ‘the state’s bio-power is transformed into market psychopower’ (2010, p. 128). Focusing on the way our behavior is organized and influenced by technical objects, there is a close connection here to what Deleuze called ‘societies of control’. In a control society, viewed through the lens of Stiegler (2014), power relations no longer mainly aim at disciplining the individual body, which deprives the individual of his or her freedom to choose, or at regulating life through institutions of the nation-state that monitor,

modify and control life processes, but at conditioning the psyche to stimulate consumption and at creating consumer subjects. To discuss the relation between control and our behavior, Stiegler writes: 'A control society does not only consist in the installation, throughout society, of social control, but rather penetrates into consciousness ... and thus reinstates corporate control' (2011, p. 82). In other words, the focus of attention needs to be shifted to the role of, what Stiegler terms, mnemotechniques or mnemotechnologies, from imaging to storytelling to writing to the digital database, which are currently being put into service by the industries of consumer capitalism. To be clear, for Stiegler, technology is not necessarily something bad that will alienate modern humanity. Following Jacques Derrida's (1992) suggestion, Stiegler characterizes the mnemotechnical system as a *pharmakon* in the sense that each gift can turn to poison (the German word for poison is *Gift*). In other words, mnemotechniques can 'support the emancipation and edification of the mind, but it can also be used to control the mind and keep it in a state of docility' (Van Camp, 2012).

Thus far, the potential and implications of psychopolitical power have remained an overlooked subject in the literature on the securitization of society. Contrary to classical interventions such as commands and banning orders, psychopolitical techniques, such as the navigation app on my smart phone which advises me to take the subway instead of the bus, are non-regulatory forms of power that aim to influence individuals to change their behavior through subtle and cost-effective changes in their environment, for example, traveling through a safer neighborhood. This means that the struggle for power and control in society is no longer associated with the population and its relationship to production but rather by the techniques of automated engineered behavior modification. In this context, scholars speak of 'hypernudges' (Yeung, 2017), drawing in algorithms and big data to nudge individuals to effectively change their lifestyle. It is important to underline that these psychopolitical techniques are not an amoral approach but a deeply normative way of governing security with the aim to create a safer environment for everyone. In our urban environment, there seems to be more freedom, but there is also more control, precisely because these psychopolitical techniques actively influence the mind of citizens to make 'smarter' choices. As a consequence, critics point out that these techniques raise a series of concerns related to their democratic legitimacy and accountability as behaviorally informed conditioning of the mind can enter into conflict with the principle of individual autonomy, that is, the ability to order our lives according to our decisions (Alemanno & Spina, 2014).

Conclusion

Security has become the preferred context of governance in our society, for which reason scholars such as Michel Foucault have begun to refer to our society as a ‘security society’. By governance, I refer not only the actions of the state but all efforts intended to guide the conduct of others (and ourselves). This means that security has become the interface of what is ‘seen and spoken about’ and everything that could have been ‘seen and spoken about’. In the words of Mark Neocleous, our ‘language and culture has become saturated by “security”’, in such a way that ‘the paradigm of (in)security has come to shape our imaginations and social being. Every day is Security Awareness Day’ (2008, pp. 2–3). The way security colonizes our legal and moral rules, ways of acting, practices and the language in which we communicate, is undisputedly a creation of power. But how? And which forms of power?

In order to answer questions about the kinds of relations of knowledge and power we face in our security society, I have discerned a four-fold typology of power: sovereign, disciplinary, control and psychopower. When these forms of power coincide with our present-day society—it unavoidably provokes critical questions. What causes the transition between these different forms of power at a certain moment? How are they related to one another, blend into one another and ultimately partially replace one another? Data-driven surveillance, for example, has roots in a *longue durée* history, which it is helpful to keep in view when attempting to periodize developments closer to the present. To the extent that the word ‘security’ comes from the Latin word *securitas*, which denotes a condition of being without care, free from cares and untroubled (*sē-cura*), and can be already found in the work of writers such as Cicero and Seneca, it is important to realize that it serves nowadays as an assemblage of a range of discourses and practices concerned with the governance of crime and disorder. In this way, our security society emerges, to paraphrase Deleuze, ‘like a series of “building blocks”, with gaps, traces and reactivations of former elements that survive under the new rules’ (1986, p. 30). This means that the discerned forms of power are not mutually exclusive; they are underpinned by the notion of security, which can be used to address different aspects of power relations.

This new situation is illustrated by the technique of predictive policing, arguably the biggest shift in the governance of security since the criminal justice system began accepting social science and other expert evidence more than a century ago. Predictive policing

is a consequence of increased technological opportunities, and of governmental efforts to pre-empt risks as opposed to merely responding to events by primarily repressive driven measures. In relation to the question of power, it can be argued that predictive policing is a form of state surveillance (*sovereign power*), which operates, however, through data-driven technologies that can track and monitor the behavior and movements of people (*control*). Therefore, in the security society there is no question of any substitution of sovereign power by disciplinary power and subsequently the replacement of a disciplinary society by a control or psychopolitical society. Rather, the security society is about a change of accent and the appearance of new objectives generating new forms of surveillance and punishments.

And the Sparta Rotterdam game? Well, Sparta lost for the third time in a row and were relegated to the second division.

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