Positive Criminology
Positive Criminology

Reflections on Care, Belonging and Security

Marc Schuilenburg, Ronald van Steden and
Brenda Oude Breuil (Eds.)
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*Marc Schuilenburg, Ronald van Steden and Brenda Oude Breuil*

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A Critique of Security. Towards a Positive Turn in Criminology

Marc Schuilenburg, Ronald van Steden and Brenda Oude Breuil

Introduction

Every academic discipline, with criminology no exception, is governed by certain images of thought that define the general content of scholarly work at a particular time and place. Images of thought precede academic practice and, in a sense, guide thinking in individual disciplines. Acting as a kind of presupposition, an image of thought underlies the logic of a scholarly field (Hayward and Schuilenburg 2014), with various expressions and content, but often taking the form of ‘everybody knows this […] everybody recognizes this […] nobody can deny it’ (Deleuze 1994: 129-131). An image of thought constructs the common sense of a field among its scholars and practitioners. However, it would be a mistake to assume that dominant presuppositions are essentially conscious or outspoken. On the contrary, they operate on the level of the unconscious and ‘function all the more effectively in silence’ (Deleuze 1994: 167). There is simply little if any debate about this common sense.

The concept of a dominant image of thought relates to Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse, defined as ‘a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation’ (1972: 117), and ‘controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures’ (1981: 52). Like images of thought, discourses define the ways in which the reasonable has been demarcated from the unreasonable, the true from the false, and the intelligible from the unintelligible. By way of example, Foucault refers in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France to Gregor Mendel, the father of genetics, who spoke the ‘truth’ with respect to the process of inheritance, but did not fit ‘within the “true” of the biological discourse’ (1981: 61) of the 19th century.

Certain images of thought therefore gain dominance over other presuppositions, and this becomes apparent when we consider the rise of a ‘security complex’ in contemporary Western nations. This security complex entails a set of practices and discourses, implicating hybrid connections between governmental and non-governmental parties, and is underpinned by a repertoire of techniques and knowledges, which adds new layers to a longer established ‘punitive turn’ (see: Bottoms 1995; Garland 2001; Pratt et al. 2005; Tonry 2007) through a focus on the prevention and reduction of risk for one another and for society as a whole. In the post 9/11 landscape, this new way of thinking has increasingly shaped government policies and organizational practices in Western countries.
Well-known examples are the development of ‘post-panoptic’ forms of control, new technology surveillance of electronic communication (emails, mobile phone calls, social media), practices of risk management of criminals as well as ‘pre-crime’ risk management of non-criminals, the security-centred design of public and private space, not to mention the growth of private transnational security companies offering all kinds of ‘outsourced’ policing, security, design, bureaucratic, risk-management and military functions.

The obsession with security has also trickled down the academic discipline of criminology. While criminology is a field marked by a variety of theoretical viewpoints and assumptions, many of its current debates revolve around the promises of security policies – a tendency at its most visible in dominant criminological theories, such as ‘routine activity’ theory (Cohen and Felson 1979) and ‘broken windows’ theory (Kelling and Coles 1996; Wilson and Kelling 1982).

We might even posit that criminology as an academic discipline has been taken hostage by those who call for a greater number of earlier and more decisive interventions, justified by a ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric peppered with negative terms like ‘fighting’, ‘combating’, ‘tackling’, ‘controlling’, ‘punishing’ and ‘preventing’. As such, criminology finds itself acting as the handmaiden of an unquestioned, technical, administrative narrative that takes the pervasiveness of risk, danger and insecurity for granted.

MISSING OUT ON FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

Criminology, we argue in this book, has fallen under the spell of thinking negatively about safety and security. It is bewitched by policy that tackles crime and disorder through merely preventive and repressive actions. Other, more positive, constitutive discourses about safety and security have generally gone out of fashion. As Ian Loader and Richard Sparks note, the bare fact that criminology is a booming business

‘has coincided with, may even been an effect of, the rising prominence of crime within the mundane culture and political programmes of a number of western societies, and the increasing drift towards more punitive solutions to crime and more intrusive approaches to security issues’ (2011: 11).

Different explanations are offered about why such intrusive responses to danger, risk, crime and insecurity have gained ground in contemporary society. In his seminal book *The Culture of Control* David Garland speaks of a ‘crime complex’ (and, more broadly speaking, a ‘security complex’), which has replaced the penal welfare complex. Garland relates this complex to wider socio-political processes of late modernity and strategies of adaptation, denial and acting out. The latter strategy resonates with retribution and denunciation and has emerged as a salient feature of political measures, which engage in ‘an expressive mode of action and which are constructed in ways that privilege public opinion over the views of criminal justice experts’ (2001: 142). In other words:
over the past three decades, ‘thinking about safety and security’ has been put in the hands of the proponents of ‘neo-conservatism’ and ‘right realism’ (Lea and Young 1994), who advocate tougher, enforcement and punishment-oriented solutions for crime and disorder.

This transformation is fuelled by the development of populist sentiments making us continuously aware of how unsafe we are and how insecure we feel. There are two diverging consequences that may nonetheless coexist. Either punitive/exclusionary measures serve a utopian desire to create a ‘safe new world’ (Boutellier 2013: 65), or we are conditioned to feel we live in a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1986) attended by a constant sense of danger and the need to be on our guard. As a result, it can be discerned that strategies of ‘governing behaviour through the power to punish’ (Simon 2007: 73) have drawn the penal system into the realm of everyday life. Citing examples like policies on domestic violence and governing crime in schools, Jonathan Simon argues that social areas like housing, health, education and employment/workfare are being reconfigured according to the logic of security thinking. Not only is the image of insecurity used to motivate a wide range of punitive and restrictive measures that have different disciplinary intentions, but also the ‘technologies, discourses, and metaphors of crime and criminal justice’ (2007: 4) are more manifest and topical in diverse fields of life than ever before.

Understanding the security complex as a way of managing the poor in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and ghettos in big cities, Loïc Wacquant sees risk management and penal powers emerging under the auspices of a ‘neoliberal project that can be indifferently embraced by politicians of the Right or the Left’ (2010: 209). By describing neoliberalism as a quintessentially political project going beyond ideological demarcations, he stresses that freedom is expanded for those with high incomes, privileges and wealth, while at the other end

’an intrusive and omnipresent punitive apparatus is anchored by a carceral-assistential complex which carries out its mission to surveil, train and neutralise the populations recalcitrant or superfluous to the new economic and racial regime’ (2001: 97).

Against this backdrop, a basic question arises. In spite of David Garland’s and Richard Sparks’ (2000) argument that traditional divisions between policy-oriented research and fundamental research are no longer tenable, we believe that, as far as the academic debate on security is concerned, criminology is strongly influenced by the former approach at the expense of fundamental, critical and inventive ways of exploring and questioning the concept of security. What are the consequences of relying solely on an applied criminology geared towards regulation and control policies, rather than on a critical and reflexive perspective?

An obvious answer is both theoretical and practical: in refraining from asking far-reaching questions about the current state of affairs, including the consequences of crime and disorder policy, the problem arises of constructing security practices founded on the wrong presumptions. What is more, applied criminological research generally ignores current hegemonic power relations
in the discourses and tasks of security, whether public or private. Such practices and power distributions are often taken for granted, while criminological analysis only addresses the diverging opinions, perspectives and realities to a limited degree.

**The need for critique**

If a negative image of security haunts contemporary criminology, this book takes up the challenge of critically questioning its discourses and practices. The following starting point informs our basic arguments: commonly understood negative approaches to safety and security are in need of a thoroughgoing rethink. Regardless of how obvious it may seem, academics seem to have forgotten that the idea of security not only refers to ‘crime’, ‘punishment’ and ‘control’, but is also determined by notions of ‘trust’, ‘care’ and ‘belonging’ (Boers et al. 2008; Schuilenburg 2015: ch. 10; Van Steden et al. 2010). These notions are not dependent on a rationale for harsher punishment and defensive measures. On the contrary, they appear in more positively inflected debates, which, for example, stress the importance of collective feelings of solidarity and active citizen involvement in neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, we hasten to say that the definition of security as the protection of citizens against crime and disorder must not be rejected out of hand. Without a minimum level of security, life might indeed be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes 2008).\(^2\) It is not without reason that in Abraham Maslow’s famous ‘hierarchy of needs’ (1943), security – and, more broadly, safety – directly follows after basic human needs such as breathing, food and sleep.

At the same time, however, we feel increasingly uncomfortable about the dominance of current negative – control and risk-oriented – approaches to (in)security and crime. Such negative narratives have been associated with increasing segregation, poverty and isolation in Western cities (e.g. Low 2003; Wacquant 2009; Young 1999), and the intensification of surveillance in our everyday lives. And even if there are legitimate reasons to arrest and sanction offenders, Jonathan Simon quite rightly states that the current hegemonic logic of security thinking ‘is exhausting our social capital and repressing our capacity for innovation’ (2007: 6). Governing through crime (or, being more precise, governing through risk and danger) cannot make us more secure. Rather, it fuels a negative culture of fear and control and leads to dismissal of important ethical facets of security in community, civil and democratic practices.

Harvey Molotch is critical of the way our anxieties about public safety and security have been translated into command-and-control procedures in the absence of hard evidence that such practices are really effective. He emphasises that ‘we need a massive bias away from remedies of control and punishment’ (2012: 194) and instead towards a greater reliance on our human capacity to help one another. Despite such inspiring contributions to debates arising from ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric, there is little clarity among critics on what shape future analyses in the field of criminology should take. It appears curiously difficult to provide...
alternative images of thought, which open up our thinking about crime and disorder by offering a fresh set of values and practices surrounding security. This observation brings us to the goal of our book. Although a fair amount of ambiguity exists about how to define the concepts ‘criticism’ and ‘critique’ – the difference between these concepts has never become firmly established in English usage – the term ‘criticism’ is normally regarded as a negative attitude towards the object being criticised. A telling example is the recently published book *Anti-Security* in which Mark Neocleous and George Rigakos argue that we need to ‘stand against the securitisation of discourse and challenge the authoritarian and reactionary nature of security’ (2011: 21). Although the dialectics of ‘anti-security’ do serve as a welcome signal that other and better worlds are still possible, the crucial point is that such criticism fails to create new lines of flight in criminology. It leaves open the question of how we can overcome today’s common sense that security is all about warding off danger, dealing with risk, or fighting crime.

In contrast to negative criminological terminology of *de-*-, *anti-*-, *against* and *non-*-, we advance the importance of critique, a term derived from the Greek *krinein*. This concept goes well beyond a negative – critical – judgment of security by seeking unorthodox practices of thought:

‘it transforms the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over [*franchissement*]’ (Foucault 1997: 315; see also: Butler 2002).

Critique can thus be taken as a positive and creative process, a way of challenging obviousness and common sense. It reminds us that things do not have to stay the way they are. Following from this, we pose the question of what alternatives to contemporary processes of securitisation and criminalisation can be imagined when starting from a constitutive critique of security. In other words: which theoretical and empirical resources support and inspire more positive notions of security?

**A positive turn**

Picking up from Jock Young’s (2011) plea for a ‘criminological imagination’ – modelled after C. Wright Mills’s (1959) call for a ‘sociological imagination’ half a century earlier – we endeavour to think beyond the hegemonic academic and public security discourse, not so much by totally refuting this discourse but rather by imagining alternative images and interpretations of security, not often heard, or even silenced for the sake of a consistent (and, for many institutional actors, profitable) worldview. Imagination and the act of imagining new images of thought – here attuned to the concept of ‘security’ – can be transgressive and renewing in itself. Social imaginaries, Charles Taylor (2004) writes, allow for shared perspectives and can invite shared courses of action. This is ever more the case in late modernity, with communication and transport technologies that
allow us to share our imaginations far beyond the borders of traditional face-to-face communities.

The act of imagining and re-imagining security, and sharing such imaginations widely can be democratising, engaging, and might even, eventually, turn out to be liberating. Howard Becker’s (1963) plea for criminologists to add the voices of the less powerful to the academic debate is valid here – ever more so as those less powerful actors may be those most affected by security policies. We therefore return to our earlier assertion that subtle but important positive aspects regarding the usage of the figure ‘security’ are commonly left out of negatively imbued criminological deliberations and reflections. We are, so to speak, in need of a ‘positive turn’ towards security.

With this in mind, we would propose a promising transgression, which nonetheless has a long criminological tradition, in the search beyond ‘classical’ criminology for alternative notions as proposed in other academic disciplines. If we begin by looking at the etymology of the word ‘security’, for example, we find that a negative interpretation of the concept is limited at least. The Dutch word for security [veiligheid] is etymologically closely linked to the word velich in Old German and felig in Old Frisian, words that have connotations with what is now called ‘trust’, ‘being beloved’ and ‘friendliness’ (Van Zuijlen 2008). In addition, we may think of a range of concepts that can further colour connotations as love, friendship and liberty. This is all the more clear when we look at cultural-anthropological notions like ‘home’, ‘belonging’, and (transnational) ‘community-building’ as a way to resist hegemonic and negative meanings of security.

Making a plea for a ‘positive turn’ in criminology, this book consists of two parts. The first part is inspired by theoretical imaginations of security. It transgresses the limits of the current security debate by exploring positive notions of security that are partly ‘borrowed’ from other disciplines (such as ecology, philosophy, architecture, sociology and political science) and adapted to criminological reality. The second part of the book proposes alternative imaginaries of security by working ‘bottom-up’, from the sticky reality of ordinary people’s everyday lives and experiences. The studies presented in this part are based on empirical and ethnographic research, and should be regarded as attempts to make the idea of a ‘positive criminology’ more concrete. With this we hope to show, in the words of Niklas Luhmannn, ‘what one can construct and how far sensitivities let themselves unfold when one starts from here and not there’ (1997: 1095).
References


Notes

1 There are, of course, exceptions to this observation. Social disorganisation theorists, for example, have placed much emphasis on neighbourhood ecological and community structural characteristics as critical causal factors of crime and fear of crime among citizens (Sampson and Raudenbusch 1999; Sampson et al. 1997). The policy imperative, in their view, must therefore focus on rebuilding communities instead of unleashing zero-tolerance interventions to remove high levels of crime and disorder in an urban area.

2 The ambivalences haunting today’s desire for protection and reassurance highlight the fact that ‘being safe’ and ‘taking risks’ are closely intertwined. Securing safety and taking risks are two sides of the same coin. Aaron Wildavsky (1991) has captured this insight in what he terms the ‘joggers dilemma’. On the one hand, the risk of a heart attack is greater during the time devoted to the exercise. On the other hand, at all other times the body is safer. Put differently, ‘you cannot have the one – a safer organism – without the other – expanding resilience by allowing to face risks’ (1991:14).

3 The work of the Dutch scholar Louk Hulsman and his associates (Hulsman and Bernat de Céllis 1982) is the best example in the history of criminology that presented a radical new image of thought about the issue of safety and security. Hulsman was one of the founding fathers of ‘abolitionism’, a movement based on the belief that an important way to overcome the serious failures and drawbacks of the criminal justice system is to abolish the language of crime.
Theoretical Part
Positive Security.  
A Theoretical Framework

Marc Schuilenburg and Ronald van Steden

INTRODUCTION

Criminologists can be accused of contributing in their work to a merely negative concept of security. Criminology traditionally refers to security as protection against danger in the form of crime and nuisance (see, for example: Manunta 1999; Zedner 2003a). In addition, commonly used words like ‘fighting’, ‘combating’, ‘tackling’, ‘controlling’, and ‘preventing’ reflect a broad and powerful negative framework, that is chiefly connected with the apparatus of government, or more specifically the police. In this respect, Michel Foucault speaks of a juridical-political form of power, delineated by a ‘juridical sovereignty and the institution of the state’ (2003: 34; 1980: 102). Given the use of a strong juridical, contractual model in their work, Foucault identifies Thomas Hobbes and Cesare Beccaria as seminal thinkers in the tradition of state-centred security provision. He even speaks of ‘the Beccarian dynamic’ (2003:129) with respect to the punitive power of the law and sees crime control and its associated rhetoric and techniques as a ‘negative’ penal power (‘power over’). The juridical-political discourse reached its peak in the 16th century with a sovereign monarch having power over life and death. Although accentuation and priorities in our modern-day society have shifted, several aspects of this juridical conception of power are still central to the criminological concept of security, with the state depicted as a modern Leviathan focusing on combating ‘all imaginable sources of harm’ (Ericson 2007: 35; Hallsworth and Lea 2011). As a consequence, the associated ‘law-and-order’ politics has become an attractive option for the state to maintain public order and security (Garland 2001). However, the danger of such a disposition is that we are no longer able to think and act other than in terms of security measures (cf. Ericson 2007). Moreover, ‘too much security’ (Zedner 2003b) generates ‘fortification’ (Low 2003), ‘marginalisation’ (Wacquant 2008) and ‘social exclusion’ (Young 1999). These consequences, together with the paradox of crime rates falling while feelings of insecurity remain high, induce us to reconsider the negative concept of security, including its laws, institutions and practices (symbols, rituals and performances). What are imaginable positive interpretations of security?

Our aim in this chapter is to show that security is of necessity a twofold concept. An exclusive focus on fighting or preventing crime and nuisance results in scarce attention being paid to aspects of security that invoke connotations
like trust, care or well-being. Security should therefore be understood not only in a ‘narrow’ or ‘negative’ way (e.g., in terms of protection against something or somebody) but should also be interpreted in more positive or constitutive ways, focusing on human connections and local capacity building as sources of security (‘power to’). As such, this chapter proposes an alternative approach to ‘law-and-order’ politics and the growing ‘anti-security’ critique (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011) that opens up no obvious avenues towards a new way of discussing the concept of security. To accomplish a positive concept of security, we discuss three discourses that are ‘excluded’ from a juridical-political form of power (Foucault 1981): a social-biological, an anarchic and a religious discourse. We believe that these discourses provide key concepts – (1) human connectedness, (2) local capacity building and (3) a spiritual order – for a more nuanced understanding of security.

Social-biological discourse: human connectedness

A dominant hypothesis in the juridical-political discourse is the idea that public order is brought about by concluding a social contract that ends the natural and violent state of nature. Cesare Beccaria (1963) and Thomas Hobbes (2008) assume that humans in their – hypothetical – natural state unleash their animal passions on each other out of fear and enmity. The most rational thing to do, therefore, is to bury the hatchet and give up individual freedom by way of a social contract in exchange for a sovereign who maintains order. A parallel view of man is found in theories of aggressive and social Darwinism. People, in the words of Herbert Spencer’s *The Principles of Biology* (1864), live their lives as a ‘survival of the fittest’. According to this perspective, it is self-evident that only those who persevere – the fighters, the smart and the strong – will conquer. Caring for those who lag behind would degrade a society. Anyone who is not ‘fit’ enough is thus soon regarded as weak, lazy and ultimately not worth the trouble.

Several authors contest the idea that humans are antisocial beings who are unwilling to coexist with others and therefore ignite a war of ‘all against all’. They argue that positive emotions like altruism and empathy have been profoundly neglected in social science. Human beings do not fight each other ‘by nature’ since altruism and empathy are deeply embedded in evolutionary processes. This is not a sign of weakness or of being ‘soft’. On the contrary, altruism and empathy are driven by pure necessity. According to the Dutch primatologist Frans de Waal, ‘the ability to function in a group and build a support network [is] a crucial survival skill’ (2009: 33). It follows, then, that security has an important social component. A person cannot be safe alone; he needs the protection of others. ‘Security’, De Waal writes, ‘is the first and foremost reason for social life’ (2009: 20). By this he means that living together (the formation of society) precedes security. People are group animals, who need each other to protect themselves against dangers and threats. The more close-knit the group is, the less vulnerable are its members. Frans de Waal acknowledges that groups
are capable of waging war under certain circumstances, but hastens to add that supportive relationships and mutual assistance are fundamental to surviving with each other. For that reason it is a ‘macho myth’ to think ‘that we can treat the planet any way we want, that humanity will be waging war forever, and that individual freedom takes precedence over community’ (2009: 25).

On the level of human relations, De Waal’s insights, based on biological field-work, question the view of man as an individual source of purpose and power: ‘too many economists and politicians model human society on the perpetual struggle they believe exists in nature’ (2009: 7). Francis Fukuyama (2011), in his book about the origins of social and political connections, refers to De Waal and several other biological and psychological publications to validate his claim that people have never been atomist individuals but instead stem from small – tribal – communities sharing a common language and religion, and engendering loyalty, mutual assistance and protection. Although people may indeed act rationally and selfishly, and fight each other under certain circumstances, community and cooperation are dominant in evolutionary processes. Fukuyama therefore opposes Hobbes’ hypothesis of a violent state of nature by arguing that

‘everything that modern biology and anthropology tell us about the state of nature suggests the opposite: there was never a period in human evolution when human beings existed as isolated individuals; the primate precursors of human species had already developed extensive social, and indeed political, skills; and the human brain is hardwired with faculties that facilitate many forms of social cooperation’ (2011: 30).

And even though Steven Pinker warns that ‘empathy is too parochial to serve as a force for a universal consideration of people’s interests’ (2011: 591), he also rejects the ideas of a necessarily evil and a violent human nature. According to Pinker, moral sentiments such as sympathy, trust, gratitude and guilt have impelled us towards morality, peace and fairness. In overall terms, despite all the cruelty and bloodshed around us, war, terrorism, crime, torture, slavery and other barbaric practices have been on the decrease over the course of human history.

According to authors like Frans de Waal, Francis Fukuyama and Steven Pinker, it would be nonsense to deny the existence of positively interested forms of human interaction. Nonetheless, the juridical-political discourse is strongly based on a way of thinking in which the invidious position of human beings in the natural state of war determines the basis for the authority of the state to maintain public order and security. The constitutive element in that discourse is the moment at which the individual gives up his freedom, or any part of it, to a person or to an institution, in exchange for protection. Although this view is one of the cornerstones of a democratic society, the affective side of security referred to above plays little or no part in the juridical model. Hence, a purely juridical view is one-sided. It overlooks the fact that security relates not only to regulating the behaviour of individual citizens, but is also present ‘in’ the social
relations that have bound people together since the origins of mankind. This insight opens the door to an anarchic discourse that radicalizes the importance of human connections and local capacity building as sources of security to an extent that seriously questions the legitimacy of the state.

**Anarchic discourse: local capacity building**

The juridical-political discourse generally defines the anarchist body of thought in a negative manner. Elements pointing to a society without government and without set standards or legal rules are associated with 'disorder' and 'chaos' (Rimke 2011). Images of immorality and lawlessness are conjured up in support of the idea that a society without a state will lead to a total war in which the right of the strongest will prevail. This idea is underpinned by reference to the works of authors such as Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, in which any form of authority, from social contract to the law, is rejected. According to Mikhail Bakunin, ‘we reject all legislation, all authority, and all privileged, licensed, official, and legal influence, even though arising from universal suffrage’ (1970: 35). To him, the state equals ‘authority, force on display, infatuation with power’ (1973: 152). Peter Kropotkin also associates the state with ‘injustice, oppression, and monopoly’ (1972: 67). Hence, according to anarchistic thinkers, criminal behaviour, which affects both objective and subjective security, is to a great extent a consequence of the state’s power: criminals are ‘the involuntary products of the present organization of society’ (Bakunin 1973: 168). In other words, criminal behaviour is a reaction to a society in which wealth and property are defining elements. In such a world, the legal system both enhances and maintains social inequality: ‘The law is literally the origin of crime; it defines all crimes, inventing new categories from time to time and dropping others’ (Kropotkin 1975: xvii).

As a result, anarchy, in mainstream juridical discourse, is mainly presented as a counterculture. This is the case for example with how Occupy, a global protest movement driven by people’s discontent with social and economic inequality, and their fight for a more equal distribution of wealth, has been portrayed. From this perspective, anarchism is a utopian and dangerous ideal given that a state remains necessary to protect the weak from the strong, and to ensure that we do not revert to a war of all against all. That criticism is admittedly not entirely without merit. Mark Neocleous, for instance, calls for violence to combat a repressive state that, under the pretext of security, maintains a permanent state of emergency (with Guantánamo Bay the archotypical example). As he puts it: ‘We should be aiming to bring about a real state of emergency. And this is a task that requires violence, not the rule of law’ (2006: 209). Revolution and lawlessness linger in the air…

An anarchist plea for a society without a coercive state authority need not end in violence, however. Several anarchist authors do not reject ‘security’ as a public good. They simply believe that the delivery of security is not a matter for the state. Security is also possible without a state monopoly on power, without
the presence of a government. Peter Kropotkin writes in this regard that ‘a new form of political organization [...] will have to be more popular, more decentralised, and near to the folknote self-government than representative government can ever be’ (1975: 85-86, 87). According to these authors, statutory law is too general because on the one hand it does not distinguish between different communities, while on the other hand it ignores individual differences between people within a community. Moreover, statutory law is external and unaware of the knowledge that members of a community have of each other’s opinions and ideas. In an anarchist society, security should specifically be ‘from the bottom upwards’ (Bakunin 1973: 176) – that is, without the interference of the state or through statutory laws.

This does not mean that there are no forms of regulation in an anarchist society for resolving individual conflicts. Although it is difficult to determine whether the terms used are meant to be literal or metaphorical, matters such as penalties, courts and laws are certainly being discussed. Mikhail Bakunin writes about an anarchist society with ‘judges, laws, courts and parliaments’ (1973: 64-93). With respect to the judiciary, he supports a ‘direct election of all public officials, both civil and judicial, as well as of all national, provincial and community councillors or representatives, by popular vote’ (1973: 66). William Godwin, too, advocates resolving conflicts through temporary and local juries: ‘It might then be sufficient for juries to recommend a certain mode of adjusting controversies, without assuming the prerogative of dictating that adjustment. It might then be sufficient for them to invite offenders to forsake their errors’ (2001: 401). As a matter of fact, his recommendations have inspired contemporary experiments with restorative justice.

Despite the difference of the above approaches to the forming of what Peter Kropotkin calls a ‘new basis of life’ (1975: 89), the common denominator in anarchist literature is that solving security problems should not be the exclusive right of the state, but should be embedded in local approaches to protection and conflict resolution. In this way, the provision of security stems from the idea of a community governing itself. Personal responsibilities, as such, are linked to a form of self-government and to people’s active involvement in the environment they live in, without that responsibility being transferred to an overarching legal power. Rather than being imposed from above through political state power and regulation through legislation, the anarchist discourse maintains that security has its natural basis in communities formed at the local level.

**Religious discourse: a spiritual order**

The juridical conception of security also dismisses a religious model of society that was dominant in Europe until the early 18th century. Arguments as to why religious views are less explicitly expressed in the juridical discourse can be found in the fact ‘that only the laws can decree punishments for crimes’ (Beccaria 1963: 13). It is generally assumed that legal principles such as the principle of legality, whereby all punishment must be based on clearly formulated laws and
not on a divine legitimacy, were first advocated in such passages on state power. Another view central to the juridical-political discourse is the image of man as *homo economicus* – that is, the assumption that people choose the behaviour that generates the highest net benefit for them personally. In this deterministic model, as found in the work of Thomas Hobbes and Cesare Beccaria, criminality is seen as a personal choice of the offender. As a result, when seeking to prevent and combat crime, emphasis is placed on the threat of punishment by the state. This goes against the Christian image of man as sinful and prone to evil, with punishment viewed as a purifying penance.

Although criminological research continues to be conducted into the effects of religion, faith and morality on crime (see, for example: Baier and Wright 2001; Boutellier 2000; Hirschi and Stark 1969; Topali et al. 2013), the juridical-political model is generally seen as showing little if any appreciation of the possibility that a belief in God may have a positive impact on feelings of security. Quite the reverse: if religion creates islands of security in a world full of risks, threats and dangers, this may give rise to fundamentalism and nationalism, violent or otherwise, which will only worsen the security situation. However, such a discourse overlooks the point that religion, especially in times of worldwide socio-economic change and insecurity, may also be an ‘anxiety-coping’ mechanism (Karner and Aldridge 2004: 23) because it opens up sources for assigning meaning, solidarity and community formation. Faith, in essence, is more than a doctrine. Believing is connected to what gives people a sense of belonging and life energy.

Following from this, religion may contribute to a shared identity serving as a counterweight to ontological or existential insecurities associated with processes of modernisation (Kinnvall 2004) and may offer people tools to deal with ‘the limits of life’ (Van Harskamp 2008: 10) – accidents, disease, death – that transcend us because we have no influence over them: ‘Religiosity delivers tools which help in dealing with uncertainties and existential insecurities concerning the self’ (Van Harskamp 2008: 18). A religious discourse thus teaches us that, in addition to their destructive sides, faith and belief also have an often-overlooked constructive significance for building trust and security among people. The concept of security (*securitas* in Latin) even has strong religious undertones, which have been totally neglected in contemporary criminological literature. These religious undertones become apparent if we start to realise that *securitas*, in its political-juridical form, dates back only to the rise of modern states in the 16th and 17th centuries. Before that time security mostly referred to ‘pax’ (peace): a ‘spiritual order’ offering justice, tranquillity and stability to people and society alike (Conze 1984). Moreover, as Andrea Schrimm-Heins (1991; 1992) has vividly shown, *securitas* finds itself in good company of the twin-concept *certitudo* (certitude, certainty), an expression used by Saint Augustine and much later in history by Martin Luther as an alternative way for people to attain salvation. The first way, that of *securitas*, brings salvation within people’s reach if they abide by the rules and thus ‘deserve’ salvation. Luther considered the *securitas* road to salvation illusory. He held that, as a matter of principle, people have no
control over their own life and destination; they can only imagine that they do. As John Hamilton notes,

‘in strictly theological matters […] an individual’s inner sense of security should be disparaged as a sinful disposition, insofar as it breeded self-confidence and idleness, causing one to forget humility, relax self-vigilance, and neglect attentive study of scripture’ (2013: 191).

On the other hand, there is the salvation of certitudo ‘provided by the external authority of the Bible’ (Gregersen 2004: 28). This salvation, according to Martin Luther, is not illusory. Where the first possibility provides only an imaginary security, the second offers real security. But the latter applies only to people willing to take the risk of making their salvation dependent on the benevolence of God.

Luther’s plea ties in with a deep human need to seek purpose, connectedness and trust on the basis of experience that ‘the world [is] not a given, but a gift’ (Gregersen 2004: 26). This takes courage and faith, since it is not known in advance whether your contribution to society will be appreciated. After all ‘by revealing oneself to the other, one is exposed to the risks of both negligence and not being accepted’ (Gregersen 2003: 371). Against this background, it should be noted that securitas and certitudo are not diametrically opposed. Blind faith can be naïve, and even reckless. Laws and regulations, too, remain vital as safeguards of the social order. Most importantly, however, a religious discourse on security should prompt some reflection – one hundred per cent security is an illusion: life means taking risks, people can be idle and bad behaviour is all too human – and brings about some degree of relaxation in social relationships. It may serve as a counterweight to a narrow juridical-political discourse that could lead over time to a ‘sacralisation of security’ (Arends 2008: 277). The danger of such a disposition is that we are no longer able to think and act other than in negative terms of control measures (cf. Ericson 2007; Garland 2001).

A POSITIVE SENSE OF SECURITY

We have discussed three discourses that have no primacy in, or are even excluded from, the juridical-political discourse. The debate within these discourses, with varying positions being adopted, is of course far more detailed than we can present here. Nevertheless, a positive concept of security emerges from these discourses that does not necessarily place the central focus on combating crime and taking precautionary measures to prevent ‘evil’. In our view there are at least three alternative readings of security – human connectedness, local capacity building and a spiritual order – that illustrate the importance of positive security. These readings are appropriate because they raise a problem that has captivated the minds of many people over the centuries: how to shape security from bottom up?
It follows from the above that a positive sense of security requires attention for human beings’ affective level. People desire to establish connections to someone or something and to feel at home somewhere. Walter Goldschmidt calls this ‘affect hunger’, meaning ‘the urge to get expressions of affection from others’ (2006: 47), by which he emphasises that the need to strive for social connections is as strong as filling the stomach. Such social connections need not necessarily be very close. A defining condition for feelings of security is that people feel at ease and experience acknowledgement and recognition. People yearn for what is referred to as a sense of belonging: ‘a feeling that members matter to one another and to the group, and the faith that members’ needs will be met through their commitment to be together’ (Chavis et al. 1986: 25-26). In a ‘liquid world’, to use a term of Zygmunt Bauman (2000), this desire is strengthened because nation, family, language or religion no longer determine one’s identity. Especially in a time of blurring boundaries, ‘local social interaction and the familiar landmarks of the neighbourhood may take on greater significance as sources of comfort and security’ (Forrest and Kearns 2001: 2129).

The importance of interactions should not be taken to mean a plea for annoying meddlesomeness. Recognizable interactions appear mainly as a natural product or by-product of attempts to stimulate convivial and predictable behaviour in the anonymous urban domain (Hinchliffe and Whatmore 2006). Brief encounters that give people a sense of familiarity will have a positive influence on their sense of security. ‘Public familiarity’ thus contributes to ‘a sense of home and safety instead of distance and fear’ (Binken and Blokland 2012: 297). Conversely, people who withdraw from the public domain achieve the opposite. Using empirical research, cultural anthropologist Sally Engle Merry observed that

‘unlike those who adopt offensive strategies, who carry their protective armour around with them, the defensive residents are vulnerable any time they leave their homes. [...] Those who adopt defensive postures rarely know who the street youth are, nor are they skilled in identifying those categories of persons and places that are likely to be dangerous. [...] Those relying on defensive strategies are more frightened, I believe, since they have far less sense of control over their environment’ (1981: 194-95).

An interesting aspect here is that an emotional connection is expressed in an approach involving going on the offensive – assuming an open attitude, focusing on a community (the neighbourhood) and making social contacts. In this way, people familiarize themselves with a spatial environment, which potentially results in a positive sense of security and public safety. People who belong to a group feel at ease and are usually less vulnerable.

An important observation in this regard is that it is easier for people to attain their collective interests and objectives if they are part of a group (cf. Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000). However, for people to act, it is not solely a matter of the societal potential of their social networks, but also of the specific tasks and
actions that stem from their bonds and shared expectations. Robert Sampson and his colleagues (1999) come up with the example of neighbourhoods with a long history of crime and explain their findings by referring to poor ‘collective resilience’. The best way to turn the tide is to invest in mutual trust. As Sampson states, ‘the willingness of local residents to intervene for the common good depends in large part on conditions of mutual trust and solidarity among neighbours’ (1997: 919). Although the presence of government and other professionals in such situations may be essential (cf. Loader and Walker 2007), this approach places the primacy for security on the members of a group themselves. Assuming affective connections within a group, trust – and closely connected, faith – are vital, but undervalued, characteristics of security. Trust is the uniting factor that arises outside the control of the state and the law and can be used to trace positive conceptions of security among people. The juridical-political discourse overlooks, or at least underestimates, the potential of positive security since it sees a community as a system of ‘thin’ contractual relations by mutual agreement (Crawford 2003). Creating security and generating a sense of security are then closely linked to the formal responsibility of the police for public order and control. Contracts and agreements may be terminated at any time, however, and do not build affective communities. Indeed, the opposite would seem to be the case: contracts and agreements are useful only if a broader community has been formed and a public spirit created. Therefore, the juridical discourse sounds hollow unless it can be grounded in dimensions of human connectedness, community building and the awareness of a spiritual order, all dimensions which elevate people above their mere self.

Concluding remarks

We have demonstrated that negatively perceived security – combating and fighting crime and nuisance – is too narrow to ensure a decent and dignified life for all. Security should therefore not be based on a narrow, legalistic view of conflict resolution, but should instead seek holistic embedding in more general views on the development of stable forms of human coexistence. Digging up such positive notions of security is relevant because they have received little attention to date in criminological literature. In that sense we could refer to a ‘juridical black hole’ in which the tie to a more positive view of security has been severed.

At the same time, the two forms of security – positive and negative – can never be totally separated from each other. There is no negative interpretation of security on the one hand, with emphasis on the law and the police, and on the other hand positive security that seeks its inspiration in human connections and mutual relationships. In reality, the two sides of security are always intertwined. Looking at security in this way goes well beyond seeing it purely in negative terms of crime and disorder. Instead, it substantiates it with a positive sense of social connectedness to the world in which we live.
References


Notes

1 The growing proportion of non-state actors in the delivery of security has attracted increasing attention from criminologists in recent years (see, for example: Crawford 2006; Shearing and Stenning 1981; 1983; Schuilenburg 2011; Van Steden 2007). Although this is an emerging research area, the most prominent authors argue that criminological thinking has predominantly remained focused on the position of the state and the police (Johnston and Shearing...

In this chapter the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative security’ are used in an ontological and normative manner. Although other authors use similar distinctions, they do so without attaching them to the same bases (see, for example: Berlin 1979; Foucault 1981; 1995; 1998). The negative form of power, for example, characterises only Foucault’s first steps in his studies into the effects of power. In his research following The Order of Discourse (1981), in which rules of power may still obstruct a discourse, power receives a more positive connotation in the sense that it creates or produces things: subjects, knowledge, truth, healthy bodies, and normalised individuals.

See also the work of Johan Galtung (1969), Bill McSweeney (1996) and Paul Roe (2007) on the double-sided – negative and positive – nature of peace and security in the field of International Relations.

Other discourses, too, demonstrate a more positive approach to security, with a good example being the concept of human security (Commission on Human Security 2003). In addition to various kinds of ‘hard’ security threats such as war, organised crime and terrorism, this concept also includes ‘softer’ themes such as economic prosperity, health care and sustainable development (Dahl-Eriksen 2007; Eriksen et al. 2010). However, given the broad range of areas encompassed by human security, critics – see Taylor Owen (2004) for a literature review – believe the human security concept is too ambiguous to provide a solid basis for formulating insightful theory and policy.

It is impossible to acknowledge all the authors who have engaged in the anarchist body of thought. The arguments we use in this article derive mainly from the works of Michael Bakunin, William Godwin, Peter Kropotkin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and are led by Kropotkin’s definition of anarchism: ‘The name given to a principle of theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government – harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the indefinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being’ (1975: 108).

Comparing their views of the social contract clarifies the difference between the juridical and anarchic discourse. In contrast to the juridical discourse, inter alia in the work of Cesare Beccaria and Thomas Hobbes, anarchist authors reject the social contract in which freedom is relinquished in exchange for the state’s provision of security. Mikhail Bakunin, for example, believes that the social contract proposed by philosophers like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau ‘overlooks society’, which he regards as ‘the natural mode of existence of people living together’ (1970: xi; see also: 1953: 165-167). Put differently, ‘Rousseau was sorely mistaken in his belief that primitive society was established by a free contract, effected by savages’ (Bakunin 1973: 136).

Mikhail Bakunin’s work in particular contains several passages in which he advocates ‘the abolition of the criminal and civil codes currently in force in Europe – because all of these, being equally inspired by the worship of God, State, family as a religious and political entity, and property, are contrary to human rights, and because only by liberty can the code of liberty be created’ (1973: 66; see also: 1953: 241).

For example, libertarian authors such as Robert Nozick (1974) advocate a minimal state that restricts itself to the protection of individual ownership rights. This basically means the state limiting itself to protecting citizens against violence, theft and fraud, and ensuring that contracts that have been concluded in a legally valid manner are observed. For Robert Nozick, however, security remains a public good.

A relevant remark here is Alan Ritter’s dispute with the juridical presumption that freedom is the anarchist movement’s main objective. ‘Communal individuality’, he states (1980: 26), ‘is a more important objective than freedom. Freedom is only the means to achieve the amalgamation of community and individuality’. In fact, from an anarchist’s point of view, the lives we are leading have become far too isolated. As Peter Kropotkin underlines, ‘our points of contact are too rare. […] Family life, based on the original community, has
disappeared’ (1975: 54). He therefore suggests to create a communal life ‘which is more intimately bound together’ (1975: 54), and where people join local communities to perform labour and exchange products. Such ‘voluntary, functional and small’ (Ward 1973: 138) groups can be formed through ‘conversation’ (Godwin), through ‘productive enterprise’ (Proudhon, Bakunin) or through another form of ‘cooperative association’, as in the case of Kropotkin’s ‘friendly neighbours’.

In this respect the juridical model resembles the anarchic discourse. The latter, however, sees religion mainly as superstition and a way to control people. Mikhail Bakunin, for example, writes that ‘rebellion is first of all directed against the supreme phantom of theology, against God’ (1973: 149).

An early Dutch publication on the relationships between religious moral standards and good behaviour, for example, found Roman Catholics to be far more criminal than Protestants (Nagel 1961). Various explanations for this have been sought, including the fact that Dutch Catholics in the 1950s lived mainly in the border area of the Netherlands, were relatively poor and were, therefore, more often involved in smuggling. More daring arguments have suggested that Catholicism contains a degenerative effect – the brightest and best behaved boys became pastors or priests without offspring – and that the ‘ease’ of confession and absolution means the individual conscience of Catholics is less developed.

This realisation prompted Jürgen Habermas to introduce the concept of the ‘post-secular society’ (2006: 4), by which he thinks that, despite secularisation and criticism of religion, religious convictions in society should be taken seriously. In other words: democratic principles of a ‘neutral’ public domain and security as a ‘public good’ should not be confused with banishing faith and religion from the public arena since ‘neutral’ means that all voices, including religious voices, must be accorded a place in society.
THINKING ABOUT SUSTAINABLE SECURITY. 
METAPHORS, PARADOXES AND IRONIES

Adam Crawford

INTRODUCTION

Security as a concept is especially susceptible to textual and figurative analysis as its meaning lies more in its usage than as something that can be defined in a philosophically pure or analytically contained way. You could say that ‘the meaning [of security, AC] lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not others’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). Security has symbolic salience and a self-referential quality but also a lived reality. In what follows, I wish to explore the concept of security through the use of various tropes, notably metaphors and analogies. My concern is not to pin down the essence of ‘security’ and display it in a decontextualized, ahistorical and reified box where its contours, coating and demarcations can be endlessly scrutinized, admired and critically reviewed, but rather to explore the terrain, topography, tropography and habitat that sustain it and over which it ranges. Extending this ecological metaphor, I go on to question the extent to which security practices are, or might be rendered, sustainable.

Metaphors are ‘master tropes’ that describe a subject by asserting that it resembles, on some point of comparison, another otherwise unrelated object (Manning 2012). Thus conceived, metaphors can serve as analytic devices that allow us to think about one thing in terms of another. They can be useful ways of highlighting the salience and illustrating distinctive features of a subject of investigation. They bring to our attention certain characteristics without ever fully capturing all of the qualities of the phenomenon itself. As used here, the metaphors deployed are designed to allow us to bring into sharp focus particular facets and properties of security (as well as the practices, technologies and mentalities to which they give rise) in order, to help clarify the internal dimensions of what has otherwise been described as a ‘vague and ambiguous’ concept (Gearty 2013: 1; Waldron 2010: 111). Rather like Claude Monet’s series of paintings of Rouen Cathedral, metaphors allow us to see the same object from differing perspectives, in different lights and under various conditions. Metaphoric thinking allows us to hold a multiplicity of points of view and, in so doing, to see the object – security – as partaking of distinctive qualities that should prick our awareness and inform our thinking. Nevertheless, metaphors have their limitations. They provide resemblance, but they do not provide explanations.
Furthermore, metaphors (especially where pushed too far) can introduce confusion.
In keeping with the theme of this book, the chapter will seek to contribute to a positive notion of security. It will do so by endeavouring to reclaim a reflexive conception of security from the growing and somewhat dystopian (and utopian) ‘anti-security’ critique (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011), whilst acknowledging the dangers and malign societal impacts of which this body of literature sagely warns us. In its place, a conception of security as distinctly social, tied to notions of justice and legitimacy that is attentive to its temporal implications and distributive consequences will be advanced. It sets out from the premise that an underpinning of security is an essential prerequisite for a stable economy and vibrant communal life, as well as for inter-subjective well-being and human flourishing. This socially sustainable foundation necessitates that governments, businesses and societies can better predict, prevent and mitigate threats to security but also requires the capacity of societies, communities and individuals to adapt and live confidently with risk. The chapter seeks to bring a greater focus to the ethical dimensions of security (across time and space) and the societal consequences of security practices as a framework, which can be used to enable and empower public policy and social interactions, rather than simply hinder them. It underscores the importance of ethical and cultural considerations in understanding insecurities and public attitudes to security concerns. Hence, the chapter begins to sketch out the normative conditions under which security policies and practices might become socially sustainable, in that they are legitimate and just, in ways that avoid generating malign social consequences and the erosion of other societal values or ethical principles.

The chapter is organised in two parts. The first outlines a number of metaphoric interpretations of security in contemporary discourse to highlight its ambivalent and ironic qualities. Particular attention is given to security’s evolving quality and social character as well as to its temporal and distributive dimensions. The purpose is to highlight the aggrandising and future oriented ramifications of securitising practices. The second section briefly explores the implications of the preceding discussions for how we might conceive of a conception of ‘sustainable security’ as a progressive and positive notion.

Part I: security as metaphor

**Liquid security**

Both literally and figuratively, security is on the move. As contemporary threats and challenges to social order have become more complex and interconnected, so too, the concept of security is no longer static but fluid; it is influenced by the interplay between a range of factors, fields and forces. Understanding the shifting meaning of security is closely connected to an appreciation of the evolving dynamics of and influences over its antonym – ‘insecurity’ (Crawford 2002; 2010). Insecurities change and mutate, new threats emerge and perceptions shift as to
what measures are ‘appropriate’ in responding to these developments. Social values, ethical principles, cultural norms and political sensibilities – which mediate security demands and responses – are subject to continuous challenge and change. Practices for dealing with security also evolve, as new technologies are fashioned and innovations spawned. In various forms, security is in perpetual motion. Security can thus be said to have a temporal and evolving dimension (to which we return later).

Borrowing from Zygmunt Bauman, Lucia Zedner (2006) develops the notion of ‘liquid security’, highlighting its fluid, transient and dispersed character. This is exemplified both in security’s (more recent) escape from the fixed and solid shackles which tied it to state-formation, nationhood and identity, and in the growing operation of the private security industry. The modern state was to be built on claiming and accumulating the legitimate monopoly of physical force. Consequently, both conceptually and de facto, the activities of non-state – commercial and civil society – institutions became sidelined. As Clifford Shearing (2006) has argued, state-centred thinking came to dominate the social sciences, subsequently blinding much analysis from understanding the governing capacities of diverse forms of non-state policing, security provision and ‘private government’. Security, thus, came to be seen not only as allied with the protection of state interests but also as a product of state activities.

However, recent decades have seen the exposure and erosion of the foundational ‘myth’ that the sovereign state is capable of delivering security and controlling crime within its territorial boundaries and in fact whether it ever did so (Garland 2001: 110). The resultant predicament for modern governments has been that recognition of their limited capacities to guarantee order and security – in the face of largely uncontrollable global flows of capital, goods, people and risks, as well as the stubborn influence of local social ordering for people’s safety – has politically high costs, given that political authority is so intrinsically tied to the state’s claim to being the effective provider of security. The interconnected nature of contemporary security risk and threats – extending beyond national territories – has both reinforced the limited competency of the nation-state alone to control the flows of crime and blurred the distinctions between external and internal security, as well as the roles of the institutions fashioned to ensure them – namely the Army and Police. In a ‘liquid’ modern world, borders and boundaries (both physical and conceptual) have become increasingly permeable (Bauman 2000). Global and local insecurities routinely inform and interact with each other. It is now widely recognised that, on the one hand, policing and security measures designed to prevent and manage international threats demand local intelligence and responses whilst, on the other hand, the experience and salience of neighbourhood safety is informed and influenced by international trends, conflicts and developments. Insecurities may have their origins in injustices and conflicts experienced both locally and/or far away, in other parts of the globe. Consequently, both the production and mitigation of new risks is said now to lie beyond the control of the traditional nation-state, such that national policies and state-centred political frameworks, on their own, are not capable of governing security without substantial international
co-operation and the involvement of private, voluntary and community level organisations. Some commentators highlight a ‘de-nationalisation’ of security, whereby networks of transnational elites increasingly define security threats and responses to them (Bigo 2013). But as Katja Franko Aas (2011) astutely notes, trans-border connections and transnational flows do not necessarily undermine, ‘hollow out’ or weaken nations but may be ways of achieving the goals of the national and result in transformations in various aspects of sovereignty or statehood. Rather, the global, national and local are increasingly enmeshed and integrated in ways that challenge conceptual categories and political suppositions.

The spiralling costs associated with state provided security have also increasingly questioned traditional assumptions about the umbilical cord tying security with nation-states. The challenge to European welfare states presented by the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and the onset of neo-liberalism has reconfigured risks – some of which were contained through forms of social insurance. As a result, risk and the responsibility for managing it has become increasingly ‘individualised’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001) and privatised. In recent years, a multiplicity of actors has become enlisted in the provision of security. The result is recognition on the part of businesses, retailers, designers, town planners, municipal authorities and citizens that they have a responsibility for security and the prevention of crime risks (Crawford 1997). This has prompted shared responsibilities and increasing partnerships between public, private and voluntary and community organisations. Today, security can no longer (if ever it could) be reduced to the purposive strategies of governments in their quests to defend themselves and their citizens’ explicit interests.

The social life of security

As anthropologists and urbanists have long noted, systems of security and order have a fundamental social basis in tacit and mutual mechanisms of social control and networks of mundane voluntary standards (Jacobs 1961). Harvey Molotch asserts that ‘real security comes from the assemblage of artifacts, habits, and procedures which mostly are already there’ (2012: 217). Authorities, notably police and security services, ‘are better at reproducing order than producing it’ (Hills 2009: 208). The danger is that in the quest for security and the urge to create apparent order, formal authorities ignore and efface existing systems of mundane order and socially produced security. Ultimately, security is a shared and collectively generated condition (Loader 1997).

Security is distinctly social in that not only are objective insecurities socially produced, but so too are subjective experiences of feeling secure socially conditioned. Perceptions of (in)security are the subject of broad influences that are not directly connected to security practices. Moreover, security practices themselves may generate insecurities. Hence, attaining security as an end goal is illusive and insatiable, since absolute security is both unattainable and a sociological non sequitur. Collective security is more than the sum of private endeavours. Furthermore, individual security is to some considerable degree dependent
upon the security of others as well as on general human sociability. We rely on other people for our own security. Hence, the Commission on Human Security (2003: 2) noted: ‘The security of one person, one community, one nation rests on the decisions of many others – sometimes fortuitously, sometimes precariously’. Likewise, our security measures have social consequences for others. As Ian Loader and Neil Walker persuasively argue:

‘There is a tendency for the quality of security […] to be enhanced in the case of any particular individual when the security of those with whom that individual shares a social environment is also reasonably attended to’ (2007: 161).

In this regard, the very concept of ‘private security’ may be a contradiction in terms as security is ‘implicated in the very process of constituting the “social” or the “public”’ (Loader and Walker 2007: 162). Crucially, ‘private’ security qua market commodity fosters the inequitable distribution of (in)security, as those who can afford security insulate themselves from unsafe ‘others’, in safety enclosures and secure enclaves. Whilst some groups and places experience a surfeit of policing and security, others suffer a security deficit. Access to enhanced security through the market is primarily determined by wealth as well as the financial and organisational capacity of groups and businesses to form security ‘clubs’. A central paradox of security in a market society is that there is often an inverse relationship between provision and need. In this context, security can become a ‘positional good’ defined by wealth, access to protective services and membership of secure enclosures. Ironically, however, such investments in security do not necessarily resolve existential security dilemmas of individuals or groups (the ‘anxious secure’), as objective safety can – and frequently does – coexist with pervasive subjective insecurity. Those citizens that shelter themselves in gated communities, for example, do not necessarily experience feeling safer as a result, as they are reminded of the insecurities that lie beyond the gates (Low 2004).

In this regard, security as a ‘club good’ or ‘parochial collective good’, by its very nature, is infused with a complex mix of dynamics of exclusion, combined with circuits of inclusion (Crawford 2006). Security clubs can result in the progressive ‘exclusion of bad risks and the grouping together of narrower risk pools’, in a way that ‘reinforces the residential segregation of rich and poor achieved through “voting with the feet”’ (Jordan 1996: 68). Social withdrawal through investments in private or parochial security not only reduce social attachments to others but can prompt pressures to opt out of contribution to local or municipal security provision. After all, why pay twice? Where residents are able to purchase security themselves, they may prefer to withdraw from contributing to its public provision. Such ‘civic disengagement’ may reduce the quality of the public sphere and services provided therein. Public security in this scenario becomes a second-tier form of provision of last resort, more geared to coercive law enforcement and the residual policing of those left behind. Whilst private security practices sometimes have benefits that are consistent with broader social values and the interests of wider constituencies, at other times they
adversely impinge on the public realm and serve to undermine social cohesion (Crawford 2011). Hence, the inequitable distribution of security in favour of affluent areas and individuals should challenge governments and civil society organisations to think creatively about how to respond to the security deficit experienced in some of the poorer parts of societies; and hence how to mitigate, where possible, excessive inequalities in security distribution.

Security as coloniser

In its movement, the concept of security also enlarges, invades and engulfs; driven by internal dynamics and external forces, like processes of ecological succession. In so doing, security changes the conditions of the environment into which it moves; it transforms the landscape. Through its analytical forays, security has become an increasingly important strategic concept through which diverse areas of economic and social life are thought about and governed. It has become an organising idea and lexicon central to the exercise of authority across numerous domains and, as such, is used to legitimise interventions that have other rationales, motivations and impulses. Consequently, traditional policy domains are now ‘governed through (in)security’ – in much the same way that Jonathan Simon (2007) argues contemporary societies increasingly ‘govern through crime’ (cf. Gagnon 2010). To paraphrase Jonathan Simon, the ‘technologies, discourses and metaphors’ of security ‘have become more visible feature of all kinds of institutions, where they can easily gravitate into new opportunities for governance’ (2007: 4-5). The concept of security has not only colonised social policies – such as housing, health, education and employment/workfare (so evident in the realms of tackling anti-social behaviour) – but its promiscuity has extended farther afield. From human well-being to global conflict, environmental survival and natural resources, the technologies, discourses and metaphors associated with security have become increasingly eminent features of contemporary institutions and governing bodies. We now talk of ‘food security’ as a way of framing (and, to a degree, in place of) issues of food scarcity, shortage and sustainability as well as inequalities of food production, supply and distribution. Security ‘talk’ has become simultaneously more promiscuous, more significant and increasingly consequential.

This aggrandising quality of security alerts us to the possible adverse consequences of ‘securitisation; understood as the processes through which groups of people construct something as a ‘security threat’ and the very real consequences of conceiving issues through the lens of ‘security’. There are well-founded fears that the high degree of influence accorded to ‘security’ as an organising concept in the construction of societal relations may result in public policies, their direction and funding, being redefined in terms of their implications for (in)security and social (dis)order. A potential consequence is that fundamental public issues can become marginalised, except in so far as they are defined in terms of their security qualities. Other priorities may come to be viewed as no longer vital public issues in themselves. Rather, their importance is seen to derive from the belief that they lead to insecurity, crime and disorder.
That they may do so is no reason not to assert their value in their own right. Security thus conceived can be corrosive of other public goods. It is precisely this quality that scholars of ‘securitisation theory’ have highlighted (Buzan et al. 1998; McDonald 2008; Stritzel 2007). They have sought to demonstrate how by uttering the word ‘security’, an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object or group. In seeking resources, media, public or government attention, certain threats, risk or harms can be socially constructed as sufficiently salient to warrant security-responses. Hence, security is understood as an illocutionary speech act. Such linguistic acts entail performing an action that creates new realities. By simply evoking ‘security’ something is being done and something demands to be done. As Ole Wæver notes:

’It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real: it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like giving a promise, betting, naming a ship). It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one’ (2004: 13).

By voicing security, things that might ordinarily be politically untenable become not only thinkable but also acceptable, including the introduction of extraordinary or exceptional new legislative powers or special measures. Security, thus viewed, is the result of a move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as above ‘normal politics’. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making. Its implied mode of extraordinary politics, by necessity, both institutionalises fast-track decision-making (‘process’) and produces categories of enemy others (’outcome’) (Aradau 2004). This is what Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde term ‘the securitising move’. Importantly, they underscore that securitisation only fully occurs ‘when the audience accepts it as such’ (1998: 25). It is important, therefore, to understand the processes through which a shared understanding is constructed of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. This highlights the fact that securitisation efforts may be contested, resisted and incomplete. Consequential securitisation, then, is ‘the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (Waever 2004: 8). Securitisation scholars have tended to highlight the implications for formal politics of ‘securitising moves’ with less regard to the wider cultural and social consequences of evoking security and viewing resources, services and activities through a security lens. In contrast to this prioritisation of formal (state) politics, there is a need to recognise and address individual, ‘everyday’ security concerns and to move beyond the discursive level to the lived realities of security practices of multiple actors within distinct and specific contexts as well as the values that inform these practices. The illocutionary speech act largely denies a meaningful role for the audience as it is not dependent upon the speech act’s acceptance by the relevant audience (Blazacq 2005).
simply language that has securitising force but the manner in which security as a concept is mobilised, institutionalised and has effects in and through security practices, their reception and impacts. There is a tendency within securitisation scholarship to give prominence to actors with formal powers to securitise – to name problems as security issues – at the expense of other actors who are too often conceived as passive recipients of securitising processes. Consequently, less attention has been accorded to the manner in which lay sensibilities and informal processes influence, propel or work against securitising tendencies. The implications and outcomes of securitisation have almost exclusively been interpreted in a negative light as undermining democracy, destabilising political values, circumventing legal principles and eroding social relations. This has led some to lament ‘farewell to democracy and the advent of a securitized globalized world’ (Bigo 2008: 10). Thus understood, securitisation represents failure: failure to address the issue within ‘normal bounds’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). The optimal ambition, therefore, is desecuritisation. Less regard has been given to how security – as a social good – is productive, and by whom and in accordance with what values it is produced. Likewise, insufficient attention has been accorded to ‘everyday security’; how it is lived, managed and fashioned in ways that enable rather than simply constrain. Moreover, securitisation processes have tended to be construed as overly deterministic, unilinear and totalising in their effects, with less consideration for the unintended consequences that attend securitising moves.

The double-edged quality of security

Conversely, I contend that one of the pivotal dynamics of security is its double-edged, paradoxical and precarious nature. It is both a necessary precondition for sociability and a constraint upon it. As such, it has both positive and negative attributes; in the sense of security as a protection from harms, threats and risks (‘security from’ – its negative shield-like quality) and security as fostering the conditions that empower people to engage in certain pursuits (security to’ – its enabling, foundational quality):

‘Security is achieved when individuals and/or multiple actors have the freedom to identify risks and threats to their well-being and values (negative security), the opportunity to articulate these threats to other actors, and the capacity to determine ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats either individually or in concert with other actors (positive security)’ (Hoogensen et al. 2009: 3).

Yet there are evident dangers implicit in the quest for positive notions of security and explicit in Hoogensen’s (2012) work in constructing unhelpful and overly solid binaries: negative/positive, bad/good, constraining/enabling, violent/non-violent, state/individual, securitising/emancipatory and so on. Rather, these ambiguous qualities of security need to be understood as porous, interacting and interconnected in ways that produce ambivalence and ironies.
These paradoxical facets of security inform and are illustrated by two analogies that we now turn to consider.

**Analogy 1: security as ambulance**

In deploying security as a discursive lens for framing all sorts of policy debates, the danger is that security takes on the analogous quality of an ambulance: imparting urgency, impending consequences and the suspension of erstwhile norms – the usual ‘rules of the game’. Huysmans remarks on how securitisation institutionalises ‘speed’ against the relative slowness of normal politics: ‘Calls for speed not only question the viability of deliberation and a contest of opinion; they also support strengthening executive-centred government, and suppress dissent’ (2004: 332). Just as the accepted norms are suspended for the perceived higher good of saving lives as the ambulance rushes to its destination, so too, the values and principles (both procedural and substantive) of everyday life are routinely suspended in the name of ‘security’. The associated mobilisation of political and economic resources can lead to the trumping of other values, the stifling of debate and the side-lining of countervailing interests: ‘Rather than debate and deliberation, securitisation calls for silence and speed’ (Roe 2012: 252). So too, the noise from the ambulance’s siren drowns out other sounds or voices. This ‘securitisation’ of social life can thus be thought of as a consequential condition in which issues and problems are depoliticised and alternative ways of framing and responding to problems of order are set aside or suspended (Wæver 1995). In the process, it is not just the realm of politics that is refigured; so too is the wider moral and cultural order.

The pursuit of security thus can become a justification for what Richard Ericson terms ‘counter-law’, whereby: ‘New laws are enacted and new uses of existing law are invented to erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that get in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of harm’ (2007: 27). In this light, ‘the counter-law of security is designed to trump law that seeks to protect citizens from excesses of security’ (Ericson 2007: 163). Under certain circumstances, therefore, security becomes less a public good and more a corrosive toxin that eats away at social and ethical norms and values of a society, resulting in the perverse reality of ‘too much security’ (Zedner 2003). Whilst deliberate inaction in the face of evidence of possible serious risks and irreversible harm is understandably hazardous, so too over-reaction and too great an emphasis on security can at times present greater dangers, particularly where this generates unintended securitising consequences and results in the consumption of resources that might have been deployed in more socially beneficial endeavours.

This use of law to enhance securitisation has been particularly prominent in the post-9/11 context of counter-terrorism reforms, where the threat of terrorist violence has been used to erode traditional legal rights and side-step due process (Zender 2007). Since 9/11, the scope and substance of the criminal law – notably in Anglo-American jurisdictions – has undergone significant change (Ashworth and Zedner 2012). The quest for security has prompted new offences of inchoate
and pre-inchoate liability, as well as a wider preventive focus of criminalization. However, it would be wrong to suggest that 9/11 was the sole catalyst provoking this seismic shift. A preventive logic was well entrenched and forms of counter-law had already established a secure footing prior to the events of 9/11. In the UK, for instance, the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 ushered a decidedly preventive focus of criminalisation, as well as the introduction of novel hybrid civil/criminal preventive orders in the form of the ASBO. As a result, a new category of behaviours defined loosely as ‘anti-social’ became the subject of pre-emptive criminalisation (Crawford 2009). In elaborating his ‘counter-law’ thesis, Richard Ericson draws upon the ASBO as an archetypal example of the manner in which ‘substantive laws are reformed and reinterpreted within a precautionary logic’ (2007: 25). Contemporary security threats from terrorist violence, through ‘ordinary’ crime to acts of disorder and anti-social behaviour, undoubtedly present real and pressing challenges for governments, businesses and citizens alike. But there are evident dangers that in the way in which we both interpret risks and respond to them, we may end up undermining some of the core values and principles of justice, whilst simultaneously eroding relations of social trust and mutual toleration.

But the ambulance also captures a dimension that is often lost among securitisation scholars, namely the positive possibilities of security. The suspension of normal politics through processes that combine silence and speed only produce morally unacceptable outcomes if we value democratic decision-making above everything else. It also presupposes that ‘normal politics’ conforms to certain democratic and deliberative ideals, which, in practice, are often absent. The ambulance reminds us that silence and speed – and the suspension of ‘normal rules’ – in certain circumstances may be morally appropriate. Pursuing this line of thinking, Rita Floyd contends:

‘If, for instance, we value the reduction of human wretchedness in the world above all else, then the suspension of ordinary politics is morally permissible, provided that human beings are the beneficiaries of security policies, and not power holders and elites’ (2010: 4).

The key, therefore, is to identify the conditions under which proportionate ‘speed’ and parsimonious ‘silence’ become morally justifiable. Nonetheless, the enduring cautionary concern is that the ambulance increasingly comes to take the form of juggernaut, as security develops its own momentum and direction of travel.

Analogy 2: security as foundational building blocks

The evolving and promiscuous quality of security discussed earlier is also aptly captured in the increasingly in vogue, yet capacious, notion of ‘human security’. This broadens the focus of security concerns to encompass a wide-range of interconnected facets of human development and fundamental rights that enhance and protect the ‘vital core’ of individual freedoms and fulfilment. In so
doing, it underscores the foundational human condition and essence of security. Human security is understood as a condition that results from an effective political, economic, social, cultural and natural environment (Alkire 2003: 3). It is protective in the sense that it seeks to safeguard the rights and freedoms that pertain to survival, livelihood and basic dignity. As well as encompassing a diverse range of threats and harms, it centres security on people, not states (Axworthy 2001). It reinforces the break from state-centric assumptions about the state as the primary referent for security. Instead, human security places individuals centre stage and attributes to them universal qualities that demand protection. It asserts that people matter as much as states, and in the process revises our understanding of state sovereignty constrained by the rights of individuals. Kofi Annan (1999) has alluded to the notion of ‘individual sovereignty’ to capture this transformation. As such, human security is both individualistic and explicitly universalistic in its aspirations. It embeds security in common values rather than national interests. As a consequence, it introduces the language of morals and values into a discourse that otherwise largely relies on (state) interests. It creates obligations and responsibilities: to invest and provide, as well as to prevent and protect. Furthermore, it incorporates diverse actors and organisations – notably civil society institutions – into the fold of both security providers and the producers of insecurity.

The United Nations has done much to endorse and foster the concept of human security (UNDP 1994), which has also found its way into EU policy debates (Albrecht et al. 2007). Proponents have used the concept to generate a wider public debate focused on addressing the ‘security gap’ experienced by many around the world, notably those living in poverty and disadvantage. In many senses, human security has emerged as a practice in search of a theory. For some, the notion of human security is directly linked to humanitarian intervention and the idea of a global civil society (Kaldor 2007). From this perspective, it has been closely associated with the development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and the work of the Canadian Government sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).

By shifting attention from the causes of insecurity to the prerequisites of peaceful co-existence and development, human security is considered to be less ‘defensive’ in character and productive of more creative concerns for capacity building and enhancing human dignity. From this perspective, security is seen as analogous to the foundational building blocks on which the architecture of human capabilities and community cohesion are constructed. The Commission on Human Security defines human security as:

‘protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’. [It] means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity’ (2003: 4).
Thus conceived, security is an essential prerequisite for liberty and informs the constitution of fundamental freedoms (Gearty 2013). It represents the foundations upon which good governance, individual fulfilment, collective well-being and the commonweal are grounded. Annan (2000) elaborated this in declaring: ‘Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national, security’. Reflecting the expanding range of human security, he subsequently added a fourth freedom: ‘freedom to live in dignity’ by promoting the rule of law, human rights and democracy (Annan 2005). Importantly, he sought to root human dignity in freedom via both human rights and security, thus tying together liberty in and through security.

Accordingly, human security underscores the inter-linkages between security, development and human rights as well as the universality and interdependence of a set of freedoms that are fundamental to human life. Not only are freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity tied inextricably to freedom from fear as interconnected foundational building blocks of human flourishing, but so too, poverty, inequality, environmental degradation and a lack of dignity are seen as harbingers of future insecurities and conflicts. As such, human security also demands an integrated approach to these interconnected elements.

 Whilst the breadth of human security as a concept has been useful in licensing and justifying wide-ranging policies of intervention and the deployment of diverse strategies in support of humanitarian protection and democracy promotion, it has also been characterised by some as ‘conceptually sloppy’, ‘too warm and fuzzy’ and vague to the point that specific security policies are left without much guidance or direction (Khon 2001; Martin and Owen 2010). This leaves human security as ‘a normatively attractive but analytically weak concept’ (Newman 2004: 358). Troublingly, the pervasiveness of human security as a term ushers, in its wake, processes of securitisation. New threats and new actors are drawn into the vortex of ‘governing through security’. Matters as all-embracing and subjective as well-being, dignity, respect and human development (Nussbaum 2011), all become caught up in the logic of securitisation. Conversely, this highlights the possibility that the more capacious security becomes, the more it may come to be diluted of its negative securitising dynamics and implications. To do so, however, necessitates attention to ethical principles with which to assess the normative acceptability of specific security practices under particular conditions, given their likely consequences.

Furthermore, from this perspective, security and justice – likewise human security and human rights – are viewed as complementary and mutually reinforcing foundations. Little attention is accorded to the ambiguous and tense relation between the two. For some, human security is a vehicle for advancing and a rallying slogan for promoting a human rights agenda. However, human rights and human security are not the same. The former provides a normative framework with entitlements and obligations that focus on the correlative duties of other parties, while the latter operates at the level of politics as a policy tool. If used interchangeably or confused, human security may dilute the legal character of human rights, such that: ‘the precision and legality of the
human rights framework could suffer if too closely allied with the ambiguity and mere rhetorical appeal of human security’ (Petrasek 2004: 59). Gerd Oberleitner (2005) conjures up the wonderfully evocative image of the relationship between human rights and human security as ‘porcupines in love’; close yet problematic! He warns against the dangers of securitising human rights in ways that erode their indivisible quality and universality; allowing for a ‘pick and choose’ approach on the grounds of the value of given rights for security (Alkire 2003: 39). Human security recognises that some human rights conflict with one another and that in real-life situations of limited resources or in the face of political will some prioritisation is needed. However, this may invite governments to avoid human rights obligations under the pretext of protecting human security. Accordingly, this could have the effect of diluting human rights or trumping them with superior human security claims. Reconstructing human rights as human security accentuates the prospect that security is taken to be the desired end.

One emblematic example of where security as ambulance and security as foundation collide is the mobilisation of the right to security as a foundational right (Shue 1996) or type of ‘super human right’ (Taylor 2004). Proponents of a ‘right to security’ frequently draw justification through reference to discourses of human security whereby security is seen as a fundamental human right – for some ‘the basic right on which all others are based’. Whilst human rights may frequently be used to limit the excesses of security, the nature of the relationship between human rights, security and justice cannot be depicted simply within a framework in which human rights serve as a limit on the coercive reach of the criminal law and state institutions or act as a counterweight to criminalisation and securitisation. As Liora Lazarus (2007) has shown, assertions of the right to security can imply, and have been increasingly exploited politically to presage, greater powers of surveillance, increased police authority, wider use of pre-trial detention and pre-emptive measures aimed at risk prevention. Attempts to cast the right to security as a meta-right, and subsequently to re-order the priority of rights, thus run the risk that rights themselves will become securitised (Lazarus 2011). Rather than justice and rights to liberty being conceived as pathways to security, they may come to be seen as products of security. From this perspective, security becomes the precondition for the enjoyment of any right. The danger here, however, is that we may become preoccupied with the quest for security as the precondition to liberty to the extent that we end up with enhanced security but with scant liberty.

**Part II: sustainable security**

This prompts consideration of the nature of the vexed relation between security and liberty. More often than not, the metaphor that is conjured up in contemporary policy debate about the security-liberty relation is the image of balance. Recently, the notion of ‘striking a new balance between security and liberty’ implies the notion of trade-offs. As Jeremy Waldron (2010: 22) notes, frequently
when the balance metaphor is invoked it is deployed by those who wish to take
up a new position on the issue with regard to the pre-eminence of security and
a change in attitudes to civil liberties. Talk of (re-)balancing evokes the idea
of finely grained calculations of weights and measures that can be objectively
assessed and calibrated (i.e., Home Office 2006). It presupposes that liberty and
security are ‘eternal values’, that they are easily differentiable, quasi-quantifi-
able and homogeneous (Bigo 2010: 398). By contrast, security and liberty are
better understood as incommensurate goods in which no simple equilibrium
can be struck, but where their relationship demands open deliberation and con-
testation in relation to other social values, norms and goals.
In the language of balance, intra-personal trade-offs are often confused with
inter-personal trade-offs (Waldron 2010: 12). Intra-personal trade-offs are where
individuals accept certain constraints on their own liberty in order to render
themselves (and possibly others) safer and more secure, where each of us bears
the costs of security whilst simultaneously each of us reaps the benefits. By con-
trast, inter-personal trade-offs – more problematically – occur where we sacri-
fice not our own liberty but the liberty of others in order that the rest of us may
be (or feel) safer. Such trade-offs highlight the distributive qualities of security
measures, whereby the burdens of security may fall unevenly across the popu-
lation. Many of the contemporary changes advocated to enhance security actu-
ally protect the security of some whilst overlooking or actively undermining
the security of others. They have adverse implications for and impacts on mar-
ginal and marginalised groups within societies, those upon whom dominant
groups project their fears and anxieties.
Hence, in confronting the distributive mix of security and liberty, we need to
reflect upon the questions: ‘whose fears?’ , ‘whose security?’ and ‘whose liberty?’
is being enhanced or diminished. These are particularly salient questions for
the uneven distribution of security across different social groups: men/women
and minorities/majorities. Such questions, however, are less evident in debates
about threats of terrorism and political violence, as well as other contempo-
rary fears and responses to them. Nevertheless, in the political confrontation
between fear and liberty, where necessary, actions that infringe liberties are
more evidently justifiable if those who support the actions are burdened by
them and their impacts are not restricted to members of identifiable minority
groups – whether implicitly or through differential implementation.
Drawing together the metaphors and analogies outlined thus far, in thinking
about how we might conceive the relation between ‘security’ and ‘liberty’, the
following sets of relationships are suggestive:
1. ‘Inversely related’ in that more of one produces less of the other – as in the
metaphoric balance – whereby the notion of ‘trade-off’ implies that enhanc-
ing security demands corresponding reductions in liberty and vice versa.
2. ‘Mutually reinforcing’ suggests a relation in which the two are intercon-
nected and can enrich each other – possibly to the extent that they constitute
each other – evoking ‘liberty in security’ and ‘security in liberty’.
3. ‘Security as a precondition for liberty’ evokes the earlier analogy of security
as foundational building block, whereby security is a prerequisite for the
exercise of rights and the enjoyment of liberties.
4. ‘Security as precluding liberty’ evokes the securitising tendencies of the ambulance *cum* juggernaut captured in ‘counter-law’.
5. ‘Liberty as a precondition for security’ implies that normative principles of justice, human rights protections and experiences of fairness and equality of treatment may be fundamental pathways to security; evoking ‘security through liberty’.
6. ‘Precariousness’ suggests a relationship that is simultaneously close but problematic and ambiguous, as conjured up by Gerd Oberleitner’s ‘porcupines in love’.

It is with regard to a combination of these last two relationships that I wish to elaborate a conception of sustainable security, in my concluding thoughts. As already identified, security has both temporal and socio-spatial, distributive dimensions.

First, temporality is central to all security projects and informs experiences and prospects of security (Valverde forthcoming). Unlike the retrospective gaze of criminal justice – that seeks normatively to reorder the past – security looks to what is to come. Not only does security continually evolve and transmute as a concept (as threats and risks as well as practices and technologies change), but so too, security has a future orientation. Security is concerned not simply with managing present threats and risks but also with governing as yet unknown futures. When we think of our safety, we think not just of the present moment but project into the future. Hence, technologies, mentalities and practices of security offer assurances about the future and generate expectations that people can count on and build upon (to continue the architectural metaphor). Yet, in anticipation, we project towards the future, but what comes out of the future is our past, our inter-subjective and culturally informed assumptions, experiences and beliefs that all inform our insecurities.

Moreover, security practices and securitisation moves have both short-term implications and longer-term consequences – they exert an evident temporality. The evolving and interdependent nature of security problems means that nothing done to solve one security hazard is without its impacts. As Harvey Molotch notes: ‘this sets up the need for continuous change and refinement – with no end ever’ (2012: 219). Security practices and discourses, he argues, too often presume ‘finality’; ‘armour in place, bad guys dead or behind bars, instead of ongoing attentiveness to ranges of interacting opportunities and constraints’ (2012: 219). Troublesomely, in their myopic attempts to control present risks and assuage extant fears, today’s quests for security scatter the future with sources of impending insecurities. For example, the suspension of normal codes and recourse to ‘emergency measures’ – be it extraordinary rendition, extra-judicial hearings or other forms of ‘counter-law’ – may provide temporary relief, but will often have ramifications that reverberate into the future. More mundanely, these may have an incremental and accumulated acculturation and normalising effects – whereby over time the exception becomes the norm in an undefined ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 2005) or ‘permanent state of emergency’ (Bigo 2010) – and/or may generate legitimacy deficits that undermine social trust.
Yet, trust and legitimacy are precious ingredients in shared experiences of security. Like other forms of authority and power, public security systems seek to generate commitments to compliance and cooperation. In this, judgements about the legitimacy of legal authorities and security apparatuses – people and systems – are crucial to why people obey the law and comply with decisions taken (Tyler 2006). Hence, the urgent ‘now’ (ambulance-like) dimension of security, if experienced as illegitimate, can serve to undermine future security.

Second, security is socially and spatially variegated. The existence of excessive security differentials and uneven distribution of safety have the capacity to exacerbate and compound extant inequalities. So too, they can foster intergroup or inter-personal tensions and social conflicts. Thus, spatial and social inequalities in security, like illegitimate security, can generate vicious circles and malign feedback loops across time. In many senses, security expresses the ‘intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships’ (Bakhtin 1990: 84). It is here that the notion of sustainable security has some purchase.

The concept of ‘sustainability’ has most often been deployed in environmental studies and human development. In these contexts, sustainability is characterised in terms of meeting short-term needs without compromising future generations’ capacity to meet their own needs (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). Central are the concepts of needs and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the ability to meet present and future needs. The notion of ‘social sustainability’ implies interdisciplinary insights in its connections with economic and environmental sustainability, but privileges societal values and social norms. To furnish sustainable societies, we need to better understand and to seek to change practices and behaviours that are unsustainable; those that, in a security context, undermine ethical principles or normative values, and promote inequalities that foster future conflicts and insecurities. Sustainable security practices, therefore, can be defined as those that meet the needs of the present without compromising the well-being of the future through adverse societal impacts, depletion of other fundamental social values, such as trust and legitimacy, or eroding principles of freedom, due process or equity of treatment.

Like security, sustainability expresses temporality; it is an ongoing process, evincing movement, responding to change and requiring open-ended reflection, not a fixed state to be achieved. Hence, the notion of ‘sustainable security’ is useful in that it foregrounds the temporal and spatial unevenness of security practices and their implications for peoples’ liberties and freedoms, as well as experiences of (in)justice both in the present and in the future. In addition to its analytical attributes, the notion of sustainable security has normative and political properties. First, it foregrounds equity of access to key goods and services as a prerequisite of sustainable communities, in that inequities breed insecurities. As such, security should not be treated as a good simply to be maximised, but rather as something to be achieved as far as possible at an equal level for all, to minimise inequities of distribution. Second, it underscores equity between generations, in that future generations should not be disadvantaged by the activities of the current generation. Third, it challenges the neo-liberal trium-
phalism of the market as the distributor of social utility by providing space for the recognition of the moral limits of markets (in the provision of security), and in so doing subordinates economic goals to social values (Sandel 2012). A conception of sustainable security seeks precisely to reconcile short-term security needs that enable people to adapt and live confidently with threat and risk, with longer-term goals of developing a functioning, legitimate and normatively viable security system. It follows that the sustainability of security practices as public goods necessitates not only the construction of a just society in the present, but also the design of arrangements and procedures that secure lasting and continuing (social) justice in the future. This involves not only being attentive to the capacity of security measures to impact disproportionately on specific groups or unduly discriminate against them, but to be reflexive in terms of the constantly changing social, environmental, economic, political and legal climate in which security is enacted. Such an endeavour will necessitate consideration of the role of justice principles and the rule of law as vital stepping-stones along the pathway to legitimate and sustainable forms and levels of security. This underscores the requirement to attend to the short-term security needs of living with risk and threat in contemporary societies in which uncertainty prevails, without prompting social injustices and amplified inequalities or compromising future security by generating new sources of insecurities. The goal is to contain and restrict the prevalence and harmful consequences of the exceptional emergency (ambulance-like) and counter-legal qualities of security whilst facilitating its legitimate and well-being protective characteristics.

Research agenda

Security is frequently identified as a core component of what makes resilient and ‘sustainable communities’ (Raco 2007). Yet, the role of security logics and practices in sustaining the vitality of communal life and security as a positive social good and lived reality are little understood. Aligning security with the notion of sustainability, begs a number of useful allied questions: to what extent and in what ways do security practices, discourse and technologies sustain and promote equitable, inclusive and just societies? To what extent are they socially sustainable? Conversely, to what extent and in what ways do quests for security in seeking to meet short-term demands compromise the security of future generations? Sustainability is ultimately bound up with institutional design, social practices and human behaviour. As such, it opens up debate, negotiation and contestation over preferred futures, under conditions of deep contingency and uncertainty. Hence, the appeal of sustainable security as an idea resides in its capacity to operate as an integrating framework; as a way of thinking about the relationships between different dimensions that constitute security as a practice and ideal, rather than simply as a barometer for assessing the justifiability or otherwise of a specific component of security.

In foregrounding a conception of ‘sustainable security’ (as a positive notion), a future research agenda will need to connect extant ways of thinking about
security with key normative principles and values of social justice and legitimacy which shape both its current and longer-term pursuit. These will need to include concern for both substantive and distributive justice and fairness. In so doing, it will need to connect with and support human rights discourses while remaining attentive to the differences and interconnections between human rights and (human) security. Such an approach must go beyond overly simplistic binaries and balancing acts between ‘security’ and ‘liberty’, as if these exist in some direct hydraulic relation. It will also need to avoid any implication that attempts to enhance security inevitably lead automatically to some type of rights-related infringement, and that enhancing rights leads to increased insecurity. This requires us to conceive of the relationship between security and liberty as a recursive relationship in which security is also seen as a platform for well-being and human autonomy – for the exercise of freedom.

In this vein, Rita Floyd (2011) specifies three criteria that, if fulfilled at the same time, would render securitisation morally right. These are that: first, there is an objective existential threat; second, the referent object of security is morally legitimate; and third, the security response is appropriate to the threat in question. This forms part of what she terms a ‘just securitisation theory’ (Floyd 2014) which interrogates and seeks to build criteria for assessing the morality of both securitisation and de-securitisation. This demands consideration being given to thresholds and questions about principles of proportionality – not simply from a legal or normative perspective but also in terms of a more nuanced and descriptive sociology of seriousness. Hence, how do we evaluate the seriousness of security threats and risks? What is the evidential basis upon which security threats become actionable? What are the appropriate thresholds for securitisation? In this regard, the Commission on Human Security (2003) has proposed to restrict its focus to ‘critical’ and ‘pervasive’ threats, be they environmental, economic, food health, personal or political. Such a threshold-based conception cuts across and challenges both narrow and broad interpretations of human security (Owen 2004).

The preceding arguments have sought to underscore the significance of tacit security mechanisms, mundane order and the quotidian needs, conditions and practices of ordinary people. Traditional notions of security have been criticised for their rigidity in relation to insufficiently incorporating the views and experiences of minority groups and women in particular (Hansen 2000). Any sustainable understanding of security must explore how security and its evolution have been gendered in the past and might be influenced by changing gender relations in the future. Ironically, perhaps, the etymology of the word ‘security’ derives from the Latin root *securus*, which literally means ‘without care’. Care in this sense refers to anxiety, fear or worry. Hence, to be secure is to be ‘carefree’. This juxtaposition of security and care belies a deeper association between the two terms in that security presupposes care – feelings of attachment and sociability. One can only be truly ‘carefree’ where there are ongoing, routine and tacit systems of sharing, relations of care, and forms of resilience that constitute a latent benign social environment. It is self-evident to suggest that relations of care – like forms of mundane security – are profoundly gendered.
Despite its universalising implications, human security – like human rights and the liberal political tradition from which it borrows – embodies a model of the autonomous, rational human subject who is the bearer of capabilities and of individual rights (Gilligan 1982) which sits awkwardly with the situated and relational quality of social power that mediates much human life, structural inequalities, violence and insecurities and, in particular, women’s experiences of them (Nussbaum 2005). Moreover, the logic of rights pays insufficient attention to an ‘ethics of care’ (Kittay 1999; Robinson 2011). However, as Natasha Marhia notes: ‘There is no a priori formula for intervening in these relations: this requires situated empirical analyses and is inevitably (and productively) a source of contestation’ (2013: 32). Nevertheless, in order to address the uneven global and local distribution of vulnerabilities and insecurities, any notion of sustainable security must do more than secure the individual; it must acknowledge and nurture the ‘social life of security’.

Concluding remarks

At the same time, we need to be aware of the limitations and misuses of notions of sustainability, notably in the context of security. First, sustainability has a consequentialist (ends-oriented) logic in which future security needs may be used as a trump to present-day individual rights and civil liberties. Human rights discourses, by contrast, are non-consequentialist. We need to be careful that under conditions of uncertainty, worst-case scenarios (Sunstein 2007) do not promote precautionary logics that stifle civil liberties and sideline legal norms of due process in order to intervene at the earliest possible stage to stop our (as yet) unknown demons surfacing (Crawford 2010).

Secondly, some have argued that the language of sustainability – drawn from the apocalyptic scenarios over climate change – has a tendency to depoliticise and de-democratise debate and constitute a key arena through which ‘the post-political frame is forged, configured and entrenched’ (Swyngedouw 2010: 216). Swyngedouw contends that:

‘Much of the sustainability argument has evacuated the politics of the possible, the radical contestation of alternative future socio-environmental possibilities and socio-natural arrangements, and has silenced the antagonisms and conflicts that are constitutive of our socio-natural orders by externalizing conflict. It is inherently reactionary’ (2010: 228).

By contrast, a progressive notion of sustainable security should seek to politicise the values and moral choices upon which security decisions are premised. In so doing, it should open up debate and dialogue about our conceptions of security, the practices to which they give rise and their social implications. Consequently, there is a need for an expansion in the policy and critical imaginations that are used to categorise, diagnose and provide solutions to security problems. This will require, amongst other things, a re-imagination of the
long-term socio-economic causes of insecurities and their distribution across time and space. This means acknowledging the interconnections between local violence and vulnerabilities, such as domestic violence, and global violence and vulnerabilities, such as war and social conflicts.

Thus envisaged, security constitutes a radical vantage point from which to consider questions of social sustainability. As Harvey Molotch contends: ‘Security entails thinking critically and in a comprehensive manner about present strategies and questioning them – at general levels as well as in specific detail’ (2012: 217). Demands for ‘more security’ should invite fundamental examinations of societal values. They require us to attend to judgements both about the present and the future based on normative principles informed by empirical evidence of existing security practices; both those of authorities and of the everyday, mundane and ordinary social means by which people manage their lives.

In sum, an understanding of ‘sustainable security’ needs to be attentive; first, to the temporal and distributive dimensions of security; second, to the capacity of security measures to impact disproportionately on specific minority groups or unduly discriminate against them; and third, to the manner in which minority voices and gender dimensions are frequently silenced in security debates. Such an approach should seek to investigate how security is produced, by whom, and informed by what values. It should also seek to identify the conditions under which security practices can turn from vicious into virtuous circles, and the norms and values that inform the long-term sustainability of security measures and processes. Moreover, it needs to develop a more nuanced understanding of the interconnections and interactions between security and liberty. Following Didier Bigo (2010: 415), it will need to give ‘more serious attention to liberty as the condition of existence of any account of security that claims scholarly pretension’.

Finally, context matters. A normative approach alone does not take us far enough. In the study of what constitutes sustainable security, there is an evident need to supplement normative and analytical enquiries about logics, dynamics and attributes of security and securitisation processes, with a robust empirical examination and critical interpretation of given security practices and lived experiences in particular locales. We need to know more about what ‘security looks and feels like to different actors’ working in specific settings (Ranasinghe 2013: 104). In this, a research agenda focused around sustainable security will need to be attentive to questions of temporal and spatial scale (Valverde 2011). It will also need to interrogate the manner in which the ambiguities, paradoxes and ironies outlined in this chapter are played out and influenced by ordinary people in habitual settings, as well as by elites at particular moments in history, through specific security projects. Last but not least, it will need to pay close attention to the implications of current (and past) security endeavours for future security practices and the wider social forces that shape tomorrow’s insecurities.


Notes
1 The latter section of this chapter develops upon some initial ideas outlined in a brief unpublished paper in which the notion of ‘sustainable security’ is advanced as the basis of a research agenda (Crawford and Hutchinson 2013). I am grateful to Steven Hutchinson for some of the discussions and insights that informed that paper.
2 For example, the European Commission’s latest research and development framework, Horizon 2020, casts ‘food security’ as one of its six key ‘societal challenges’ alongside ‘energy security’ and ‘secure societies’ see: http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm. Likewise, the UK government announced a Global Food Security Programme – see: www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/.
3 The hybrid and preventive regulatory model introduced by the ASBO was adapted and transplanted to other realms such as the terrorism-inspired ‘control order’ (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005), the alcohol-related ‘drinking banning order’ (Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006) and the organised crime-associated ‘serious crime prevention order’ (Serious Crime Act 2007).
4 As articulated in May 2007 by the then Home Secretary, John Reid, in a speech delivered in Venice to ministers of the six largest EU nations – see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6648849.stm
5 Didier Bigo goes on to argue for the development of ‘liberty studies’ to ‘go beyond critical security studies’ (2010: 413).
Growing Sanguine about the Weeds. Gardening and Security Revisited

Simon Hallsworth and David James

‘Mary, Mary, quite contrary, how does your garden grow? With silver bells and cockle shells and pretty maids all in a row’ (Anon, English Nursery Rhyme).

Introduction

The problems associated with negative security in part stem from the dark and repressive practices associated with its exercise: the deadly symbiosis between prison and ghetto; the growth and extension of dark side surveillance technologies; and repression, more generally, in the developing security state. Given these dark connotations any attempt to rethink security in a more positive light must entail breaking free from a construct now seemingly ineluctably saturated with images of violence. This construct should simultaneously allow us to reclaim security as what Ian Loader and Neil Walker (2007) term a ‘thick’ public good, and indeed go beyond it to a more positive conception of security. In this chapter we will explore and develop a more positive conception of security by looking at the concept through the metaphor of gardening and gardens. In the light of Zygmunt Bauman’s (1989) study of the Holocaust, this might, we accept, appear to many to be something of a doomed endeavour. After all, was not the Holocaust, as Bauman persuasively argues, the application of gardening principles to the social body in a more or less systematic way? While not discounting the power of his analysis, it is nevertheless our contention that there is more to say on the subject. More specifically, by revisiting gardening examining different kinds of gardeners and, not least, garden design, it becomes possible to think through some of the many problems attendant in conceptualising security in a positive light.

It is here that we must pause a little and take things slowly, digging a little, in order to make our understanding of security deeper, more complex and ultimately somewhat paradoxical. Only by engaging in such spadework can we gain the necessary perspective to think about what a more positive version of security entails as a ‘thick’ public good with a history and a context. Boldly put, the term security has become too widely used, too flexible, and too separated from care; it has become uncaring. John Hamilton (2013) allows us to explore the range of meanings given to security by linking care (Latin: cura) with security (Latin: securitas), literally apart or away from care (Latin: se-cura). In this way
security is the negation of care, and most conceptions of security, as safety for example, depend upon a negative definition of care as ‘anxiety’ or ‘pain’. This inversion of positive and negative is particularly unsettling, but allows some fresh air to enter the discussion of security. It is by taking in the range of meanings given to care and security, that we can gain a more complex and ambiguous understanding of security.

**RHIZOMATIC MEANINGS OF SECURITY AND CARE**

There is no easy definition and approach to care, but as we shall see later, moving from an exclusionary conditional form of care towards an inclusive unconditional ethic of care is one way to make important moves towards rethinking security. Equally the security of the state needs to be widened out to a concern for security in daily life, and going further than this to reanimate a discussion about care through the lifecycle. Given that security is usually imbued with a meaning of ‘apart or away from care’, it is important to reconnect the two, even to consider care from the cradle to the grave, and further, as having an important pastoral dimension. This also allows us to enter into a discussion of security and gardening without having to evoke the standard state-centred realist approach to conceptualising security. Indeed John Hamilton notes that the meaning of security

‘begins to resemble more a rhizomatic network producing nearly infinite opportunities for interpretation and instrumentalization, for metaphors and mythic recastings, each actualization remaining unable to control the latencies that underlie and often undercut every historical instance’ (2013: 12).

If care and security are rhizomatic then examining their roles in the context of a debate about gardening seems particularly apposite. With this in mind we begin here by reflecting on what we mean by the metaphor of ‘gardening’ before connecting gardening activity with a range of state-centred security practices. As we shall see, while it is possible to connect weed clearance, waste management and erecting fences with what we might consider the more negative connotations of security (protection from/elimination of enemies), gardens are also threatened by the failure of gardeners to care for them appropriately. While this may intimate the possibility of a more benevolent conception of security evident in the need on the part of gardeners to actively sustain the health and vitality of their garden, was this not precisely the same approach that underpinned the biopolitical project the Nazis were engaged in?

This leads us to revisit Zygmunt Bauman’s work on the strategies of the ‘gardening state’, and Michel Foucault’s reflections on biopower in order to draw out more clearly the paradox that connects biopolitics with its celebration of life with decidedly necro-political outcomes including the Holocaust. While the work of Bauman and Foucault may initially suggest that examining gardening in order to arrive at a more positive conception of security is an impossible
endeavour, we will suggest that this is mistaken assumption. In part the problem here lies with the vision of the gardener that Bauman evokes to make his case. Gardeners, as we shall observe, come in many forms. However Bauman works with only one type, what we may identify as the ‘extreme gardener’. What motivates the extreme (Nazi) gardener is their slavish adherence to ‘cutting out the elements of the present reality that neither fit the visualised perfect reality, nor can be changed so that they do’ (1989: 65). This gardener is:

’[O]ne armed with a detailed design of the lawn from the border; with a vision of harmonious colours and of the difference between pleasing harmony and revolting cacophony; with the determination to treat as weeds every self-invited plant which interferes with his plan and his vision or order and harmony; and with machines and poisons adequate to the task of exterminating the weeds and altogether preserve the divisions as required and defined by the overall design’ (Bauman 1989: 57).

This is the extreme gardener’s security dilemma, and the pathway to a more positive account of security must lie in overturning this ‘visualised perfect reality’ as the end to which gardening practice needs to be directed.

Bauman’s work can be further problematised in so far as he does not talk about gardens in general but an assumed model of formal regimented gardens produced according to a vision. As we shall see, when we briefly investigate Nazi horticulture, in many respects the formal garden Bauman evokes to make his case was by no means consistent with the garden designs the Nazis were actually working with. As we shall also establish there is an array of far more radical gardens which, if posed as alternatives to Bauman’s formal garden, lead us towards a very different conception of security than that he associates with Nazism and its disturbing commitment to the vision of ordered mono-cultural perfection along with a disturbing obsession with weed clearance.

If we attend in particular to more progressive and radical gardens it becomes possible, we contend, to conceptualise security practices in ways that evoke a more positive conception of security and one that takes us away from the uniformity of the formal garden that the extreme gardener aspires to create and the problems of waste management he suffers from and obsesses about. Against the figure of the extreme gardener (from Waffen SS officers to contemporary law-and-order politicians) we pose a ‘temperate gardener’ capable of embracing what we would identify, following Emmanuel Levinas (1999) and Zygmunt Bauman (1989), as an unconditional ethic of care in relation to gardens in which difference and diversity is encouraged. We conclude by suggesting that if we model societies on the template of a radical garden, managed by temperate gardeners (a species yet to emerge) a more positive evocation of security emerges.

Preliminary observations on gardening and security

At its most general, gardening is an activity undertaken with the aim of growing and cultivating plants, either for their aesthetic properties or for reasons
connected with the instrumental uses to which plants lend themselves, such as their medicinal or nutrient qualities. Gardening is also about the process of creating and sustaining a garden. This implies, in the first instance, determining the particular form of garden to be cultivated and its relationship to the environment; secondly, engaging in plant selection (those consistent with the envisaged design); and thirdly, establishing how the various elements selected (vegetation – but other props as well), are organised and displayed as a harmonious totality.

Gardening extends beyond design to the business of ensuring that, once created, a garden is maintained and sustained over time. That is what the day-to-day business of gardening, considered as a practical, sensuous activity, is all about. This involves nurturing the garden with a view to ensuring that the plants within it receive the nutrients and resources they need to stay healthy and thrive; it is also about the business of protecting the garden and the life it sustains from external dangers such as invasive plants and wildlife which, if untended, might harm it. A garden is also always a work in progress rather than a final goal. The practices of gardening determine both the garden itself and the form of the garden. There is no end point of security, in other words, and this is the problem of the extreme gardener under a negative vision of security.

If we begin with a prime example associated with negative security, the control or elimination of enemies, then self-evidently, the business of gardening appears directly connected with this negative security imperative. Gardens, after all, face all number of threats and these come in several forms. Let us begin with the perennial problem posed by what are classified as ‘weeds’. That is, otherwise healthy plants that have no place within the envisaged design (plants out of place or in the wrong place). Then there are threats posed to the integrity of the garden by invasive insects or creatures that might damage or destroy its vegetation. Various diseases also threaten gardens. When read as a security endeavour, therefore, gardening appears from the outset to invoke practices that revolve around protecting a garden and its vegetation from these threats: dealing with the weeds, the various insects and not least ensuring that the plants receive the protection they require to remain healthy. Gardening problems can therefore be conceived as security problems.

But do the threats posed to gardens end here? By no means. Gardening, as we have observed, requires continual effort. Neglect is also a perennial problem that threatens the integrity of many gardens. Failure to water the plants and ensure they receive the nutrients they require to grow directly threatens a garden’s survival. For those who cultivate gardens of the more formal variety other problems present themselves, not least of which is that they might become overgrown. This, of course, was the problem Lucy finds herself facing in Francis Hodgson Burnett’s novel, *The Secret Garden* (1911). Its owner simply neglected it, leaving it to run wild.

If we compare the threat posed by neglect with those of the external variety, while the failure to address both pose real risks, the order of risks that have to be managed are very different in each case. In the former the risks are posed by external threats (the bindweed, greenfly, rodents); while in the case of the latter,
the threat lies in the failure of the gardener (or gardeners) to garden appropriately. But in each case the end result is the same. The integrity of the garden is threatened. A failure to care, in the sense of actively nurturing a garden, also poses a direct threat to its integrity and well-being.

If we pursue this line of reasoning then it is evident that, when read in gardening terms, security is not only about protecting the garden from external threats but also, equally importantly, about ensuring an ethic of care is maintained in relation to the way life within the garden is sustained and maintained, but never viewed as an end in itself. Both constitute different sides of the same security/care coin. To put this another way, imagine a gardener who is fanatic about weed clearance but who fails to care for the plants appropriately (this figure is reproduced in literally terms in the figure of the father in Ian McEwan's 1978 book *The Cement Garden*). This would not be a good gardener. The implication of this is that security, as a practice, needs to be more than weed clearance and waste management. Security as a practice that adheres to an ethic of care needs to be more than extreme gardening or neglect, two of the key security strategies of many modern states. Being a good gardener also implies a moral stance towards the garden. The good gardener should be able to practise an ethic of care.

**Biopolitics and the gardening state**

At this point we need to complicate matters, for things are not quite as clear-cut as they might otherwise appear. For if we take the conditional ethic of care a gardener exercises to ensure his garden grows (tending the ‘right’ plants, eliminating the rest), and apply the metaphor to modern societies, is this not precisely what biopower and biopolitics were always about? Was it not the modern biopolitical project that resolved itself into the construction of healthy social gardens built according to a ‘perfect’ plan? And was it not precisely this self-same project that resolved itself into the horror of the Holocaust and other forms of genocide (and more recently mass incarceration societies)? If so, what may appear a positive notion of security belies a dark truth that is altogether different. This leads us then to the work of Bauman and Foucault and not least to the gardening state.

Before we get to Bauman, however, it should be observed that conceiving of society as a garden is by no means new. Ernest Gellner deployed the metaphor of wild cultures to designate pre-modern agrarian social formations that, by and large, reproduced spontaneously ‘without conscious design, supervision, surveillance or special nutrition’ (1983: 48). He contrasted wild systems or cultures with the cultivated or garden cultures of modernity. Garden cultures do not reproduce themselves spontaneously but through a high culture sustained by all manner of technicians and specialists located in a range of educational and bureaucratic institutions. This high garden culture requires the political underpinning of nationalism and of its own nation state. It is here that the zealous gardener carefully exterminating weeds can be identified, sculpting the
social body in order to realise the vision established by high culture without much by way of regard for what was already there.

Others have conceived of the garden as being excluded and outside society. David Hume (an urbanite who dreamed of common life, but looked down on those who got there) views the garden as a separate place, a therapeutic place, where the social world and all metaphysical and religious questions can be put to one side. It is also a place to take time, to be lazy and indolent, in fact in this way the ‘relentless slug exterminator or the manic composter are not gardening well’ (O’Brien 2010: 200).

Bauman subsequently developed the gardening metaphor in his attempt to make sense of the Holocaust. Like gardens, he observes, modern societies are brought into existence through decisive acts of human engineering. Modern societies are also akin to gardens in the sense that, as modernity evolved, it became increasingly possible to view them as such, not least by utopians committed to distinctly modern meta-narratives of progress (Bauman 1989). Modern societies are also like gardens to the extent that they are artificial, designed and ordered as opposed to being ‘wild’ and unregimented – like premodern social formations. Finally, societies are also like gardens in so far as waste production presents itself as an inevitable by-product of their development and thus as a problem which, like weeds in a garden, social engineers have to manage.

Weeds are the waste of gardening, mean streets the waste of town-planning, dissidence the waste of ideological unity, heresy the waste of orthodoxy, strangerhood the waste of nation-state building. They are waste, as they defy classification and explode the tidiness of the grid. They are a disallowed mixture of categories that must not mix (Bauman 1991: 15). Once conceived this way, that is, as orderly spaces that could be reconstructed in accordance with a pre-envisaged design (or grand plan) from which all that intrudes on the beauty of the final design (its waste) must be eliminated, then, for Bauman at least, the road towards Auschwitz had already, in part, been taken. Modernity would also bring into being the means necessary to realise the design: a rational bureaucratic ‘gardening state’. Nazism, in this sense, takes as its point of departure a biopolitics already well-established in the deep grammar of the modern state. Which is also to recognise that its origins run wider than a sadistic cult established around a totalitarian leader.

Nazism in practice involved applying these elementary principles of garden design to the social body. The Nazis wanted to establish a new order in the same way as a gardener establishes his garden (the Volk). Like a gardener, the Nazis had a clear vision governing the kind of garden they wanted to cultivate and propagate, and this came with a clear sense of the particular species they wanted to tend and let bloom within it. Nor did they let the problem posed by existing cultivars, people and communities that existed but which had no place in the envisioned scheme, intrude on their deliberations. Like a gardener they also paid close attention to the matter of weeds and dealing with other forms of garden waste they encountered along the way. These were reconstructed as forms of life held to threaten the survival of the permitted species and the
aesthetic design of the garden more generally. As a consequence, the weeds (the Jew and other ‘objective enemies’) are ruthlessly expunged.

Nazism, at least as far as Bauman was concerned, simply applied this biopolitical model to macro structure reality and six million Jews, along with hundreds of thousands of others, duly died as the means available to the gardening state, its rational, problem solving, bureaucratic apparatus, went about its allotted task of waste (national security) management in a suitably detached, depersonalised, instrumental way. For Bauman ‘[t]he Holocaust is the by-product of the modern drive to a fully designed, fully controlled world, once the drive is getting out of control and running wild’ (1989: 93).

Foucault (2003) draws out the intimate connection between sustaining and elimination that are integral to Nazism in his reflections on biopolitics and the govermentalisation of social relations that came into being from the 18th century onwards. Within a biopolitical frame of reference, the pursuit of security is directed at the protection of a people, facilitating its right to life. This is what distinguishes modern biopolitics from the pre-modern exercise of sovereign power. While predicated, as a political project, on the need to sustain the health and vitality of a species, its security concerns nevertheless also entail eliminating other species that threaten it (inferior ‘dangerous’ races but also all forms of life that do not equate with the biopolitical norms at play within a given social formation). For Foucault:

‘The Nazi state makes the field of life it manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people, but also its own people…. Of course, Nazism alone took that play between the sovereign right to kill and the mechanisms of bio-power to this paroxysmal point’ (2003: 260).

This presents us then with an unsettling, not to say unhappy, paradox about modernity. Namely that the mission to cultivate life, which is what distinctly modern biopolitics is all about, comes with an imperative attached that seemingly and ineluctably entails the repression or destruction of the other however that is defined: the other of reason- unreason; the other of the ‘normal’, the deviant; the diseased, the criminal and so on. In other words: that which departs from the biopolitical norm however this is established. While it might therefore appear plausible to see biopower with its lust for life as a progressive alternative to the death-obsessed prince of the Absolutist state, this is to miss the point. The prince kills only for sovereign life and territory. The classificatory gardening state Bauman evokes also eliminates life but in the name of protecting a nation’s life and vitality, or rather the vision of what should be in the nation. Moreover it has the means to achieve this in ways not available to pre-modern states and their warring princes.

Given this impasse, pursuing a positive sense of security through the metaphor of gardening might appear to be self-defeating. What looks most positive about the image of gardening, the idea of growing and cultivating, when applied to the social body, appears a legitimation of state practices of the worst kind and
so we are back once again to the problem of the weeds and waste management and by implication negative security. We further need to note that gardens are constituted through the range of security practices undertaken by the gardener in the same way as the modern subject is brought into being through the range of practices that enables it to be visible and known.

At this juncture, where power and state-centred security concerns pervade everything, and any idea of positive security seems to be tied to the positive production of effects of power on the social body, Foucault provides some direction. Shifting from a concern with security, discipline and control of populations through biopower, he turns toward the care of the self in his later work. This shift from security to care can give us the basis for considering a more positive sense of security through care. Conceptions of care provide the exit route from a negative set of productive state-centred security practices.

**Gardens and gardening revisited**

Let us begin with a fairly obvious observation by way of an opening gambit: gardens come in an array of different forms and range in design from wild gardens to those that are more formal and regimented. With this in mind it could be observed that the garden that Bauman evokes in his writings, and the gardening activity he describes, apply to a particular kind of garden whose roots can be traced back to the early modern period. This is very much a formal garden, not to say a mono-cultural affair. Within it, only a particular species is cultivated, difference and diversity are noticeable by their absence and, in the name of waste management, weeds are ruthlessly purged.

While it is true that modern formal gardens of this variety certainly developed in the early modern age, it could be noted that garden design as it evolved thereafter was not characterised by such extreme formalism and regimentation. Nor was the artifice integral to the formal garden lost on, for example, the English metaphysical poets. Andrew Marvell, writing in the 17th century, drew clear distinctions in his work between nature classified as wild, uncertain and innocent, with human gardening endeavour he identifies with the tame, the engineered and the enforced. In his poem *The Mower Against Gardens* he writes:

‘No plant now knew the stock from which it came;
He grafts upon the wild the tame:
That the uncertain and adult’rate fruit
Might put the palate in disrepute.
His green Seraglio has its Eunuchs too;
Lest the Tyrant him outdoe.
And in the Cherry he does nature vex,
To procreate without a Sex
‘Tis all enforc’d; the Fountain and the Grot
While the sweet Fields do lye forgot’ (1963: 42).
Moving forward to the 18th century, looking now at the spectacular gardens of the aristocracy created by the great British garden designer Capability Brown, we begin to witness a backlash precisely against such artifice. In his gardens the formal, symmetrical and the regimented have been replaced with landscaping in a much more natural style. Indeed, the further the West moved into the industrial age, the more pronounced would become this return to nature read as a template for garden design.

Strangely enough, though Zygmunt Bauman mobilises the image of the formal garden and formal gardening practice to develop his analysis, in many respects the metaphor he uses was by no means congruent with the Nazi doctrine of *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) and National Socialist landscape and gardening practice more generally. National Socialism, perhaps unsurprisingly, worked with versions of natural, even wild gardens, drawing for inspiration on the English naturalistic tradition of Capability Brown. Indeed Willy Lange, an influential German garden theorist, explicitly denounced formal gardens in 1933 when the National Socialists came to power, describing them as characteristic of ‘South Alpine Races’. According to Nazi ‘blood and soil’ philosophy cultures that were the most developed culturally were those that were authentically rooted in the soil and the land. This, not least, would lead German garden designers of the period to endorse natural, wild planting, with ‘native’ varieties, while leaving them hostile to the idea of foreign horticulture imports. That is an issue picked up by Lange in his critique of formal gardens which explicitly relied, he argued, on the import of ‘foreign’ plants that were not conducive to a ‘healthy’ plant ecology.

While Bauman is thus correct in the equation that the Germans would draw between Jews and weeds, he is nevertheless wrong to use the metaphor of the formal planned garden to make his case. Jews appear as weeds within National Socialist ideology precisely because they appear as alien and foreign and thus incompatible with ‘healthy’ native species within the space of the *Heimat* (homeland). Unlike ‘cultured’ races, the ‘inferior’ races could not establish an ‘appropriate’ relationship with the soil.

Notwithstanding the model of gardening Bauman is working with in each case we are back to the problem of extreme gardening and the extreme gardener and their waste obsessions. Clearly if we are to move beyond the necro-political outcomes that this system of gardening invariably implies and the negative connotations of security evoked (affirmation of the native, elimination of the outsider, the strange and the different) we need to evoke a different kind of gardening practice associated with a different kind of gardener and, not least, we need to associate this with an altogether different form of garden.

Leaving aside the huge formal gardens of the aristocracy that appear to provide the model of the garden culture of modernity that Bauman works with, we propose to study instead smaller, less megalomaniac, varieties of the wild and inclusive kind, not least because, as we shall see, they provide us with different ways to think about and consider issues of security. These wilder gardens, as we shall establish, do not require extreme gardeners, nor is the ethic of care they
work with conditional in the same way as it is found expressed in formal gardens. As we shall see, wild gardens instead require gardening practice shaped by an unconditional ethic of care. This, we contend, points the way towards a more positive and inclusive conception of security.

Wild gardens emerged very much as a response to the artificial cultivated aesthetics found in formal gardens. Against formalism, geometric symmetry, the wild garden embraces and indeed is modelled on more naturalistic planting styles. Although as we have seen, fascistic desire within some forms of wild garden, particularly those modelled on blood-and-soil philosophy, can express itself in the celebration of a ‘natural species’ fear of non-natural ‘alien’ native plants, it is nevertheless possible to retain the image of a wild garden organised around a diverse ecology, one which is inclusive and in which difference is encouraged. Consider for a moment the concept of the arboretum, woodlands built around collections of species often collected from across the world. Here the celebration of the native species is wholly opposed by the import of foreign trees. Consider as well more anarchic gardens where different elements are thrown together in new ways.

Here the contrived symmetry of the formal garden is replaced by the shock of the new. Unlike formal gardens which exist only on the basis that all matter out of place is excluded, the kind of wild garden we want to evoke as a model for society presents us instead with a space of inclusion. Within them multitude flourishes and is permitted to flourish. In wild gardens you do not find the classificatory excess that Bauman identifies with the modern gardening culture. Furthermore, in a wild garden, the problem of what a weed is does not present itself in quite the same way as it does in the more formal variants. Here the ‘hatred’ of weeds that the extreme gardener displays, is replaced by an ethic of benign tolerance: ‘Let live and let diversity thrive’, becomes instead a more viable mantra, especially when practised by more temperate gardeners.

It could be noted that in the context of wholesale ecological destruction of the planet, its wildlife and fauna during the 20th century, gardening in the 21st century tends precisely towards a sensibility to that which is natural and sustainable, or rather well structured and enduring, more temperate in other words. In wild-life gardens, for example, habitats are constructed with the explicit purpose of creating viable ecosystems that will prove attractive to a variety of animals, insects and birds, many of which, like newts and hedgehogs, are threatened species. Rather than using toxic weed killers, more sympathetically tempered gardeners today seek to use more sustainable, less environmentally destructive methods to maintain their gardens, planting marigolds next to their tomatoes for example on the principle that marigolds will prove attractive to the ladybirds who will then eat the greenfly that infest the tomato. This is a cooperative not an exclusionary ethic of care.

What the vision of wild gardens intimates, and what the more relaxed orientation of much gardening today embraces, is a very different relationship between the garden and the gardener than that evoked by extreme gardeners with their obsession and phobia about weed and waste management. As we have seen, wild gardens are not sites or spaces of radical exclusion. As we have also seen, the problem of weed definition and consequent elimination does not present
itself in the same way. Nor do we find ourselves preoccupied in a wild garden with the cultivation of artificial, pristine pure specimens, or indeed the elimination of other cultivars to make way for them. On the contrary, such gardens are precisely designed to be natural – to evoke already existing habitats. And all of this, we contend, points the way towards reconceptualising security in a more positive way; just as it allows us to break free of the image of the biopolitical gardening state evoked by Bauman.

Towards a positive conception of security

Let us begin by returning to fascistic desire production: the cultivation and purification of the Elect and the Pure, the hatred of the Other, the reduction of the Other to a bloody mess: weed clearance and waste management in Bauman’s terms. And maybe this does embody something of the gardener and gardening practice intrinsic to formal, regimented gardens just as it did to the perverted blood-and-soil doctrine the Nazis actively worked with. If we begin with the idea of the more wild, inclusive and diverse gardens we considered above, and work with this as our template for thinking about security, then it seems to us that when we apply this to social bodies we find ourselves looking at a kind of society very different to that evoked by Bauman, to which different forms of gardening practice lend themselves and which require a very different gardener.

Nazism, as we saw, sought to cultivate pure natural species and sought to eliminate everything that departed from and was felt to pose a threat to the preconceived design its army of engineers and architects worked with. Were we to use a wild garden as our template for modelling society then a very different form of garden would be allowed to take shape and emerge, one in which difference is encouraged. Within it the small and the everyday are conceded as much, if not more, significance to the grand and epic kind of statements celebrated in the Nazi garden (think back to the Nuremberg Rallies as these were represented in *The Triumph of the Will* by Leni Riefenstahl). Where formal gardens require immense effort to maintain in order to become true actualisations of a preconceived vision, society viewed as an inclusive wild garden resolves itself instead into a vibrant mix of different ecologies, working productively with what is already there.

Elimination and purification is no longer part of the gardening vision. True enough, the more wild and inclusive gardens we are evoking here are by nature inherently messier, more diverse and to an extent chaotic – but that is precisely their point. Rather than being designed around the principle of exclusion, they are designed to be inclusive and attractive to a multitude of life forms, specifically those that are in jeopardy or threatened. In this we see at work not just an ethic of care which all gardeners require, including as we have seen the extreme gardener that Bauman evokes, but, to evoke Levinas instead, an unconditional ethic of care, and this we contend is different. Whereas the extreme gardener cares, but only for particular plants and species, the temperate gardener cares for all species.
Tending a social formation modelled on a wild garden invites us to embrace a wholly different set of principles – not to say ethics – to those favoured by the extreme gardener. Rather than aspiring to classify, locate and destroy all the plants that are out of place, the wild gardener tends her garden and its life but without the classificatory zeal of the formal gardener. She has to prune back, certainly, but this is not waste management read as an obsession. True, this form of gardening is biopolitical, but this is not a biopolitics that lends itself to necro-political outcomes of the Nazi kind. Not least, because, within it, the problem of matter out of place does not present itself in quite the same obscene way, just as the problem of regimentation integral to formal gardens is wholly absent from an aesthetic predicated on natural disorder. The temperate gardener is not a slave to an envisaged perfect reality in the way an extreme gardener is, precisely because the temperate gardener is sanguine about what a weed is or is not, and is a lover of variation. The love of order and regimentation which the gardener of a formal garden must exhibit is replaced not only by a recognition that some chaos and disorder are necessary, but also a pleasure in that very prospect.

At this point in our enquiries we find ourselves back with Richard Sennett and his seminal book *The Uses of Disorder* (2008). For the Nazi garden we have discussed above parallels closely the ‘purified’ social order he was contesting, just as the fascist gardener appears to embody the purified self his work attacks. But the parallel runs deeper in so far as the wild garden and the gardeners who tend them embrace, we would hazard, the very spirit of disorder he sought to celebrate as an alternative to purification. The search for purity, he argues, resembles a ‘defensive pattern’, which ‘create(s) in people a desire for a purification of the terms in which they see themselves in relation to others’ (Sennett 2008: 9).

But hidden in this desire to purify one’s identity with others and oneself lies a conservative tendency. The known in this scheme of identity is so insistently taken as true that new unknowns that do not fit are excluded. Reality cannot be permitted to be other than what is encompassed in one’s clearly articulated image of oneself and one’s world (Sennett 2008: 23). Sennett connects the desire for purification at the psychological level with the desire for self-repression. At the psychic level this produces a self that aspires to avoid or turn its back on the unknown and the different, and which seeks instead the defensive security of a purified community of others, themselves mirror images of the purified self. Within the purified self-security, preoccupations of the worst and most negative kind proliferate. For the purified self-hates and fears the Other, like the extreme gardener of the garden Bauman evokes, who hates his weeds. Faced with the immensity of that which is other to itself, the purified community eliminates weeds in order to remove the source of what makes it anxious. In so doing the purified community not only turns its back on possibility, it condemns existence.

In defiance of purification Sennet advocates the need for and production of a self that rejects self-subjugation viewed as a form of enslavement. To be healthy, to be human, requires a world in which a certain degree of disorder, chaos and
anarchy figure. Only by opening the self up to difference and disorder can a more sociable society be constructed. Only in the context of a society in which disorder figures can a self be produced that desires more than its self-subjugation, and concomitant to this, the subjugation of others.

Concluding remarks

As we saw in the introduction, security has developed as a concept but in ways that have led to its separation (indeed divorce) from the concept of cura (or care) to which it was once connected. In the wild garden we are evoking and in the figure of the temperate gardener, we find ourselves back to a conception of security in which an unconditional ethic of care animates and gives life to its practice. The temperate gardener, anchored in the eternal cycle of the seasons, cares, and in that care a positive evocation of security can be found. This ethic of care is animated by a desire to sustain the whole, not preferred species within the garden. It is animated too by a sense of pathos anchored in compassion and empathy, not anger and repression.

Societies modelled on the image of the garden evoked by Bauman cannot accomplish this unconditional ethic because, by design, they interpolate gardeners shaped in their own image. Here security is only ever conditional. No compassion here for the weeds, only obscene obsessions. Unsurprisingly, the purified modern garden invariably produces purified extreme gardeners, and in them negative security obsessions of the worst kind will invariably thrive. And is this not in point of fact precisely our problem of the present day? Late modern societies, in this sense, have not effected an epistemic break with a biopolitical past which also continues to orientate patterns of social action within them. Which is precisely why preoccupations with negative security continue to proliferate today, indexed, not least, by the contemporary ‘punitive turn’ (Hallsworth 2000) and the ‘penal excess’ that has accompanied it.

In a world where we imprison ever more people, where poverty has attained the status of a self-authorised disease, where fear of the other is used routinely to justify even more extreme security measures to punish them, the spectre of the extreme gardener with waste obsessions continues to inspire security practices everywhere. Now more than ever we need a different and more inclusive vision. The wild garden and the temperate gardener offer, we suggest, a better alternative: societies modelled on wild integrative gardening principles and governed by temperate gardeners. In the former we would find less of a tendency towards regimented perfection, but a messier if more inclusive world where a degree of disorder, chaos and anarchy are allowed and where difference is valued. These in turn will be nurtured by gardeners who are not obsessive about waste management and who are sanguine about weeds. In the society modelled on wild garden principles the security of all is what matters, not the security of a future state of perfection that must be achieved. Such a garden is unified not by a conditional ethics but by an ethic of unconditional care.
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Power and Servility. An Experiment in the Ethics of Security and Counter-Security

Phil Carney and Deanna Dadusc

Introduction

Why do we desire our subjection as though it were our salvation? Why do people fight for their own domination as if it was their freedom? One possible answer to these questions, posed first by Baruch Spinoza (2007), picked up in succession by Friedrich Nietzsche (1967), Wilhelm Reich (1997), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (2004) and Michel Foucault (2004) can be found in the phenomenon of security, both as desire and as technology of government. In this chapter we will first analyse how the order of Hobbesian security has been conceptualised at certain moments, in a mostly heterodox history of political thought, both as a desire derived from the sentiments of fear and enmity, and as a technology of power that works on individual and collective conduct. Following this critique, we will point to alternatives in an experiment with the ethics of security. In asking whether it is possible to have an ethically ‘good’ security, we encounter ethics in two senses: first, in considering the possibility of ‘good’ (ethically acceptable) techniques of security and, second, a way of conducting the self in the face of the indubitable and apparently increasing power of security apparatuses. We are interested in the second aspect because we want to look more closely at the ethical side of the power relations through which security operates. Hence, our aim is to consider a positive or productive ethics of security, an ethics of security that seeks to overcome the traditional affective investment of security in fear and enmity. In this respect, and as a positive alternative to ‘anti-security’ (Neocleous 2008; Neocleous and Rigakos 2011), we will examine in this chapter the possibility of a counter-conduct of security.

Contract, security and sentiment

The concepts of security, obedience and liberty are deeply intertwined in the history of political theory and practice. Security has achieved a threefold meaning: (1) security from threats, such as an external enemy or an internal force; (2) security to access to basic goods and rights, such as food, health, resources; (3) security of, intended as certainty or peace. Throughout this chapter we will
focus primarily on the first conceptualisation: security from threats, from internal and external enemies, the kind of security associated with fear, enmity and servility that dominates discourse today. In the history of political theory the concept of security is related not only to liberty, but also to obedience (Necleous 2008). Desire for security legitimises the exercise of political authority over citizens, inducing individuals to renounce and limit their liberties, to submit their rights to an authority, and to promise obedience to a sovereign body. For Hobbesian classical theory, security is associated with the social contract: the imaginary pact that arises as an answer, or a reaction, to the fear and enmity that characterises the natural state. This means that the constitution of society, of a secure society, is the result of – is founded upon – the sentiments of fear and enmity, and of a process of negation, of subtraction of power, rather than the constitution of a stronger power. Order can only be granted through imposition by a higher force and authority, whether it is a sovereign or a juridical order (or both), which will limit the power of individuals to destroy each other. Obedience, compliance, and submission to the higher body are what will free the subject from fear and hatred. Individual liberties must be limited, sacrificed in the search for security where civil rights replace natural rights. In this perspective, the sovereign is legitimised, permitted by a contract in law, to ‘do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of peace and security, by prevention of discord at home and hostility from abroad’ (Hobbes 2008: §47). Security, therefore, is not to be understood as the counterpart/contrary/antinomy of fear, but as its direct effect. Sentiments of fear and enmity underpin the desire for security. Hence those who resist government become public enemies. The disobedient, the rebels, the anarchists are considered as political monsters, as criminals who, by breaking the social contract, go back to the state of nature. By making their own laws, they position themselves not only against the law, but also against and outside the society on which these very laws are founded.

While Hobbesian security and its governmental progeny were founded on the affects of fear and enmity, all the better to cultivate willing servility, the Spinozist approach seeks instead to establish a political order driven by the ‘joyful’ affects that multiply rather than limit the capacities of the governed. According to Spinoza, no one would submit to a pact and limit their rights and powers [potentia] unless out of fear of a greater evil or out of an abstract, forlorn hope for a greater good. Sovereignty will retain a power to compel by force only as long as it is able to promote and maintain both this hope and this fear. Indeed, for Spinoza, the security achieved by these means should not be called security but subjugation and slavery where the will turns away from ‘using’ life, from expanding life, only in order to escape death (Balibar 2008). The course of history is in reality conditioned by the fear of the multitude’s strength. Those who govern are constantly in fear of the latent power of the masses and, in response, seek to induce fear in them, even terrorise them. Therefore, the so-called peace and security achieved through delegation of rights to the sovereign, is mainly a security of the sovereign from the subjects. With the establishment of political institutions and with the submission to an order of security, fear, instead of
being eliminated, is just displaced or inverted: from fear of the masses by the sovereign, to fear of the sovereign by the masses (Balibar 2008). Fear becomes both a tool to legitimise the exercise of power, and to make this exercise of power effective, as it is also the basis of the authority of those who govern. In the end, fear as a sentiment, as an affect, leaves the individual in a merely reactive position, diminishing her power of action.

Spinoza rejects the classic distinction between natural right and civil right along with the concepts of social contract and representation: rights, indeed, cannot be granted by the juridical order, but coincide with the expression of one's power to act \([\text{potentia}]\): the right of the individual is co-extensive with its power (Spinoza 2007). Here right is not an abstract category defined juridically, but can only be expressed; it can exist only in so far as it is actualised: one's right is not something that can be transferred, but is rather enacted. Instead of contrasting rights and duties, Spinoza analyses the relation between independence and dependency, and where the variations in their degrees establish the level of freedom of individuals. While absolute dependency is equivalent to slavery, absolute independence is impossible, as individuals are always in a relation of force, and all entities are necessarily reciprocally interdependent (Spinoza 2005). Hence, the question posed by Spinoza, and that distances this perspective from that of Hobbes, is one of how to balance the relations of forces entailed by each power to act (rights) so as to add up and multiply, rather than limit and subtract this power. Spinoza offers an answer that makes a distinction between compatible and incompatible rights, and it is related to the singular qualities of rights: compatible rights are those entailed in a collective praxis that leads to the multiplication of power, and that contribute to the constitution of a stronger force; incompatible rights are those that de-compose a body or a force, and that lead to its destruction (Balibar 2008).

While the sociality of Hobbes is founded on repression and delegation of power to normative laws, Spinoza's involves an immanent movement of interrelation, cooperation and expression of forces in order to produce a stronger, rather than weaker, social body: the key concept is constituency, rather than security. In order to achieve such an expression of forces, it is not only desirable but also necessary to overcome fear and enmity. In short, for Spinoza the desire for security and the consequent dependency/subjection to a sovereign is strictly dependent on threats and promises, fear and hope: fear of enemies, justifying sovereign violence, and an indeterminate hope for a fear-free, therefore negative peace. In the \textit{Ethics}, Spinoza (1989) counts fear and hatred among the sad affects \([\text{tristitia}]\), the affects that depress strength and inhibit action. Politically, \textit{tristitia} renders people more governable because they are less strong and therefore have less capacity to express their power \([\text{potentia}]\). In this state, obedience is far more easily enforced. In order to resist this state of affairs, we must overcome those mechanisms that cultivate sentiments of fear and hope.

Before moving to the conceptualisation of security proposed by Michel Foucault (2004), it is necessary to deal with the reflections of Friedrich Nietzsche on the development of the relationship between modern morality and power.
In many important ways, he constitutes an important bridge between Spinoza’s and Foucault’s conceptualisations of power and of security.

**Self-enslavement: from Spinoza to Nietzsche**

Clearly inspired by Spinoza, for in the *Genealogy of Morals* he gives to the 17th-century philosopher one of his rare bibliographic acknowledgments, Nietzsche describes the ‘slave morality’, which involves a complex set of emotions at the core of which is *ressentiment*, an angry bitterness about the world in general, particularly about that which is not ‘the same’. Slave morality is only capable of reacting negatively rather than acting positively. In effect, Nietzsche extends Spinoza’s analysis of the sad affects [*tristitia*], the affects that inhibit the capacity for action [*potentia*] and which enables a dominating power [*potestas*] to operate. If Spinoza asks why the sad affects of submission are striven for, then Nietzsche provides a genealogical analysis of the power relations in which they are generated.

In the *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche describes how a slave morality is carefully cultivated among their ‘flock’ by priestly elites, the first form of pastoral power later to be analysed by Michel Foucault. In its mediaeval form, priestly rule is a mode of governmentality that inculcates a knowledge about the world as a place criss-crossed by demonic danger and spiritual insecurity, a place where clear choices must be made between the pure and the impure, a place of a perpetual war between good and evil. The path of righteousness is perilous but is made all the more so because members of the flock are ‘fallen’ and prone to sin. As a result of their sinfulness, individuals in the flock are plagued by guilt, which inhabits a new form of interiority. Ever-vigilant of the risks of temptation and tendencies to sin, the flock is a multitude of the sad.

In the ritual practices of the pulpit and the confessional, the priest is a pedagogue who inculcates a fearful, self-observing, ever-vigilant and self-punishing subjectivity. Through these new forms of priestly technology another epoch-making step is made in the operation of power: the capacity for self-enforced servility. For Nietzsche, pastoral power works to cultivate self-surveillance and self-punishment, thereby transforming the active into the reactive and inculcating a slave morality, a morality seeking docile obedience as a ‘moral’ good, as an ultimate aim. It is a clever power for it makes subjects the agents of their own subjection. We can now see clearly the antecedents of Michel Foucault’s (1995) analysis of surveillance, discipline and punishment. It is not so much a repressive apparatus as it is a ‘productive’ technology, producing docile subjects. Even more cleverly, it is a self-subjection that hides its essence as a practice of power and sublimates it in the most elevated, transcendent, and unquestionable ideals of religious morality. Nietzsche describes a pastoral government where the priest is a broker of the Good and a protection against Evil, a religious forerunner of the by now familiar relationship between danger, fear, enmity, obedience and security, as well as, of course, hope in salvation that delivers a final, absolute, eternal state of security.
Self-servility is forged in the crucible of enmity, where the self is the reactive product of a battle against an evil other. ‘Goodness’ is only the product of an absence, an absence of evil, and ultimately an absence of danger. Nietzsche argues that

‘in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world […] Its action is fundamentally reaction. […] Picture “the enemy” as the man of ressentiment conceives him – and here precisely is his deed, his creation: he has conceived “the evil enemy”, “the Evil One”, and this is in fact his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a “good one” – himself!’ (1967: I §10).

Through a nothingness of the good, the absence produced by the never-ending process of purification, the flock’s inner tristitia and therefore its submission to pastoral government is profound. In this state, enmity against an evil other may burst into the world in an intensely reactive form. In his work, Nietzsche touches on the example of anti-Semitism, an affect-driven system of fear and anger at the core of which is a vengeful rage characteristic of ressentiment. Nietzsche does not develop his views at this stage but here we are reminded of the broader ‘wars of the races’ characteristic of 19th century nationalism and analysed by Michel Foucault (2003), in which fear and enmity identify external and internal enemies. An exemplar here would be the infamous Dreyfus case, the anti-Semitism of which centred on the construction of an ‘enemy within’ as a security threat, thus translating into the secular realm the reactive affects cultivated by priestly, pastoral power.

FROM RELIGIOUS TO SECULAR SECURITY

Michel Foucault follows Nietzsche’s understanding of how power relations work, and of how security, and the ‘secure man’ can be conceptualised. Security here is a technology of government, working not primarily by means of repression but by ‘activation’. Foucault discovers a new technology of security analytically distinct from the mechanisms of discipline with their medicalised construction of normal and abnormal, which cannot completely escape religious constructions of good and evil. Nietzsche’s ‘ascetic ideal’ lives on in discipline, but an attempt is made to articulate it with new governmental practices of security. We might ask the Nietzschean question: what happens to security after the death of God?

Perhaps Foucault’s description of security provided in his lectures at the Collège de France (2008; 2009) is a provisional answer. In an uncertain way, Foucault’s analysis of security mixes the forms of ‘security from’, ‘security of’ and ‘security to’ we mentioned earlier. While he appears to focus for the most part on the ‘security of’ and ‘to’ in the new liberal, capitalist order, the other form of security is not excluded. The utilitarian discourses and practices of security, so closely related to those of liberal political economy, coexist with other discourses that keep alive and, indeed, give new vigour to sentiments of the ascetic
ideal, to the *ressentiment* of Nietzsche’s slave morality. At the same time, the obedience demanded by sovereign power is so much more effectively enforced when it is distributed across the social body in the form of a subjectivity of voluntary servility. But, first, let us examine Foucault’s analysis more closely.

While, formally, the security of sovereign power is ‘negating, legislative, prohibitive, censoring, and homogenous’ in Foucault’s (2009: 83-85) concept of governmental biopower, the negative connotation of repression is left behind in order to develop an understanding of the productive force of pastoral power. In this context, power is not primarily exercised by means of prohibitions but by a productive network that runs thought the whole social body, which does not so much repress as it incites, induces, seduces, makes easy or difficult, enlarges some and, by the same token, limits other possibilities of action (Foucault 1982; 1988). In *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault refers to Guillaume de la Perrière’s definition of government as ‘the right way of arranging [disposer] things in order to lead [conduire] them, not to the form of common good, but to a suitable end for each of the things to be governed’ (2009: 126). According to Foucault the emergence of priestly, pastoral power in the Middle Ages represents one of the key moments in the history of power that led to the constitution of the modern western relations between government and subjects. Modern configurations of security power relations have their predecessors in the pastoral principle of salvation. Thus security is a governmental technique where obedience is founded on and by the desires for salvation that flow through individuals.

Foucault’s conceptualisation of power relations entails an analytic differentiation between the technologies of sovereignty, discipline and government (‘security forms’). They neither exclude nor replace each other but coexist – and their various combinations produce different effects. Whenever we speak of the technique of security, we are obliged to consider its articulation with the technologies of sovereignty and discipline. While the tool of the sovereign is a law underwritten by an assumed monopoly of violence, and fear of the sovereign is the technique that guarantees obedience to the law, contemporary societies see the development of new techniques of government. While the sovereign law-violence dyad continues to play an important role, it is articulated with the pre-eminent technique of government in contemporary western societies, that of security. Sovereignty entails obedience, but the security of governmentality entails ‘conduct’; the technique is not to produce a subject that is stopped from acting in a certain way but a subject that respects a specific code of conduct and way of life. In this context, therefore, the classical dialectic between security and freedom changes its relation, as freedom becomes the prerequisite for security, or a technique for security. Freedom, in other words, becomes a technique of government itself, as it actually sustains and enables the functioning of security (Foucault 2009).

At the same time it is important to emphasise again how sovereignty and security interact. In the first volume of *History of Sexuality*, Foucault (1998) appeared to overstate the idea of a shift from sovereign forms to biopolitical forms of government in modernity, but it is also clear that he saw sovereign violence operating in modernity through the obverse of biopolitics, *thanatopolitics*, some-
thing he reiterated in his Society Must Be Defended lectures (2003). In The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), he mentions three dimensions of the discourses of liberalism and liberal government that develop from the later 18th century. The first is the idea of freedom and its intimate relationship with security. Freedom is produced and therefore consumed and it is always in a relationship with security. The construction of freedom takes place in certain key areas, whether in markets, trade, civil rights, and so forth. Foucault is making a familiar argument: freedom is not released into its true nature by the removal of restraints – the conventional discourse of the Enlightenment – rather it is produced in various ways through social practices. The second feature of liberalism is the idea of risk and danger. All kinds of danger are identified. Foucault mentions discourses of crime, disease and degeneration as examples. We could also refer to the associated fears and dangers of perversity, conspiracy, spies, foreigners and colonial underlings, many of which walk hand in hand with discourses of ‘security from’. In the course of the 19th century an ‘entire education and culture of danger’ (Foucault 2009: 66) appears. As a consequence, liberalism is always accompanied by a ‘political culture of danger’ (2009: 66). The third feature of liberalism is the proliferation of ‘procedures of control, constraint, and coercion’ (2009: 67), especially those Foucault analyses as panoptic in Discipline and Punish (1995). Liberal government in modernity is therefore marked by a complex interplay of freedom, security, danger and control. While in sovereignty, security is centralised at the heart of the state, in the context of governmentality it is distributed among multiple forces that govern and conduct not only behaviours but also desires, moral values, social relations and modes of life. It enters the hearts and desires of the people. Echoing Nietzsche, Foucault proposes the concept of conduct as translation of ‘oikonomia psuchon’ (2009: 192), namely the management of souls, the way in which the pastorate not only exercises control on the principles of salvation, law, and truth, but also establishes other types of relationship through all kinds of diagonal force: therefore the exercise of power extends to guiding the possibility of conduct. The result is the constitution of ‘a specific subject, who is subjected in continuous networks of obedience’ (2009: 239). Obedience is not the outcome of repression; rather repression becomes possible through the micro-political cultivation of obedience. Conduct not only involves leading others, but refers to a way of conducting oneself: it is a reflexive power of self on self. If security, in the context of sovereignty, was assured by obedience, in the context of governmentality, people secure themselves through a practice over the self. As a form of power relation, an important dimension of security (like discipline) is an obedient relation of self to self rather than solely a relationship of obedience to the outside. It is not so much subjection, as in sovereign power relations; it is subjectification [assujetissement].

Foucault (2003) demonstrates how the enmity and fear underpinning Hobbesian security undergo a process of mutation in modernity. He shows that narratives and tropes of fear and enmity enter modern, liberal forms of government. A secure society is also that which is defended against internal and external enemies, who become versions of the anormeaux, somehow different, somehow
inferior, somehow threatening, but always enemies and objects of enmity and, indeed, fear. In the new liberal order, it is the biopolitically-constructed national population, called ‘society’, a nationalistic society, which is obliged to defend itself against these enemies whether they are internal or external. A society seeking its own security is always in a state of enmity, seeking to defend itself from interior or exterior threats. Here we re-join one of the themes in the Birth of Biopolitics lectures (Foucault 2008). Our ‘risk society’ (Beck 1986), the society in which there is a ‘political culture of danger’ (Foucault 2009: 66) is also a society that constructs dangers in the form of enemies against whom we must wage a kind of constant war in which we either capture and neutralise or expel/eliminate the target. These ‘wars’ involve the articulation of all three forms of power: security, discipline and sovereignty. As Foucault (2003) makes clear such threats have often been constructed in the terms of ‘race’. Indeed race is an operative concept in this play of enmity and fear. Hence, in passing, we might recall how readily this kind of enmity has come to the lips of those who govern in modernity, from the notion of social defence to the various wars on poverty, drugs and so forth, as well as in the fascism and micro-fascism that constructs the foreign other as an enemy, and builds armies, police forces, borders and apparatuses of security to fight it.

Thus, following Foucault’s own prescriptions at the beginning of Security, Territory, Population (2009), we are dealing with a nexus of power in which security, disciplinary and sovereign forces interact with each other. In this way, we find the intensely value-laden emotions of fear and enmity, for example, playing a key role in the ostensibly value-free, passionless, liberal order of security. Thus the 20th century in particular has been witness to populist discourses animated by the mass media, sometimes insurgent, sometimes governing. For sure, security is never very far away from the patriotic and xenophobic hearts and minds of the populist right and far right today, where a fear and hatred of migrants, multiculturalism, the new, dangerous other of Islam, the cosmopolitan EU, criminals (and, even better, foreign criminals), the terrorist outside and inside, among other spectres and evils, is an outlet for the ressentiment described by Nietzsche and channelled through modern discourses and practices of discipline, biopolitics and sovereignty. Safety from these dangers is to be provided by well-armed sovereign authority and expressed in the surveillant powers of migration police, secure detention centres, a harsher criminal justice system, a strong national army and well-functioning apparatuses of security. When modern security meets sovereign violence, as it so often does, we therefore remain under the shadow of Hobbesian affect, traversed by the forces of fear and enmity.

HOW POSSIBLE IS A COUNTER-CONDUCT OF SECURITY?

We have seen that security is achieved not simply by means of repression but by means of activation, conduction and the production of subjects who desire and cultivate servility. Hence individuals become not only a target of govern-
ment but also its tool, as power exercised through their very conduct. Using the concept of conduct, we have explored the field where politics and ethics meet each other in order to produce governable subjects. This understanding has important consequences when thinking through an ethics of security, how it is that we become servile, how government may be resisted, and how it is possible to challenge and subvert the power that is exercised not only upon individuals but also through individuals.

Foucault’s famous statement that wherever there is power there is also resistance should be considered with care. Indeed, Foucault (1982) does not see resistance as a reaction to power, but rather as its counterpart. Hence the subject enters a field of power in which the will-to-submit is in play with countervailing forces. Power relations are the outcome of many forces of different modalities and vectors. We can extend this understanding as far as to argue that security, as a technology of government, interacts not only with subjectified compliance traversed by the affects of fear and enmity, but also with specific forces of resistance to domination and discipline.

If the power \textit{potestas} of security combines sovereignty, government and discipline, then there are multiple fields where struggles (can) take place (Foucault 1982). In resisting the power associated with Hobbesian security and in challenging the way one subjects oneself to desires for security, it is necessary to enact resistance at all the levels in which the power of security operates. In the case of governmentality, Foucault (2009) has examined a particular form of struggle, designated as ‘counter-conduct’. Coining the word ‘counter-conduct’ Foucault decided to abandon other words such as disobedience, dissent and insubordination, as practices of resistance may have a productivity, forms of existence, organization, consistency and a solidity that are not captured by other concepts, which tend to imply a negativity of power relations. As such, counter-conduct is not simply opposition, but the production of a new way of living, of relating to civic life, ethics and obligations. It is a force that, either collectively or individually, constitutes nodal points of attack on the strategy of conduct, by putting it in question, working on, elaborating, and eroding its systems of salvation, obedience, and truth. In this context, Foucault (2009) addresses struggles that are not merely passive refusal, but creative of alternatives and of heterodox forms of existence. He does not refer to present-day cases, but in the mediaeval pastorate he mentions, for example, a form of counter-conduct relevant to the regime Nietzsche (1967) described: the Amaurians in Paris – pantheists who rejected the idea of sin and who cultivated practices irreducible to obedience (Foucault 2009: 263) – perhaps anticipating, we might add, certain aspects of the Spinozist position on security.

Counter-conduct places an emphasis on the immanent aspects of resistance, which are never external to power but always in correlation and mutually constitutive. Using the perspective of counter-conduct allows an understanding of resistance beyond the negativity of ‘protesting against’ or ‘rebelling against’ power: movements of resistance indeed are not merely anti-power, but, by actively creating alternative modes of politics and ethics, constitute counter-powers. Contemporary autonomous social movements (Graeber 2009;
Martínez 2007; McDonald 2002), attempt at elaborating modes of life, social relations, and political organisations alternative to those prescribed by the law and morality imposed by the sovereign social contract and by governmental and panoptic power. Rather than repressing or being formed by the renunciation of the individual power to act and delegation or representation of individual rights, these movements find their force in the conjuncture of everyone’s capacity to act. In this view the power and rights of the individual are not intended as threats to the collectivity, but as an enrichment, a constituent force of collective counter-powers.

The practices expressed by these contemporary counter-conducts are not disconnected from the modern security dispositif that Foucault described. They are embedded in the society to which they seek an alternative: they are not outsiders, they do not and cannot refuse every dimension of the social and moral order. Thus an important question is the extent to which, in resisting security apparatuses, there may also be a tendency to elaborate practices of anti-security (rather than counter-security), which instead frame the struggles with a language of enmity and reproduce the dangers found in the Hobbesian legacy and its articulation with modern, governmental security. As discussed above, reactive modes and sad affects based on enmity, hatred and fear are the very tools that lead to one’s subjection and subjectivation. Consequently, resistance to security by ethics and practices of anti-security can easily lead to a form of self-enslavement, and to the reproduction of the relations of power that resistant movements intend to subvert.

Thus resistant movements that refuse to be governed and acted upon in the way established by the Hobbesian social contract have to experiment not only with different forms of social and political organisation, but also with alternative ethical relations which side-step the sentiments of fear and enmity. Hence, as an alternative to both security and anti-security, we would like to experiment with an ethics of counter-security, or a counter-conduct of security, by inventing different forms of conduct, and alternative elaborations of both political and ethical life. Engaging in a counter-conduct of security entails inventing social, political and affective relations based not on fear and repression of each other’s power of action [potestas], but on the mobilisation of active affects and the multiplication of power [potentia].

Concluding remarks

It is a desire to be servile to power that we have examined in this chapter together with the possibility of countervailing forces of ‘resistance’ to the modern forces of security or, better, a ‘counter-conduct’ of security. Power, servility and resistance are activated and at play in the micro-politics of security, and must therefore be considered in an ethics of security. In this ethics we must pay particular attention to the affective dynamics of power relations. Where there is Hobbesian security, there is also fear and enmity, as well as a passive, stupefying hope for something better. In a model originating with Spinoza we find a
relation between active forces, that go to the limit of what one can do (potentia and joyful affects), and reactive forces, that separate things from their power of action (potestas and sad affects). Fear, enmity and hope are reactive forces associated with the sad affections of security. Indeed Nietzsche elaborates on this formulation, differentiating between active and reactive forces and describing the problem of reactive servility (the ‘slave morality’) where ressentiment, a bitter, vindictive and vengeful rage, moves deep in the heart of this love of domination (Deleuze 2006; Nietzsche 1967). And so the circle is complete: it is precisely the affects of ressentiment that are recruited in all the various micro-fascisms at play today, found in that continuum between the populist politics of the centre, radical populism and the far right, where hatred of the other and the call for strong security is never far away.

There are ethical and political pitfalls in resisting the power of security. The elaboration of counter-conduct involves a double movement: first, a kind of refusal of the prevailing affective order of security and, second, the affirmative construction of another way of life. Somewhere deep in the word ‘resist’ is a certain way of acting against. Surely to resist is also to be reactive? How do we avoid falling into that trap? The answer is four-fold. To avoid this negativism, resistance is obliged to go beyond the initial ‘refusal’ towards a more active mode of living. It is in this spirit that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) warn against a politics of refusal. Second, this kind of resistance is a pivot, a moment, a turning point, rather than a project. Third, the resistance is not animated by the twin sentiments of fear and enmity; it is instead moved by affirmative sentiments. There is always a problem with resistance that takes the form of a refusal based on hatred, an affect that constructs enemies and thus reproduces rather than transcends the Hobbesian affective nexus. This kind of refusal intoxicates, becomes addictive and thereby only ever becomes a form of ressentiment. Fourth, only an affirmative will undoes the inherently negating force of the term ‘security’, which is marked by an absence, an absence of ‘care’ [se cura].

If we fail to go beyond the turning point of refusal, even a refusal without hatred, then we may become trapped in a project of resisting for the sake of resisting, something which wills nothing, an ultimately nihilistic gesture. Driven by an act of willing nothing, such a stance mutates again into the desires of ressentiment, the very same desires that will servility. In Spinozist terms, it is a recipe for inaction and incapacity, a renunciation of potentia and therefore following a path into wilful servitude. As a gesture that seeks to resist an oppressive power, it becomes its opposite. It has been suggested that a politics of refusal could avoid the negativism of ‘saying no’ and take the form of the Bartleby formula, ‘I prefer not to’. However Bartleby’s formula is agrammatical, involving a will without an object that slides between willing nothing and not willing at all (Deleuze 1997). It therefore moves between reactive negativism and self-extinction in a politics of negation.

Instead of a politics of refusal, which inhabits the same territory as ‘anti-security’, our ethics of security uses refusal as a pivot, as the momentary means to the end of an affirmative form of security. It is therefore a counter-security in
the service of positive security. In a strong sense, this affirmative ethics cannot do anything else but go beyond the moment of resistance and become a positive will, a creative will, an expression of *potentia* rather than a reactive will to submit to the *potestas* inherent in the Hobbesian affects of security. When invested in the field of security, this positive will is also a will to enact a positive security. Of course, this positive will enters an arena of forces in which the active and reactive are at play. In moving away from negation, a positive ethics of security transcends the basic terms of the equation: it is not so much an aim for that which is absent [*se cura*], the ‘without care’, but instead an elaboration of a different kind of care. It is not a dialectical movement from the monstrosity of ‘insecurity’ (without-without care) towards security. It is not a movement from a double negation to a negation. Instead it follows a trajectory away from these dialectics in order to enact something positive, something affirmative. This is where we must begin our experiment.

**References**


Notes

1 Brian Massumi (1992) differentiates between ‘affect’ as a pre-personal force, ‘emotion’ as social interaction and ‘feeling’ as personal, but we believe this pigeonholing of such mobile forces is problematic and goes against the micropolitical approach we want to take, where the same forces flow across the social field at the same time as traversing individuals. Hence we will use the terms in a free and exchangeable way. Thus in this use of Spinoza, our position will also see ‘affect’ in its more obvious, common sense of emotion.

2 Herman Melville’s 1853 story, Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street has been discussed in the context of a politics of refusal, originally by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), who draw on Gilles Deleuze (1997), among others, and latterly in relation to the heterogeneous Occupy movement. The eponymous Bartleby initially refuses to undertake his tasks in a Wall Street firm and then progressively refuses more and more, becoming a kind of squatter, until he lands in a New York prison where he meets a self-willed death foretold from the moment he arrives in the story and declares ‘I would prefer not to’.
Introduction

Governmental concern for maintaining security in the face of terrorist threats has grown dramatically in intensity and scope in the US since September 11, 2001. As a powerful imperative, security shapes governmental responses to a great many circumstances and events that have no direct relationship to terrorism yet are treated as if they are threats to national security. As a result, notions of security and attendant practices have seriously undermined community and democracy. So from a US perspective it is difficult to view security in any positive light. My decision to do so nonetheless lead me to identify several egregious drawbacks of security as it is currently conceived and practiced in the US and to use those drawbacks as material for imagining a more positive notion of security, one that could support and even enhance safety and community. In other words, I aimed to answer the question: How can the problems with the ways security is framed and pursued suggest alternative framings and practices that would be beneficial? The chapter relies on observations and previous research about US cities with particular attention to New York.

I first briefly review some history of the term ‘security’ and compare it to ‘safety’. I then explore several key problems with the current framing of security to identify alternative ways of thinking and acting. These problems are: paying more attention to the security of place than to the safety of people; applying practices that assume the scale of the nation without sufficient attention to what is local; a framing of security as from rather than security of and for; and prioritizing vertical relationships over horizontal ones. I use examples of the design and management of urban public space to explore strategies of security-from, which are largely exclusionary, compared to strategies of security-of and security-for, which seek to support and strengthen circumstances that are already present or could emerge.

Security and safety

Starting in the 1940s and developing further during the Cold War the term ‘security’ became closely identified with national security – referring to the survival of a nation in the face of external threats largely through military means.
The United Nations body primarily responsible for maintaining international peace, which held its first meeting in 1946, is called the UN Security Council. And starting in 1947, the US president’s principle forum for considering foreign policy has been the National Security Council. The organization shown to have been collecting data on the phone records of everyone in the US as well as foreign leaders is the National Security Agency.

With the first terrorist attacks in the US, such as the bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995, and then those of September 11, security in the US has come to mean security from terrorism with all the militaristic associations previously associated with national security. After the September 11 attack, a new federal department, the Department of Homeland Security, was established. The act of Congress establishing the Department described its primary mission: ‘prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States’ (Department of Homeland Security 2014). This is certainly not an unreasonable mission. What is problematic are the measures that have been adopted to carry out that mission and the consequences of those measures. Of equal worry is the extremely wide range of events that are deemed to be terrorist threats to ‘national security’. One hundred eighty-seven existing federal agencies are under its purview including Citizen and Immigration Services and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEEMA). The latter inclusion demonstrates that the Department’s responsibilities extend well beyond addressing terrorism to encompass preparedness, response, and recovery regarding natural disasters. Such an extension placed natural disasters and terrorism in the same category and lead to the employment of militaristic responses to both, as so clearly and painfully demonstrated in FEEMA’s responses to Hurricane Katrina (Cooper and Black 2006).

To capture the inclusiveness of the disparate kinds of threats that Homeland Security must address, beyond terrorism, the mission the Department now declares for itself is: ‘to secure the nation from the many threats we face’ (Department of Homeland Security 2014). This statement makes clear that the focus is on the security of the nation, not of people or localities, and that the security to be achieved is security from rather than security for or of.

A brief review of the recent history of the noun ‘safety’ in the US reveals a different focus and orientation. In US policy and federal departments it refers to laws, acts, departments, requirements that will protect individuals from bodily harm, threats that are external, but what is often addressed is the safety of circumstances and the safety of people. One example appears in the stated purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration: ‘To assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and women...’. Other government agencies are also charged with ensuring safety by setting and enforcing standards of products or places: the Food and Drug Administration, the US Department of Agriculture, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the American National Standards Institute as well as non-profit organ-
izations such as the National Safety Council and the National Crime Prevention Council.
Acts of terrorism are indeed a threat and rightly require preventive strategies. So do acts of crime. Yet the all-encompassing concentration on achieving security against terrorism generates more attention and funding than does increasing the safety of people from acts of crime, particularly in low-income urban neighbourhoods. Although rates of violent crime have been decreasing in cities throughout the United States, crime, including homicide, is still an everyday threat in many poor urban neighbourhoods, keeping both adults and children fearful of leaving their homes. Even when safety-from does receive attention, authorities often adopt policies and practices similar to those for seeking security: to achieve and maintain a high level social and spatial order so that efficient and predictable flows and routines of city life are not disrupted and so that control of space by police and other agents be fully maintained, regardless of the consequences. This imperative to control, and the adoption of and physical design features and management practices in public space to achieve control, frequently reduce people’s use of public space and the liveliness of the city, thereby undermining both community and democracy. Security is pursued through strategies of exclusion rather through strategies to improve or strengthen what is already present. And so: ‘... all too often “securing public space” means securing public space from the public, not for it’ (Vale 2005: 41).

IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE AND THE LOCAL

With the legacy of security as national security, it is not surprising that security practices in the US focus on geographically defined places and employ militaristic means to respond to threats, whatever the actual source of threat may be. As a result, the overriding concern of federal and local authorities appears to be the security of places rather than the safety of people, with the latter being re-framed to be first and foremost a matter of security of place and secondarily, if at all, the safety of people. This mindset and related actions become dramatically apparent after catastrophic events when protecting property receives more attention than saving lives. In response to highly exaggerated and unsubstantiated media reports of ‘looting’ of stores after the Katrina Hurricane in New Orleans, the state governor changed her original announcement that search and rescue would be the highest priority to ordering police to pursue law breakers rather than focusing on saving lives. National Guard and active military units sent to New Orleans adopted the appearance, weapons and tactics of a military action, attending more to securing the city from ostensible looters than to the safety of its residents. Militaristic tactics so closely connected to security rather than to life safety constructed residents of New Orleans not as victims but as the enemy. In using the term ‘war zone’ the media and officials did the same (Cooper and Black 2006). In addition, the imposition of strict curfews prevented possibilities for residents to help each other. Just as the importance of people was ignored so was the importance of relationships between people.
Along with prioritizing the security of place over the safety (and well-being) of people, current security practices ignore differences between places, starting with overlooking scale. Another legacy of national security is that the scale that is implicitly assumed is that of the entire nation and not the region, city or neighbourhood. Hence, as Cindy Katz (2008) notes, the same kinds of efforts to increase security are made at the level of nation, city and home. So just as differences between various kinds of life threatening events are ignored (a terrorist attack vs. a hurricane) so are differences between different places. And so generic kinds of militaristic, exclusionary responses are used regardless of the nature of the event and across all locations. However, any particular event, even a terrorist attack, occurs in a particular location with its most powerful and most direct effects being local, not national, affecting a neighbourhood, a city, and the surrounding region. Implicitly viewing eminently local events at a national scale makes it possible to apply the same generic, generalized responses to all locations and to overlook the particular weaknesses as well as the strengths of individual locations, be they cities, neighbourhoods or even blocks. In focusing on the national, the importance of the local is not only overlooked but also neglected by relying primarily, if not exclusively, on federal or state authorities after disasters and not sufficiently on community organizations and local residents.

Fortunately with respect to crime in some cities more attention is now being given to the local: to the exact locations where crimes have occurred. Criminologist David Weisburd has shown that street crime takes place in concentrations in small geographic areas – at the scale of street blocks – over long periods of time. For instance, over 50 percent of the total criminal incidents reported in Seattle each year took place in only 5 to 6 percent of the city’s street segments (Weisburd et al. 2004). Experiments he and his colleagues have conducted assigning police to criminal ‘hot spots’ demonstrate that police presence not only reduces crime on those blocks but in nearby areas as well (Sherman et al. 1995; Weisburd et al. 2006). The New York City police department now recognizes that crime varies not only by neighbourhood but also by street block and so maps the locations of crime and deploys police accordingly (Tierney 2013a). Other circumstances would benefit from this kind of micro-geographic research and management as well.

The micro-geographic mapping of crime assumes that places differ, at least in the occurrence of crime, and investigates those differences. Recent research about urban neighbourhoods, growing in sophistication and insight, documents the ‘enduring’ effects of characteristics of a neighbourhood on people’s lives (Sampson 2012). It proceeds from the fundamental assumption that places, at the scale of neighbourhoods and even individual blocks, differ significantly from each other and that these differences matter. A positive approach to security would do the same. By necessity, any design or management intervention to increase security must occur in particular geographic locations and so is necessarily local. A positive approach to security will recognize that the best interventions are likely to vary by location, depending upon local circumstances. For instance, in those communities that have many local organizations and
close relationships among residents, those organizations and networks can be mobilized in times of emergency. In other areas where such groups are scarce and relationships between residents are weaker, authorities will have to take on more prominent role.

A positive approach to security would address the safety of people as well as the security of place without sacrificing the former for the latter. At the same time, place would be addressed with attention to the local and characteristics of the particular place that is under threat or in crisis. With the prioritizing of the local, attention could be paid not only to the individual occupants and households of a place but also to the relationships between them and how those relationships could be mobilized as a resource, so that residents can extend aid to each other, so that existing community organizations can mobilize themselves.

SECURITY OF AND SECURITY FOR

Security as currently framed and pursued in the US is security from someone or something rather than security of a given circumstance or phenomenon. Cindy Katz describes this well: ‘... attending to the (exaggerated) concerns of security from at the expense of attending to the more widespread problems of social reproduction that can be framed as security of’ (2008: 319). The common strategy is to exclude or minimize a threat from a place rather than to enhance or strengthen what is already present in that place and provide security for what is there. The means employed for doing so are to reduce the physical or visual accessibility of a place, through design elements and management practices, or to remove those already present. Security-from relies heavily on methods of exclusion; security-of and security-for rely on inclusion and, when necessary, exclusion. To explore strategies of security-from and strategies of security-of and security-for, I will use examples of the (1) design and (2) management of public space.

(1) Designing public space

Design features of public space work in varying degrees to exclude people and activities from a given place or to invite access and activities. At least two basic features play significant roles here: the nature of the physical boundaries that define the space and what design elements and amenities are present that support its occupation. If the intention is to exert control and reduce accessibility, designers will make the space difficult to see or to enter and provide few options for activities within it. If the purpose is to invite use, the space will be made physically and visually accessible with cues, through design, for what people can do there and amenities that make it pleasant to be there. So one can ask of any public space: What is the nature of the boundaries of the space and what possibilities for using it are incorporated into its design?

Creating boundaries to public space as a means of excluding is best illustrated by interventions that prevent or restrict access such as closing streets to vehicu-
lar access, placing Jersey barriers or bollards on sidewalks in front of buildings and checking or restricting people’s access to the interior of public buildings with metal detectors at the entrance (Boddy 2008; Németh and Hollander 2010; Vale 2005). Trevor Boddy’s observations indicate that some of these security measures through design have become less visible, being camouflaged in various kinds of street furniture so that planters serve as barriers in front of buildings or bollards are designed to also serve as seats and people use them as such. Other forms of protection through exclusion may also invite use, such as wide swaths of park like public space around the new American embassy in London, which includes a moat around the building itself. These particular design elements whose main purpose is to protect the building from attack also serve to encourage the use of public space near the building. Security of public space and the public’s use of it do not have to be antithetical to each other. Both increased security and increased use of public space are achieved. This is not the case, however, of the security requirement for solid, blank walls at street level (and sometimes higher) and the forbidding of retail outlets at ground level (Vale 2005). These features reduce the visibility of the sidewalk from the building interior and remove opportunities for using the sidewalk (to window shop, to enter or leave shops and restaurants), making the sidewalk less lively and less safe for pedestrians. The goal is security-from, not security-of.

Using physical design to limit physical and visual accessibility of urban public space, ostensibly to increase security and feelings of safety inside the space, has design precedents in the 1980s. During that period in the US of building privately owned interior public spaces in corporate buildings, hotels and urban shopping centres, the tendency was to make these spaces nearly invisible from the street by enclosing them with blank walls, or reflective glass, and building skywalks so that people could move from one building to another without walking on the street, thereby reducing activity on the adjacent sidewalks. Commentators such as Mike Davis (1992) and Trevor Boddy (1992) documented this situation, particularly in Los Angeles, pointing to the fortress-like character of these buildings. Through these design features, a new kind of public space (indoors, privately owned but accessible to the public) was designed in opposition to the traditional public spaces of sidewalks, squares and parks.

Disconnecting public space from adjacent city sidewalks was also apparent in the original design of the Lincoln Centre for the Arts in New York City and the plaza at the base of the Twin Towers at the World Centre. In both cases existing streets were removed to create superblocks. Buildings were placed to enclose open spaces within both complexes so they became hard to see from adjacent streets. The spaces were provided with few amenities that would encourage people to spend time in the space. As documented by William Whyte (1980), even when plazas in New York were close to the street and visible from it, being large and barren made them un-inviting. Intended primarily to create some kind of respite from the city, these spaces did so by walling the city off, and gave little attention to the possible liveliness of the public space within the plaza or without. Use of space and its possible liveliness had no place in this framing, and designing, of the public realm.
Expressions of the opposite view – that the use of the public space of streets and sidewalks and their liveliness are vital to city life and to people’s safety – preceded the building of fortressed public spaces, emerging as it did in the 1960s and extending to the present day. Central to this body of research and design are two key ideas for how to increase safety of public space: allow visual accessibility to a space and provide reasons or amenities that encourage use. It was precisely the mixture of residential and commercial uses of neighbourhoods and the ability of residents to easily see the sidewalks below them that Jane Jacobs (1961) described in her groundbreaking work as key features of safe sidewalks. Neighbourhoods composed of low-rise residential buildings and small retail outlets that directly abut and opening onto the adjacent sidewalk give a variety of people different and ample reasons for being on the sidewalk over the course of the day. Residents and shop owners have views of and easy access to those sidewalks. It is just such features of design that ensure use and safety. The effects may be long term, generating and supporting relationships between residents, relationships that serve them well in emergencies. Research conducted many years later in Chicago showed that in mixed use residential neighbourhoods with an active street life residents were more likely to know each other and to come to each other’s aid, so that elderly residents in these neighbourhoods were less socially isolated and less likely to die in the 1995 heat wave (Klinenberg 1999).

The visibility and physical accessibility of outdoor space and people’s use of it figure in other research and design guidelines about multi-family housing. Oscar Newman (1972; 1981; see also: Newman and Franck 1982) showed that the visual and physical accessibility of spaces immediately outside people’s homes and the clear assignment of those spaces to adjacent residents for their use encourages residents to use them, to take responsibility for them and thereby to keep them safe. It is true that the intended consequence is that outsiders who have no reason to be in the space will be excluded but the goal is to increase the safety of the space for those who do have reason to be there. The goal is security of the space, security achieved by residents themselves through their own use and care of space.

While Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman addressed use of space and safety in residential neighbourhoods, William Whyte examined how public spaces located downtown can be lively. In his findings and his design recommendations, the design features of visibility and easy accessibility from adjacent public spaces, particularly the sidewalk, again figure prominently along with amenities that will encourage use – sun and shade, movable seating and the opportunity to purchase food (Whyte 1980). Jan Gehl’s (2010) recommendations for designing public spaces downtown and in residential neighbourhoods also focus on the importance of mixed-use, physical and visible accessibility, the character of boundaries and the provision of amenities. Notably Jan Gehl advocates for the ‘soft edge’ between building interiors and adjacent exterior spaces of sidewalk and street, recommending ‘transparent, welcoming and active facades’. Vikas Mehta’s (2013) study of sidewalks in Boston demonstrates that the block with the most pedestrian social activity possessed several defining features includ-
ing a variety of businesses, permeable building facades, public seating and commercial seating.

Many of the design interventions have been made to encourage the use of urban public space. In 1975 and 1977, New York City’s planning commission permitted the city to enlarge its variety of privately owned public spaces or to ensure that they have the necessary amenities to encourage use. The tenets of new urbanism employed in the building of new communities include mixed-use neighbourhoods. In replacing public housing with mixed income housing, developers adopt some of Oscar Newman’s guidelines – namely the building of single-family houses with outdoor space assigned to particular houses. Some of the most dramatic design shifts can be seen in the renovation of arts and civic complexes where the preference for enclaves of public space, separated from adjacent streets, has been replaced by a desire to re-connect to the city. Lincoln Centre in New York has been redesigned to achieve this goal by: transforming one significant wall that faces the street from solid to transparent, by creating open space with seating along streets, by making pedestrian access into the complex more visible and more inviting and by incorporating more amenities within the public space of the complex (including a sloping lawn). With respect to the World Trade Centre, the local community was successful in ensuring that a previous through street will be restored to run through the complex, reconnecting the public space of the Centre to the surrounding neighbourhood.

Since 2001 other design initiatives undertaken by New York City government have clearly increased the use and liveliness of public space in particular locations. Notable is the closing of selected traffic lanes along major streets, such as Broadway, to create seating areas that are enclosed by planters and contain movable café chairs and tables. Between 2009 and the end of 2013, 59 of these pedestrian plazas have been created through partnerships between the Department of Transportation and local community organizations, resulting in over 71 miles of space pedestrians can use (Wolfson 2013). The Department of Transportation will also be installing 1,000 new benches along city sidewalks by 2015. The city has also encouraged bicycling by laying out 365 miles of bike lanes and installing many bike racks as well as establishing a bike-sharing program. Many new parks, including Brooklyn Bridge Park, have added to the city’s store of open space for recreation and programmed events. In several other US cities a different method of providing outdoor sit-able space has been adopted: installing benches or tables and chairs and other amenities in what were formerly parking spaces next to sidewalks. These ‘parklets’, which started in San Francisco in 2010 and now number 38 in that city, are funded and maintained by local businesses and community organizations but are free for all to use:

‘A parklet repurposes part of the street into a space for people. Parklets are intended as aesthetic enhancements to the streetscape, providing an economical solution to the need for increased public open space. They provide amenities like seating, planting, bike parking, and art’.2
A lively and inclusive street life – pedestrians passing, shop fronts directly facing the street, outdoor cafes, street vendors and places to sit for free – can increase both the security of places as well as safety of people since more people are watching, some of them quite perceptive and knowledgeable. An excellent example is the two street vendors in the theatre district in New York in 2010 who noted smoke coming from a vehicle, alerted the police and so foiled a car bombing. However, conflicts between the desire for liveliness and an active street life and certain security strategies do arise, as the directive for blank walls and no retail outlets demonstrates. Another example is the police department’s decision that access to the through street to be restored through the World Trade Centre site will have to be limited and controlled. Streets in and around the centre will be closed to normal traffic with guard booths for allowing only certain vehicles to pass. Residents who lobbied for the restoration of the street are suing the police department over the ‘fortress-like’ security plan (Dunlap 2013). It is also clear that the increase in design interventions in public space in New York to make it more inviting and usable have come hand in hand with the increasing gentrification of neighbourhoods in all boroughs and growing income inequality. The initiative of building of new parks and renovating existing parks has overlooked some poorer neighbourhoods. However, when the threat of violent street crime is great enough, as it is in some urban neighbourhoods, just being in public space can put one at risk of being victimized and possibly killed. In such cases increasing use of public space may not increase people’s safety but actually jeopardize their lives and other measures, including crime prevention programs pursued by the police and other agencies, are required.

(2) Managing public space

Use of public space is also shaped by rules and regulations and the related practices of authorities responsible for ensuring people’s safety – municipal police officers, private security guards and in times of emergency the National Guard. As with the role of design elements, these rules and practices shape the nature of the borders of a space and the activities that take place within them. Indeed, the degree of exclusiveness of public spaces does not result as much from its design qua design or even from its form of ownership but rather from what laws and regulations govern its use and their enforcement and, more generally from commonly accepted behavioural norms in the space (Parkinson 2006). For instance, one of the public spaces seen to be most restrictive, particularly of political activities, is the shopping mall. But its restrictiveness is a direct function of management decisions and court cases supporting those to exclude political activities. Given different management and legal decisions, it could be otherwise (Barber 2001).

Using management strategies to control accessibility and use is very clear when police cordon off sections of cities during events that are expected to attract demonstrators, such as political demonstrations restricting access to adjacent streets, plazas and highways and even air space. Peter Marcuse (2006) recounts
one such case: the 2004 Republican Convention in New York. The 400,000 demonstrators were only permitted to march up 20 blocks of 7th Avenue several blocks east and out of earshot of the convention at Madison Square Garden, and no rally was permitted for Central Park, frequently the site of mass gatherings for entertainment and, many years earlier, for anti-war protests. The police also adopted a dragnet approach of forcefully removing all occupants, not only demonstrators, from spaces that were deemed necessary to be secured. During the demonstrations by the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011 police used excessive force in several US cities to remove demonstrators from streets and plazas. Other examples are the militaristic security measures taken during global summit meetings to very tightly channel and control all forms of dissent through the control of space (Starr et al. 2011).

Since 2001, as efforts in New York to design public space for people’s use increased so did the police practice of stopping and searching young men suspected of carrying guns even when there was no legal basis to justify such a search. Reports have shown that this practice of ‘stop and frisk’ was exceedingly frequent, racially biased, and rarely resulted in finding any weapons or other evidence of criminal behaviour. In 2012 for example, police stopped New Yorkers 532,911 times; 89 percent of the people stopped were innocent; 55 percent were black and 32 percent were Hispanic (American Civil Liberties Union 2013). It is a management practice that treats any young black or Hispanic male, even in his own building, as a potential enemy. Just fitting the profile and being in public space was sufficient to be treated as a threat. Fortunately the practice, a clear violation of constitutional rights, has been recognized as such by the courts, has decreased dramatically in frequency and starting in 2012 is under careful scrutiny.

A governmental strategy of removal in the pursuit of security-from can jeopardize community as well as democracy. Starting in the 1980s the preferred judicial measure taken toward illegal drug transactions in the US has been to give extremely long prison sentences even to first offenders, meaning that usually male residents of poor urban neighbourhoods are incarcerated for many years. Such high incarceration rates for long periods of time weaken families and communities. One study (DeFina and Hannon 2009) shows that mass incarceration between 1980 and 2004 increased poverty (and very likely decreased levels of community efficacy). As with curfews the imperative is to remove and exclude from a space rather than to strengthen and support what is in the space, namely the relationships between residents that help create and sustain community.

Following the bombing at the Boston marathon in April 2013, one might have expected the New York City government to forego any marathon in November 2013 in fear of a similar attack. Instead intense security practices and presence of a much larger contingent of police were employed to ensure the safety of the runners and the many watching them. Runners passed through metal detectors before the run began; bomb sniffing dogs were present in many locations and those who wished to watch the last one quarter mile of the race had to pass through security check and helicopters patrolled above (Macur 2013). Police
presence and security surveillance to ensure safety and to be able to respond quickly should an untoward event occur was also used, by necessity, during the weeks in fall 2011 that Occupy Wall Street demonstrators camped out in Zuccotti Park in New York when no existing regulations allowed the police to remove them. However, once the court ruled that the demonstrators could not legally camp in the park, police used brutal tactics to remove them. Even with the threat of possible terrorist acts, large recreational events such as concerts and marathons, are not only allowed but encouraged by city government, but forms of dissent, a necessary feature of any democracy, are highly restricted. And just as recreational uses of public space are increasingly encouraged through both design and management, so are its commercial uses. Over the past decade the number and variety of food vendors conducting business on New York sidewalks and in parks and plazas legally has increased. And, in an effort to increase the availability of fresh fruits and vegetables in poorer neighbourhoods, in 2008 New York City instituted the Green Cart program for private entrepreneurs to sell fruit and vegetables on sidewalks. The vending of food and other items in public space is part of the larger phenomenon of the people, and businesses, adopting public spaces of all kinds to pursue activities of their choice, with and without official sanction (Franck 2012; Franck and Stevens 2007).

One type of public space whose lively use by the public has not been recognized is New York’s privately owned public spaces that are often located within office buildings. In fact, they have been criticized for being exclusive enclaves by virtue of their design and management features (Miller 2007; Németh 2009). However Te-Sheng Huang’s (2014) field observations demonstrate that a wide variety of people actually use some of these spaces for diverse activities. Notably, with respect to security and community, groups of people regularly meet in these well-lit, climate-controlled places to engage in recreational and educational activities. Moreover, group activities are pursued by people who did not know each other previously, suggesting that this type of public space serves as a kind of community centre where ‘community’ is not based on co-residence in the same geographically defined area but on shared interests. While rules of conduct are posted and security guards are always present, they are less of a constraint upon what people do than previously assumed since, as directed by management staff, they do not always enforce the posted rules. Rather than discouraging people’s use of the spaces, it seems very likely that the presence of security guards helps create a safe setting which people find suitable for group activities. Rather than serving to exclude people, their presence often seems to encourage the presence of variety of people; what is achieved is security of the space and security for those who use it.

Concluding remarks

The constant presence of security guards in privately owned public spaces ensures the safety of occupants and increases the possibility that people will
use the space including participating in group activities with people they have just met (Huang 2014). And so the security practice supports horizontal relationships – between occupants. At the same time, by being relatively flexible (and friendly) rather than strict and authoritarian, guards can establish an accepting, even friendly, relationship with occupants, modifying what are in fact vertical relationships – from authorities to citizens. This horizontal orientation is precisely the opposite of the highly authoritarian vertical or hierarchical relationships evident in the harsh militaristic tactics police and other authorities employ in response to emergencies or in everyday police practices in some cities (Quarantelli 2008).

The imposition of curfews and arresting those who break them not only illustrate the operation of vertical relationships in a time of crisis, they also show how horizontal relationships (between residents) are prevented from being an asset – a source of aid and resiliency. This is highly troubling since research shows that after disasters residents of some neighbourhoods are willing and able to extend help to their neighbours, often as a consequence of a strong existing network of horizontal relationships they have with each other. Yet in pursuit of security-from, authorities view vertical relationships as more important than horizontal ones and control as more important than community. Not only are these questionable, value-laden choices but they are also made without analysis or research to support them. In fact, research has demonstrated that lower levels of violence are linked to higher levels of neighbourhood social cohesion and residents’ willingness to intervene to achieve collective good, often called ‘collective efficacy’ (Sampson et al. 1997).

To increase safety authorities can take approaches that encourage or enhance less hierarchical relationships. In place of the recent unconstitutional ‘stop and frisk’ practice used in New York, police officers will be building closer relationships with communities, serving more as partners in crime prevention measures. Other examples of the pursuit of horizontal relationships are programs such as Cure Violence (formerly called CeaseFire) in Chicago neighbourhoods and Save Our Streets in Crown Heights in New York. The programs employ staff, often former gang members, who work to reach out to young residents who have been identified as prone to gun violence to steer them differently or actively intervene when violent events are about to occur. Cure Violence also adopts methods to mobilize local community organizations in the fight against local crime. Research has shown the effectiveness of its efforts (Skogan et al. 2009). It seems very likely that when horizontal relationships are valued, more attention is given to what the local problems are and how best to address them.

The design recommendations of Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman also point to the importance of horizontal relationships: between residents or residents and shop keepers and between residents and the spaces adjacent to their homes, which in the right circumstances residents can use and so come to know their neighbours and also adopt as part of their own zones of influence and so help ensure their security. While Oscar Newman’s design recommendations do suggest how outsiders can be discouraged from using these spaces, certainly a form of exclusion, the intention is to ensure their use and their safety for resi-
dents and, thereby, for encouraging a sense of community (Franck 1983; Newman 1981).

Design features as well as management practices that encourage diverse uses of public spaces support horizontal relationships, certainly an important step toward ensuring safety and strengthening community. Pursuing security of place with a heavy reliance on vertical relationships and exclusion may have its place in the prevention of terrorist acts. But with respect to the safety of people and the thriving of community, it is not so much the control of space as its liveliness that needs to be valued and sought. This means that a perspective characterized by security-of and security-for recognizes the value of horizontal relationships. It can also focus attention on the individual characteristics of particular places and their occupants, on the need for local conditions to be supported or created, giving significance to what and who are already there and their relationships with each other.

References


New York Civil Liberties Union (2013). ‘Stop and Frisk Data’. Available at: www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data.


**Notes**

1 Some of the discussion of positive and negative aspects of ‘securitization’ parallels what I say in this essay but without the focus on public space or design (cf. Aradau 2004; Roe 2012). There seem to be two quite distinct bodies of work regarding: (1) securitization or (2) security and public space. The former appears to be centred in Europe and the UK and the latter in the US.

Empirical Part
‘Habit is the constitutive root of the subject, and the subject, at its root, is the synthesis of time…’ (Deleuze 1991: 92).

INTRODUCTION

I had already done several stretches of fieldwork in Karachi before I settled down in Hyderabad, a city of one and a half million inhabitants and a three-hour drive from Karachi. I did not know anybody in Hyderabad, except for an old friend whom I had met earlier in Karachi. Many Karachiites had described Hyderabad to me as a town ‘in the interior’ of Pakistan, meaning that in their perception it was a far-off place, an uninviting, unruly backwater with a hot climate and a relentless law-and-order problem. Part of me felt attracted to that reputation, much to the amusement of my acquaintances in Karachi, but I also recall feeling very much on my own when I finally arrived there in the summer of 1996.

In the course of a few weeks, maybe days, I gradually began to feel at home, a feeling that grew from cultivating habits. From the moment I woke up in Hyderabad for the first time my body began to explore the place by developing certain routines that would eventually shape my everyday life in the city. The same early morning walk to the bazaar to buy fresh milk at the same dairy shop, picking up the same collection of newspapers from the same stall on the same corner of the street, the walk home via the same daily detour, the similar sounds coming from the alley while I was typing out my notes from the previous night, the same bus route to the city centre in late morning, the similar small talk in the same tea shop.... It was through these everyday habits that I began to develop a sense of knowing the place. Even the call for prayer that woke me up at five in the morning gradually reassured me of my newly developed sense of stability. It made me feel more comfortable, which must have had a subtle effect on the ways I walked the city. After a few weeks people stopped looking at me as a complete stranger. Rather than shouting ‘Amrika! Amrika!’ at me, inquisitive young kids asked me whether I was a Palestinian student: still a foreign, if not mythical, category, but also one of them. All this thanks to habits. If security has become an issue and a scarcity, I think this is so because my arrival in Hyderabad is only a variation of the social alienation caused by urban
life and globalisation. In this modern condition, I argue, a sense of security primarily rests upon habits and the question of whether or not one is socially and spatially allowed to develop habits. I use the term habit rather than twin-concepts like custom or ritual to emphasise the everyday nature of these practices. If custom is associated with tradition, and ritual with ceremonial procedures, habits denote the practices through which we consciously or unreflectively shape our everyday life, and which enable us to develop a sense of control over our environment. If this makes sense, it follows that to promote a positive notion of security means to promote the possibility of habit making.

**Community and privacy**

I must emphasise that I arrived at this thought only after rejecting two other possible sources of human security in modern society: community and privacy. Pondering the question of what gives modern subjects a reassuring sense of self, my thoughts initially revolved around social identity, which is at once a notion of solidarity and alterity. In other words, identity binds us to some people, but distinguishes us from others. The binding force accounts for the experience of community – face-to-face, virtual, imagined – whereas separation requires privacy, either as an individual or a group. There is no doubt that both principles can create a positive sense of self. In my work on Pakistan I have described how neighbourhood solidarity in the fast-growing and ethnically diverse city of Karachi has created a sense of ‘quasi-domesticity’ that enables Karachiites to continue to feel at home in a city that has grown too big and chaotic for comfort (Verkaaik 2009). Privacy, or the ability to temporarily close oneself off from public space, seems to me to be another way of empowering the self. ‘Hell is other people’ [L’enfer, c’est les autres], Sartre famously wrote, describing hell as being in a room with others with your eyelids cut off: the ultimate image of lack of privacy and freedom.

Still, despite their positive effects for the experience of security, both community and privacy are also problematic for a number of reasons. First, there is a negative side to both of them that potentially threatens, rather than nurtures, our sense of self. Communities can be oppressive and violent; consider for instance the anthropological interest in gossip as an informal mechanism of social control and normative behaviour (Besnier 2009). James Ferguson gives another graphic example in a study on economic decline in Zambia, which forces city-dwellers to re-establish contact with family members in rural areas. The forced restoration of urban-rural family ties has resulted in a revival of ferocious forms of witchcraft (Ferguson 1999). Privacy, on the other hand, can become a form of isolation, autism or anomie, if stretched too far.

Second, both community and privacy are sources of human security that, in a modern context, are constantly under threat – indeed, a contradiction in terms. Communities are primarily characterised by impermanence. Neighbourhoods are broken up by gentrification projects, migration and socially upward mobility. In the form of gated communities, they are surrounded by insecurity and
danger, like medieval castles and towns. Other terms like ‘social networks’ (Boissevain 1968), ‘neo-tribes’ (Maffesoli 1996) and ‘formations’ (Meyer 2009) have been coined to avoid the illusionary notion of stability that is associated with the term community. Over the last few decades the single most studied aspect of communities has been how they are constructed. And although this has surely prevented some of us from seeing that even constructed communities can be experienced as real and authentic, it also indicates how fragile the feeling of community has become. Similarly, privacy also seems permanently insecure. In Pakistan, for instance, perhaps the main civic frustration is locally known as ‘encroachment’, meaning that the space you feel is yours is always under threat of being invaded by others, be it a street vendor who occupies the doorstep in front of your house, an extremely powerful loudspeaker on a newly built neighbourhood mosque that disrupts domestic conversation, or a corrupt politician who illegally plans a new apartment building overlooking your patio. Everywhere, new neighbours bring new noises, not to mention norms, which may impact on your own sense of well-being.

The feelings of community and of privacy therefore both seem to me to be beleaguered aspirations, which might explain why they are so dear to many of us. Threatened by the conditions of modern urban life, these aspirations are also the product of modernity. This makes them intrinsically unstable as sources of a positive notion of human security. Given that this instability is the result of the modern and globalised condition, it cannot be remedied. That is the fallacy, I think, behind many current attempts to artificially promote a sense of national or neighbourhood community as a therapy to foster social integration. National integration courses or neighbourhood projects to enhance social interaction may have many effects – some negative, some positive (Van den Berg 2013, Vollebergh 2014) – but they rarely result in a more developed sense of national or neighbourhood solidarity among the people for whom they are designed. As Peter Geschiere has argued, the notion of ‘autochthony’, so prominently employed in contemporary Europe to denote locality and belonging, is in fact a highly relativistic and unstable principle, creating insecurity for everyone, those labelled as ‘allochthones’ as well as those temporarily defined as ‘autochthones’ (Geschiere 2009). And although I realise that the state-promoted fancy of national or neighbourhood community is a far cry from forms of solidarity that are formed bottom-up, these, too, are a dialectics of security and insecurity. To be sure, I do not think this is any different in the case of habits. But habits, as I argue below, are more flexible. They are our ways of adapting to new and changing situations.

**BEYOND BOURDIEU’S HABITUS**

The main reason why I suggest that habits are our primary source of human security is because it is through habits that we allow our bodies to adapt to the environment. If Georg Simmel (2006) was right in describing the modern city as a cacophony of signs, then modern life is characterised by the constant
possibility of change that disorients our senses, and therefore latently disrupts our sense of self, which implies that we regularly need to establish the link between our bodies and our environment anew. I propose that we do this by way of developing new habits or adjusting our habits to new situations. This suggestion of a link between habits, human bodies, and the social world obviously forces me to consider the influential notion of habitus as it has been interpreted by Pierre Bourdieu, but I will do so in a critical way. As is well-known, Bourdieu reinterpreted the notion of habitus within the context of French academic Marxism in the 1960s. The attempt was to reconcile Marx's materialism and Weber's idealism in order to show how class becomes embodied culture. The social – meaning 'class' in Bourdieu's theory – is incorporated into our bodies by way of psychosomatic forms of socialisation through which certain bodily dispositions are developed in us. My use of oblique speech here is intended to indicate that Bourdieu describes this socialising process as something that happens to us, beyond our will or even consciousness, which makes it all the more curious that Bourdieu has become one of the leading thinkers of an actor-oriented approach in anthropology known as ‘practice theory’ (ortner 1984). As Peter Sloterdijk (2011: 190) has recently put it, Bourdieu’s notion of embodied habits boils down to a ‘class-in-me’ theory, rather than a ‘class-through-me’ or ‘class-by-me’ one.

Where such a view leads to, was inadvertently made clear by Sartre several decades prior to Bourdieu in the text I referred to above, the 1944 play No Exit [Huis Clos]. The hell that is the others refers not so much to the physical bodies of others as to the habits and customs on the basis of which we judge ourselves and others. Explaining the intended meaning of the play, Sartre said: ‘What I wanted to suggest is precisely that many people are encrusted in a series of habits and customs, and that they are suffering from judgments made about them, but that they don’t even try to change... It is a living death to be surrounded by an endless concern for judgments and actions you don’t want to change.’ (quoted in: Contat and Rybalka 1974: 99) There is, however, a solution to this zombie existence governed by normative habits, a solution that Sartre called freedom. But this existentialist freedom is a freedom from socialisation, and therefore as impossible as it is inconceivable. Similarly, in Bourdieu’s framework there is nothing beyond habitus-as-class: nothing but a-social, hence inconceivable freedom. But habitus as incorporated social oppression is a Verelendung of meaning compared to what the term was supposed to do originally.

If habitus is primarily an aesthetic term for Bourdieu, denoting bodily preferences and aversions, it was originally meant as an ethical term. Aristotle’s notion of ‘hexis’, which is at the root of habitus, signified an acquired and trained disposition, the result of activity [energeia], which enables a person to act virtuously in a new situation. Similarly, for Thomas Aquinas, habitus had a profound ethical connotation, meaning a cultivated disposition to act morally without much effort in any given situation. Although Marcel Mauss, who introduced the term into modern anthropology, freed the term from its ethical implication, he still used it to describe a form of self-cultivation by which we can change our habits through bodily practice. Building upon this notion, Talal Asad (1993) used
the term in his genealogical study of ritual as a concept that meant something like ‘repetitious action’ or ‘developing aptitudes’. In all these cases, habitus is a virtue or a skill acquired through repetitious self-discipline rather than an embodied class-consciousness that is imposed upon us. Anthropologists like Saba Mahmood (2005) and Jarrett Zigon (2009) have returned to this original meaning of habitus to make sense of, respectively, contemporary Islamic piety in Egypt and Christian drug therapy in Russia. The already mentioned German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (2011) discusses the term in his Nietzsche-inspired argument about ‘anthropo-techniques’ or modern forms of asceticism. In sum, the relevance of the term today lies in its capacity to understand human agency in terms other than inconceivable existentialist freedom. The concept of habitus remains relevant to understanding that the choice for self-making is a choice for a self-imposed regime of learning and training – in sum, of habitual action. Although the terms habitus and habit are obviously related, I would like to retain and emphasise the difference between them. As I use it here, habit is a broader term, which includes habitus but is not restricted to it. Habitus is defined here as a largely conscious and willed form of habit-making: the daily exercises of an athlete, dancer or musician; the rituals of a religious person; a student trying to master another language; an adolescent trying to get used to the taste of coffee or wine; a child learning how to skate or ride a bicycle. However there are at least two other ways in which we develop habits. One is through socialisation, which is largely in accordance with the thesis of Bourdieu, but not limited to class and not equally encompassing. These are the practices through which we, often unawares, reproduce social norms and hierarchies. Finally, I distinguish a form of habit making that is closer to Michel de Certeau’s (1984) notion of walking the city, although not all of these banal practices necessarily imply the connotation of tactical resistance. These are mainly practical routines, adhered to largely unreflectively, that do however impact upon my perception of me within a particular place. I have already given an example of this third kind of habit-making in the opening section of this article, where I described the daily practices through which I let myself become acquainted with a new place. I will now briefly give examples of the other two forms.

**Habit-making through socialisation**

The study of the recently introduced Dutch naturalisation ceremony, which I conducted with a number of students a few years ago, offers an illustration of how habit making through socialisation might work. The ceremony was introduced in 2006 as the last stage of the new integration courses for migrants aspiring to become Dutch. However, its impact on the naturalisandi was meagre compared to the impact it had on the municipal bureaucrats who organised the event. Whereas the migrant went through the ritual only once, for the bureaucrats it became a regular routine. Many of them were initially opposed to the ceremony because they saw it as a disciplinary act imposed on migrants by the right-wing government of the 2000s, whereas they themselves tended to
sympathise with the migrants they worked with. However, they also learnt to enjoy organising the event, which in most cases was staged as a festive moment with a lot of local folklore. Although they did not ideologically support the neo-nationalist spirit with which the ceremony was associated, in doing they reproduced its ideology by appropriating the ceremony in their own ways. The relative freedom to organise the event in the way they wished enabled them to incorporate the ceremony and its dominant ideological meaning into their bureaucratic routines (Verkaaij 2010).

For an example of how self-imposed habitus might work, I have a number of recently completed MA theses on contemporary religiosity at my disposal. Today’s students tend to be interested in spiritual exercises like Western Buddhism or Islam, shamanism, or self-help Christianity such as *A Course in Miracles*. Often personally involved in the topic of their research, they competently avoid the simplistic theories of the sacralisation of the self, the romantic spirit of authentic experience, or the hedonism of New Age. Rather, they show that modern subjects tend to pray and meditate for the same reason people have done so in previous times, namely as a technique to master instincts and transform themselves into a moral person. They do so by constructing a transcendental entity – ‘the universal self’, ‘Buddha nature’, ‘The natural child’, ‘God’, and so on – as an ethical ideal, and then begin to work toward this ideal by way of ritual repetition, which seems to differ from earlier forms of religious practice only because of its often eclectic and self-acquired nature.

As I see it, then, all these various forms of habit are ways of doing that enable us to make peace with our environment and ourselves. Organising the naturalisation ceremony enabled Dutch bureaucrats to reconcile themselves with an ideology they did not share. Meditation and prayer enable young Buddhists, Muslims and Christians to like themselves. Daily routines enabled me to live in a strange city for more than six months. The point seems to be that habits work on the level of what, in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty, may be called ‘somatic subjectivity’. It is through subjecting our bodies to certain habits that we change our minds. Reassuring myself cognitively that Hyderabad was a safe place would have been meaningless – and untrue to boot – if I had not forced my body to experience this illusion. Dutch bureaucrats would have found it more difficult to accept neo-nationalism in their procedures if they had not enjoyed the pleasure of organising a folklorist party for new citizens.

**HABITUAL SPACE**

How, then, can we enhance security if it depends on the opportunity to develop bodily habits? There may be several ways to do so, but here I want to focus on only one possible way: the creation of habitual space. I readily admit that my choice for this possibility is completely arbitrary: it happens to be one of the topics of my current research on religious architecture. Although I do not claim this to be the only possible way promote habitual behaviour, it at least has the advantage that I have recently given it some thought.
In an article on American church architecture, Gretchen Buggeln describes the trend of Protestant church buildings in the 1950s and 1960s that accommodated the coming-of-age of the baby-boom generation. It was a quick and cheap architecture, influenced by the modernist ideology of functional design, but was however often poorly applied, with the result that many of these buildings looked like uninspired state school buildings. To the children and adolescents who went to these places for Sunday school, they conveyed the message that Protestant Christianity was ordinary and institutional. Buggeln writes:

‘I am often struck by the simple details when I walk through these buildings, such as small, grey bathroom tile that reminds me of the restrooms in my own elementary school, or linoleum floors that are nothing if not common institutional fare. Modern after the fashion of public schools, no longer monumental, and often cheaply built and unimaginatively designed – what were the lessons taught by these buildings? Did they represent the apotheosis of the Sunday school, or rather its dissolution into the ordinary? Scholars of American religion chart a decline in church affiliation that began with the adult children of the post-war generation. The reasons for that decline are numerous and complex, but it would be indeed ironic if these educational structures played some role in the exodus from the church, when the intention of their builders was so clearly to draw young people into permanent fellowship’ (2010: 212).

What struck me about this passage is that it so neatly parallels my own experiences as a 10-year-old kid in a family losing its religion in the early 1970s. We were a Catholic family when we moved to another part of the country and settled in a newly built suburb. I remember my parents being disappointed the first Sunday we went to church. Like everything else in the vicinity, it was a new, concrete building with little ornamentation and no atmosphere. After migration, without the social control of family and long-time neighbours, what was the point of going to church if it was just as ordinary and depressingly bright and optimistic as the rest of our new environment? In a matter of months we stopped being practising Catholics.

Possibly because Dutch sociologists have long thought that secularisation was an inevitable process that needed no explanation, we know little about why so many Dutch citizens left the church (Van Rooden 2004). With Gretchen Buggeln, we can only speculate what role post-war church architecture – in the case of Catholicism accompanied by the modernisation following the Second Vatican Council – has played in the decline of church affiliation. But the point that the atmosphere of a place matters in making people feel at ease has generally been better understood by the architects of commercial structures than by modern church designers. In their polemical study on the commercial vernacular architecture of Las Vegas, Robert Venturi and his co-authors briefly mention the reassuring ordinariness of the gasoline station. ‘The gasoline stations parade their universality,’ they write, describing the Las Vegas Strip: ‘The aim is to demonstrate their similarity to the one at home – your friendly gasoline station’ (Venturi et al. 1977: 35). Our new church, in contrast, was not a friendly
structure. As newly arrived suburban settlers, my parents missed the habitual space of a typical 19th century Catholic Church building, its dusty smell and filtered light. What they found instead was a sad, quasi-modernist wannabe church that looked like a gym with a cross attached to it.

The theorists of space and architecture that I will list in this paragraph and the next will usually not be associated with Las Vegas fan Venturi. In fact, they tend to write in a homely poetic hand that profoundly differs from the neon aesthetics of the desert city or Venturi’s no-nonsense style of writing. But like Venturi they all defend the comforting effect of habitual space. ‘In every dwelling, even the richest,’ Gaston Bachelard writes in *The Poetics of Space*, ‘the first task of the phenomenologist is to find the original shell’ (1994: 4). And: ‘… all really inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home’ (1994: 5). Based on these observations, Bachelard argues for a topology, that is, an understanding of human experience in relation to the spaces we live in rather than in terms of the psyche. Our memories are housed, according to Bachelard: we develop a sense of self in relation to our spatial environment. In a chapter on nests, he emphasises the vulnerability of space, and thus of our sense of self. A bird’s nest is a ‘precarious shelter’, a place of security as much as of vulnerability, and therefore, because of this duality, the first experience of confidence.

A number of architects and architectural theorists have taken this perspective further. Juhani Pallasmaa (2005) argues that we project fragments of the self not only on to other persons, but also on to places. For him, a ‘meaningful architectural experience is not simply a series of retinal images’, but an ‘encounter’ between a built space and our senses, ‘confrontations that interact with memory’ (2005: 63). The Swiss architect Peter Zumthor (1999) defines his work as a ‘search of the lost architecture’, such as half-forgotten memories of what a kitchen in his native Switzerland felt like, an atmosphere that he tries to revive in new forms and with new materials. The Dutch monk and architect, Hans van der Laan (1983) describes architectural space as a space that we fill with our experiences, a process through which we separate inhabited space from the homogeneous emptiness of natural space. Inhabiting a space literally works through decorating the place with your habits. Similarly, Pallasmaa writes: ‘Architecture is our primary instrument in relating us with space and time, and giving these dimensions a human measure. It domesticates limitless space and endless time to be tolerated, inhabited and understood by humankind’ (2005: 17). In short, what these theorists and architects suggest is that buildings are spaces of habituation, which allow us to inhabit the world and feel at home in the world. Buildings are grounding practices.

Combining these phenomenological insights with the point made by Robert Venturi leads me to suggest that these grounding experiences depend not so much on being in one particular building as on the recognition of a particular type of building, a recognition that evokes memories of spatial experiences. Venturi shows that habitual space and its feelings of comfort are not restricted to houses and farms, schools and churches, but also include elements of urban sprawl and traffic space, provided they look familiar to us. In fact, this can be taken as a rebuttal of Marc Augé’s notion of the non-place: the empty and homo-
geneous urban and global environment, ‘a world where people are born in the clinic and die in the hospital’ (1995: 78). The uniformity of airports across the globe, for instance, leads Augé to talk of the limitlessness of urban life that defies spatial identification, whereas Venturi would see this uniformity as the very condition for orientation. Airports the world over still feel familiar; for Venturi the spatial disorientation would only start when we leave the airport. In a similar vein, religious spaces may recreate a sense of self through grounding spatial sensations in a global world in which, for a lot of people, communities and privacy are notoriously unstable and home has become a portable concept. In such a condition, a church, a mosque or a temple can be a new environment in which to recall personal memories and aspirations. Such places offer an atmosphere that is largely independent of one particular building: although the interior of one church may differ from the interior of another, the atmosphere they offer is similar and not subject to change. A church or mosque largely feels like any other church or mosque, and it is for this reason that a sense of stability and self can reside in such places even if you enter the place for the first time in your life. That makes them good places for the poetics of space and self, provided that designers of religious architecture do not forget this modern function while fulfilling their heroic ambitions.

THE MOSQUE DEBATE

Before concluding I briefly want to discuss the relevance of all this to recent debates about new mosque design in Europe. For it is in this debate that we see the forces of globalisation, habitual space and security coming together in its most confused constellation. Let me start by saying that there is a profound aesthetic dimension to the protests against new mosques that we see in many European countries. Swiss Muslims, for instance, are still allowed to build mosques; only minarets are banned. In their turn, many Muslims in Europe, while for the most part not dismissing architectural innovations as such (Saleem 2013; Verkaai 2012), seem to prefer conventionally styled designs when commissioning a new mosque building.

Why do most European Muslims prefer conventionally styled mosques? The answer given by the vast majority of scholars working on Western mosques runs like this: through traditional architectural features like minarets and domes European Muslims express their Muslim identity in a non-Muslim society, and symbolically claim their presence within the public space. This is certainly true but it also ignores the insights offered by Gretchen Buggeln. An equally important incentive might be the aspiration to create a habitual space that helps allow a migrant community to feel at home in Europe. It is remarkable, for instance, that even in those cases in which a mosque committee opts for an innovative design – like the Central Mosque of Cologne and many of the recent Dutch small-town mosques – the interior design is habitual. The inside of the mosque does not represent anything to the outside world. It is, rather, a grounding place as defined above.
Conventionally styled mosques are often criticised for being traditionalist (Welzbacher 2008), but the critics of new mosques fail to see that convention is difficult to build. The mosques of the 1980s and 1990s were built by pioneers who had to learn anew many skills that had been lost during migration. They lacked the traditional knowledge of minaret construction or interior design, nor did they have much experience in negotiating legal, bureaucratic, political, and media procedures. Budgets were tight. Much has been learnt since then and new companies have been formed that specialise in mosque construction or interior design. As Shahed Saleem (2013) has shown for the UK, the quality of purpose-built mosques has significantly improved since the 1990s. The same is true of other European countries. What I am saying is that many of the new mosque buildings that are being condemned as cheap replicas of the village mosque in Turkey, Morocco or Pakistan are not traditional designs at all. They are rather the outcome of a reinvention of tradition after migration. In that sense they are better described as neo-traditionalist in societies in which neo-traditionalism, as an architectural style, is making a spectacular comeback. Criticising Muslims for their conventional preferences, then, means denying them the right to habitual space in an increasingly homesick society.

It becomes obvious that habitual space is not a politically neutral category. The many mosque controversies in Europe show that if mosques create habitual space for European Muslims, they also invade the habitual space of others. I do not think it is reasonable to hope for a win-win solution, even though there is some evidence that non-Muslim residents might get used to good quality conventional mosques that allude to the exoticism of Oriental architecture. In Berlin Wilmershof, location of the oldest German mosque built in 1925, residents have become attached to the Mughal-styled building because it brings the Orient into their neighbourhood. After initial protest, non-Muslim residents in the Dutch town of Leiden have come to appreciate the new mosque because it gives the locality a ‘Thousand and One Nights’ feel. Architectural skill seems helpful in turning the foreign into a desirable thing, which may be an argument for the state to subsidise religious minority buildings. I realise however that this is a scandalous proposition in the aggressively secularist times that some European nations are currently going through. More than that, if we take the power of habitual space seriously, we must be ready to acknowledge that even good quality architecture may not resolve the sense of violated habitual space that some non-Muslims experience if a mosque is built next door. In today’s fearful Europe, bringing the foreign into the neighbourhood is often experienced as an assault on one’s sense of security rather than a window offering a glimpse of exotic far-away places. This spatial sensation, too, is real enough, even though there is no denying that these feelings are often exploited politically.

To conclude, then, my account of religious spaces, and of mosques in particular, suggests that habits are social and political rather than merely individual. The notion of habitual space is precisely meant to make this point. We become habitual beings in spaces we share with others. For this reason habitual space is a political rather than a mere phenomenological issue. The politics of space, so often generated by new mosque projects, can thus be redefined as a competition
for space that allows for certain habitual practices while obstructing or preventing others. The construction of a new mosque is not simply a matter of public visibility and social recognition; it is a struggle for space that allows Muslims the poetics of space and self that Bachelard writes about. On the other hand, the new mosque signals a significant change of habitual space for those who have come to associate mosques with danger rather than with exoticism. As Edward Said (1979) famously argued, fear and exoticism are two sides of the same coin and I doubt whether a return to a more benevolent form of Orientalism than the present-day one of violence and bigotry is the answer to this conundrum. It also seems unrealistic to think that mosques will be considered in the same way we have learnt to look at gas stations any time soon: as a familiar and reassuring element of urban sprawl. The only way out of this political conundrum is when we gradually stop considering mosques as foreign objects. That would entail changing some deeply ingrained habits.

Concluding remarks

Let me briefly return to the key question, namely: in what ways can the notion of habitual space enhance a positive sense of security? I would not be surprised if for some readers my focus on habits as a source of positive security may seem odd or even conservative, as if security is to be found in the defence of ingrained customs and deep-seated convictions. Indeed, in general parlance habit largely has a negative connotation, not unlike custom or ceremony, as unreflective behaviour rooted in the past. As such, habit stands opposed to human agency and social change, which, in the liberal tradition at least, are associated with the notion of the rational self. Modernity sees itself as a form of emancipation from the past that constitutes us in the form of in-built habits. From such a viewpoint, the defence of habits in the name of positive security can indeed only be taken as a plea for restoration and status quo.

An older tradition, however, takes habit as the synthesis of time in the human body (Deleuze 1991: 92). Derived from the notion of habitus prior to Bourdieu’s reformulation of it, habit brings together past and future in our bodily practices in the present. From this perspective, habit can be seen as a form of self-cultivation through repetitive action that is imbedded in the past and oriented toward the future. It even stands at the basis of a critique of a liberal concept of human agency (Mahmood 2005). Instead of ‘I think therefore I am’ it postulates that ‘I act therefore I become’.

From this understanding of habits I have argued that habits may be crucial for a positive sense of security precisely because of the synthesising work that habits do for us. Habit prevents us from living a nostalgic life because we can change our ideas, cultivate our talents or improve our capacities through repetitive action. At the same time, habit averts a condition sometimes called rootlessness: an unfortunate metaphor of humans as trees, intended to denote how we are catapulted into the future without retaining the cultural competence needed to face and tackle new challenges. If positive security is defined
as ‘the ability to live confidently with risk’ rather than ‘fencing oneself off from risk’, then the possibility of cultivating habits and developing new ones seems to me crucial for such a confident notion of security, because habits give us an identity that allows us to experience ourselves as a moment halfway between past and future.

References


NOT ‘FORTRESS LOS ANGELES’. DESIGN, AND MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACES IN NEW YORK CITY

Te-Sheng Huang

INTRODUCTION

Public space is no longer restricted to sites that are created, owned and managed by government entities. It now embraces sites that are created and/or managed by private (commercial) corporations and institutions. In the United States, the increasing number of privately controlled public spaces, particularly after World War II, results from the initiatives of private organizations as well as from their partnerships with local governments (Loukaitou-Sideris 1993; Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 1998). Examples are malls, airports, office blocks and privately owned public spaces (named ‘pops’ or ‘bonus spaces’) in New York City.

Critics of privately controlled public space have long emphasised the detrimental effects they are believed to have on social life in the public domain including encouraging racial and class stratification, reducing the variety of public activities and generating a decline in street vitality (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Boddy 1992; Sorkin 1992; Staeheli and Mitchell 2008). To increase profit and maintain property values, private owners of public space often employ design and management to implicitly or explicitly exclude undesirables (e.g., homeless people, noisy teenagers, and drug dealers) and certain types of activities that could decrease their sales and devalue their properties (Boddy 1992; Davis 1992a, b; Loukaitou-Sideris 1993; Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 1998; Smith-simon 2008). Not only have building projects where public spaces are located become psychically isolated, but private security guards also discourage those who are unwelcome.

Based on his observations of various development projects and the police department’s practices in Los Angeles between the 1970s and 1990s, Davis depicted the social life of this city as ‘Fortress L.A.’ (1992b). Other studies around the US also indicated that privately controlled public spaces are exclusively used by a particular type of occupants (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989; Kohn 2004; Loukaitou-Sideris 1993; Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 1998). New York City’s privately owned public spaces have received similar critiques: that they are not easily accessible to the public, and that they are merely used for private purposes (Kayden 2000; Miller 2007; Németh 2007; 2009; Smith-simon 2006;
Researchers, in sum, often conclude that privately controlled public spaces seem to only offer benefits to certain groups of people rather than a large segment of public. However, the critiques raised were not always based on the collection and analysis of empirical data and often combined a variety of types of privately controlled spaces into a single group. This chapter therefore poses the following research question: How can privately controlled spaces contribute to a more positive (that is, inclusive) conception of security? To pursue a thorough, empirically driven research project on a single type of privately owned public space, the research from which this chapter is drawn included on-site observations and interviews with managers of 12 interior privately owned public spaces in Manhattan (Huang 2014). This chapter presents findings from a single subtype: six cases of cross-block atria in New York City focusing on their design, use and management.

**Six Indoor Cross-block Atria**

Figure 1 illustrates the appearance of the six cases. All six cases offer a cross-block connection between streets with at least one entrance at each end. Plaques at the entrances indicate that the space is ‘open to the public’ and also list ownership, hours of operation and the number of seats and tables provided. The frontage of the spaces is often made of clear glass that allows people indoors and outdoors to see each other; this is particularly true in the former IBM atrium. Unlike the other spaces, the Citicorp Atrium, being tucked inside its host building and located one floor below the street grade, is less visible from the sidewalk. Subway entrances are located both inside and adjacent to the space at 60 Wall Street while subway entrances face or are located adjacent to the entrances to the CitiCorp Atrium and Park Avenue Plaza.

The six cases offer various environmental amenities: tables with chairs, lighting, and retailers who provide food and drink. All cases have restrooms and climate control except the former IBM atrium (which only provides heat in winter). Free wi-fi is available in the CitiCorp Atrium and the Rubenstein Atrium, and the latter provides numerous power outlets. One cafe in Sony Plaza also provides free wi-fi but only in the area of the café. Three spaces include water features and/or trees. Most of the spaces also display artwork, particularly the former IBM atrium with its rotating sculpture exhibition. Sony Plaza serves as the waiting area to Sony Wonder Technology Lab, with free admission. With the exception of 60 Wall Street, all spaces offer programmed activities. The Rubenstein Atrium hosts various types of event: concerts, lectures, dance performances and movies. The other four spaces either offer a lunchtime piano performance on weekdays or a weekly student music performance during certain months.
Unlike traditional public spaces, privately owned public spaces are managed either by the company that owns the building or a management company. Management practices vary across sites but invariably include the posting of a security guard during all hours the space is open. Additionally, NYPD officers are sometimes present at 60 Wall Street and the CitiCorp Atrium during the afternoon, evening and on weekends. With the exception of the Rubenstein Atrium, rules of conduct are posted. These rules vary per space but they all prohibit certain behaviours and uses such as disorder and offensive behaviours that can...
interfere with or pose a health or safety risk to others (e.g., loitering and disruptive and lewd manners), unlawful activities (e.g., gambling and consuming alcoholic drinks or controlled substances), ‘excessive use’ (e.g., sleeping, gaming and occupying an area for too long), and unacceptable items (e.g., bicycles, skateboards, sleeping bags, excessive luggage). In Sony Plaza rules of conduct are placed on almost every table.

All six spaces are open seven days a week until 10pm or midnight, except when leased for private events. Owners of three spaces regularly lease them for private events. When private events are scheduled in the former IBM atrium and the Rubenstein Atrium, signs notifying the public of the dates of these events are posted beforehand. Private events in the CitiCorp Atrium only occupy the central area of the atrium so that people can still use the other areas. Finally, all six spaces were originally completed after 1975; three of the spaces have since undergone some subsequent redesigning.

DIVERSE USERS AND USES

I conducted field observations from July 2012 to January 2013 by visiting the six spaces once every hour between 9am and 9pm, making at least 12 visits to each space on weekdays and on weekends. To understand how people use the spaces and who they are, I gave priority to capturing the diversity of occupants of each space at each visit rather than determining the precise number of users. Because occupants change constantly, I only counted people who were seated, not those who were standing or moving. Therefore the number of occupants and the type of their activities was recorded by table on each visit.

Other than ordinary activities (e.g., eating, drinking and resting), some people conduct a range of planned activities, such as working, playing, learning and creating. These people are mostly male but comprise different races and conduct business meetings during office hours, particularly at coffee and lunch breaks. High school and college students utilize the CitiCorp Atrium and the Rubenstein Atrium to work on their assignments. With the exception of the former IBM atrium, people play games in all spaces, primarily chess, backgammon and poker (Figure 3). The frequency of games varies over the course of the day and the week, with most game-playing occurring on weekday afternoons and evenings and on weekends. In Park Avenue Plaza, the chess players vary in age and race and sometimes include office workers, security guards, local residents, and homeless people.

People also conduct various educational and self-improvement activities in all six spaces. For example, two groups meet periodically in Sony Plaza to advance their thoughts about human beings, and one group meets weekly to share knowledge on diets to lose weight. These groups comprise young and senior adults of differing gender, race, and ethnicity. Finally, with the exception of Park Avenue Plaza, people use all spaces to create works of art and handicraft: sculpture, painting, knitting, and embroidery. Participants are mostly white
women who work either alone or with others. Certain creative activities are in groups of four or more, and take place monthly: jewellery and greeting card making in Sony Plaza and doll making in the former IBM atrium.

Figure 2  People conduct various planned activities in six cross-block atria.
Features of the spaces support the activities observed: the extended hours the spaces are open; that they are free (without an entry fee or the necessity of purchasing something); shelter from weather; climate control; and the provision of amenities (e.g., movable tables and chairs, retailers, and restrooms). Through regular planned activities, groups of people not only associate with friends but may also attract those who walk through the sites. Social communities are increasingly formed and occupy certain areas of the spaces at different times of the day and week, such as the group of backgammon players in the Rubenstein Atrium, and the group of Magic Cards in the CitiCorp Atrium. If occupants notice anything suspicious in the spaces, they often inform the security guards. Thus the presence of occupants, particularly those in groups, has become what Jane Jacobs (1961) referred to as ‘eyes on streets’, reinforcing the sense of security and safety of six spaces in addition to onsite security guards.

Management practices

The diversity of occupants and activities in the spaces studied contradict the exclusiveness of privately controlled public spaces that was deduced in many previous studies. As the findings of the study note, design features are one attribute accounting for such differences. In order to understand how these spaces are managed and the rationale for certain management practices, I interviewed the building manager of each space using a semi-structured interview protocol. The interviews revealed that managers’ tolerance of certain uses and how they interpret and enforce the rules of conduct vary per space, with the IBM atrium standing out for being particularly strict.

The reason people do not play games there is because its manager believes that these games would eventually lead to gambling: ‘if I let them play chess, then why can’t they play cards? If they’re playing cards, why can’t they be gambling? What it’s gambling and then it’s get away from it’. Another concern this manager cited that was not expressed by other managers was allowing particular groups of people to dominate the space:

‘The atrium is not a gathering space for large groups. We don’t want to have people who dominate the space by having protests or organising or dating circles or things like that. So we specifically set up the rules that we think engender the real intent of the space that is public space for individuals, not groups’.

Hence people are not allowed to rearrange tables for large activities such as playing games. In contrast, managers of the other five spaces do not associate gambling with playing other games. What they define as gambling is that money is obviously exchanged in the process. As a result, people frequently gather in these spaces to play games for hours. The manager of the former IBM atrium commented on the group of chess players in Park Avenue Plaza for its different management approach:
‘Park Avenue Plaza has people play chess all day long. There is an area behind the kiosk where they encourage people to play chess. Their view is that if people play chess, they are not doing something else’.

The managers of both 60 Wall Street and the CitiCorp Atrium expressed the opinion that these spaces are intended for various purposes. The manager of 60 Wall Street stated:

‘It’s fine. They [chess players, TH] are not bothering anyone. It’s actually quite interesting .... The original intention was to have a place that the public can use. If you have a group likes to play chess, well what a wonderful place for them to do that’.

As a consequence of the Occupy Wall Street Movement (OWS) in 2011, sleeping is prohibited in all six spaces. Most of these managers equate sleeping with eyes being closed, regardless of whether it might be napping or meditating, in order to prevent homeless persons from treating these spaces as shelters. However, security guards in most of the spaces do not intervene when people close their eyes except in the former IBM atrium. Its manager noted:

‘Once you let someone take five minutes nap, why is it different to a homeless person taking a six-hour nap? Where is the hard and fast line? It starts at no sleeping, not you can sleep more than five minutes, not you can sleep more than 20 minutes. It’s no sleeping’.

In dramatic contrast at 60 Wall Street, temporary napping is allowed as long as people do not treat the space as a permanent living space by getting a series of chairs and bring a sleeping bag in and putting your night cap on. When few people use this space on weekends, it becomes an alternative shelter for homeless persons. The number of homeless people ranged from five to ten; most of them were sleeping or just sitting.

All managers believe that the placement of security personnel not only ensures the security of their properties and the safety of everyone onsite but also makes users feel comfortable staying inside these spaces. If certain unacceptable uses occur, security guards would first stop those initiators verbally and possibly ask them to leave the space. If they ignore these warnings, security guards would contact NYPD officers to remove them. The manager of 60 Wall Street provided a more detailed look at the role of security guards who are trained to search for ‘unpredictable situations’ rather than regular or normal day-to-day activities. As a result, security guards are unlikely to consider regular users of these spaces to be a threat, including homeless persons. Indeed, all managers expressed the opinion that these spaces are meant for everyone to utilise and homeless persons are welcome as long as they follow the rules of conduct. The manager of the space at 60 Wall Street said:

‘I don’t think we should differentiate between homeless and non-homeless as a practical matter of thinking about the atrium is part of a park. Parks in New York have
their rules about when you can be there and when you cannot be there. We look at it in very much the same way. So it's not our role to decide who come into the atrium.... People sit there quietly and they are there from 6am to 10pm. It doesn't matter. If they create nuisances, then that does concern us'.

Several rules that prohibit large shopping carts and bags could possibly discourage homeless persons from entering these spaces, but I occasionally observed these very items in some spaces. Not only do security guards often enforce these rules loosely but they may also have established relationships with certain ‘regular’ homeless persons. Homeless persons sometimes wave to security guards when they enter certain spaces and chat with the guards. As a result, homeless people occupy all six spaces; their number ranges from one to five persons per hour.

How to ensure a public space for everyone to use and, meanwhile, not exclude other people and their activities is a difficult task for the organisations that manage these spaces. During the 2011 OWS movement, the OWS participants held their meetings at 60 Wall Street. Initially, Deutsche Bank did not prohibit their gatherings because its idea, according the manager I interviewed, was ‘they can do that in the park [Zuccotti Park, TH]. They can do that here. That doesn’t concern us’. However, eventually when these meetings became excessive and massive, management responded by posting rules, increasing the number of security guards and placing NYPD officers in the space. The concern of Deutsche Bank was that the OWS participants had ‘eliminated the need, the ability, for anyone else to use it’, ‘impacted negatively on the retail space’ and increased ‘the additional operational “cost” for maintenance’. The manager of Park Avenue Plaza described a similar situation when they had to exclude the activity of a particular group that dominated the space:

‘Many years ago [...] a Church had its people bring food to homeless people. There would be couple hundred of homeless people.... So we had to speak to them that you got to do this in some place else.... You have to juggle that. You have to maintain the business environment but still not exclude the people’.

The manager of Sony Plaza expressed the same concern: ‘Sony has a responsibility to ensure the safety and security of all visitors, and sometimes it can be challenging to balance the City’s requirements [of managing it for everyone, TH] with safety for all’. With the exception of the manager of the former IBM atrium, managers are tolerant of a wide range of users and uses but are vigilant about allowing any single group or single activity to dominate the space over time.

Like design features of the cases, management practices that are employed by private organisations or institutions also enable the possibility of the diversity of occupants and activities. This study suggests that privately controlled public spaces can actually offer some benefits to the City, supporting and accommodating various occupants and activities. In addition, security does not depend on or require exclusivity. With the right design features and management prac-
tices these spaces can accomplish both security and inclusivity (‘positive security’). They then support the true formation of groups of people with common interests, which is a form of community – socially rather than geographically delimited.

Reflections

In the context of previous research and commentary about privately controlled public spaces in Los Angeles and elsewhere the findings of this study are quite surprising. In New York’s cross-block atria one would not expect to find a diversity of individuals in terms of gender, race and age or social communities created by groups of people with similar interests who meet regularly. There are at least two possible explanations for this contrast between these findings and earlier works and critiques.

A first possible explanation for the contrast between the findings from this study and previous research about privately owned public spaces in the United States is that the latter fail to distinguish between different spatially defined types of space and, subsequently, differences that may result in different users and uses. For instance, it is very important to distinguish between ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ spaces and between spaces with different spatial configurations or relationships to the street. Uses and potential benefits may vary significantly according to these factors and possibly other differences in type (Franck and Schneekloth 1994). Certain types of bonus spaces and cross-block atria may thus be an important exception to exclusionary practices, resulting from their design features.

Second, the presence of homeless people and the attitudes of managers toward them show that bonus spaces, as reported on in this study, are inclusive (see also Langstraat and Van Melik (2013) for the importance of the attitudes of managers in this respect). In practice, the presence of private security guards does not always discourage all kinds of people entering and using the spaces, but indeed may increase their feelings of security and thus their willingness to enter and to spend long periods of time in the spaces. Thus the attitudes of managers or management agencies could take the form of positive (inclusive) security measures instead of negative (exclusive) ones, as has often been assumed. The fortress-type and strict management practices accounted for in Los Angeles’s militarised spaces are not necessarily the norm in North American cities.

Concluding remarks

As the findings reported here suggest, New York City’s indoor bonus spaces support people’s social needs and activities far more than previous studies and critiques assert. These findings demonstrate the value of full documentation of how privately controlled public spaces are actually used over the course of the day and the week and by whom, what management practices are employed
and, if security personnel are present, how they interact with occupants. Without systematically observing spaces and collecting data from observations and interviews, important practices may be overlooked and conclusions reached may only reveal some parts of the phenomenon. Contrary to gloomy pictures of ‘Fortress L.A.’, the New York cases studied contribute a more positive (or inclusive) concept of security. Not only do particular design features enhance the spatial quality of the spaces and attract individuals, but also the management practices employed, deriving from the attitudes of their managers who view them as public spaces for everyone and for various activities, further enable the spaces to be inclusive. Because the spaces studied are located on private property and are housed inside buildings, often passers-by do not notice them or realise they are open to the public without payment. To make bonus spaces more accessible and inclusive, New York City government needs to take a leading role in promoting them. Although the Department of City Planning lists all bonus spaces on its website, separating them by district, it neither presents sufficient information about all the sites nor offers an interactive map for people to locate them. This study also suggests that certain design features would increase public awareness of bonus spaces: (1) visual and physical accessibility from the streets and (2) design and placement of public space plaques that make them easily visible. As William Whyte (1980) already argued, to attract people, the spaces need to offer amenities such as seating, food vendors, retail outlets, and toilets. This study also proposes programming of activities and free wi-fi, because these would make bonus spaces attractive and well known to the public. Through different kinds of promotion, a larger segment of the public would become aware of this type of public space and, possibly would want to find out more about them and eventually use them on a regular basis.

References


**Fluid Security? Home, Care and Belonging in Prostitution Migration**

*Brenda Oude Breuil*

**Introduction**

Listening carefully to her story, switching my mind back and forth between her personal narrative and hegemonic conceptions on prostitution migrants, I suddenly find myself distractedly staring at the little space between Yena’s white upper front teeth. I quickly sip at my coffee to hide my imposturous stare. We are sitting on the terrace of a local Marseille bar, which Yena directed me to, talking about her current life in the port city’s street prostitution. I am puzzled. I have known Yena for a year or two now. Ever since we met she has been talking about going back to her city of origin in Bulgaria. Her growing-up son is in need of her, as she has explained to me many times; he is reaching puberty and needs motherly discipline. Yena has several other good reasons to go back; according to her, she is getting older, tired of the job and the earnings are not as good as they were before the economic crisis hit Europe. She would like to build a ‘normal’ life back home. She started to do so several years ago by investing most of her prostitution earnings in housing improvements, decent education and presents for her children. More importantly, no one is forcing her to stay; Yena works ‘for her own account’. As her illustrations on her spending reveal, prostitution is not a matter of pure economic ‘survival’ anymore. It might have been in the beginning, when she took care of her sick baby child, a mother alone. Back then, her sex work might have confirmed the popular image of Eastern European prostitution migration as a survival strategy – an image that is found in much academic work as well (see for example: Ebbe 2008: 33-37). But it can hardly be perceived as (purely) such anymore. The presents Yena bought her children from the money she earns in Marseille include, for example, a small laptop of 400 Euros for her son – a far stretch from prostituting oneself to provide for the family’s food, housing or other basic needs. Moreover, Marseille has probably become more than a mere ‘place of passage’. Yena has two (on-and-off) love affairs going on in the city, which allow her some form of sociable life here. One of her ‘boyfriends’ has provided her with an opportunity to rent a decent apartment, liberating her from the heavy costs of staying in a hotel every night, like fellow Bulgarian prostitution migrants, and allowing her a more ‘normal’ life in Marseille. (From: ethnographic field notes, August 2010)
Contemporary discourse on prostitution migration

This book attempts to develop an alternative, positive notion of security. ‘Negative’ conceptualizations of security focus on defending a country or region against enemies in whatever form: international terrorists, criminal and deviant ‘species’ of human on the national territory, natural and man-made disasters and other threats that are characteristic for the world risk society (Beck 1986; 2009). Implicit in this notion is an emphasis, I argue here, on security as being necessarily linked to a fixed (or, at least, delimited) and familiar space which we once invested with our identity and which thereby has become a place we can call ‘home’. Home is associated with a feeling of belonging, or even stronger; many of us feel we are ‘rooted’ in this place (Hannerz 2002; Hedetoft and Hjört 2002). Hence our felt need, as a way of dealing with contemporary ontological insecurities (Garland 2001; Young 1999) to defend this sacred place against ‘unwanted others’. This use of the concept of security is limited in its reference to fixity and a territorialised way of thinking, which relate problematically to late modern mobilities of many kinds. In this chapter I will address this by analysing (part of) the ethnographic fieldwork done in Marseille, France, from 2006-2012, on Bulgarian prostitution migrants and sex trafficking victims. The case study being characterised by mobility, boundary transgression and liminality offers a unique opportunity to explore a more fluid notion of security. Moreover, as I will show in the next two sections, current conceptualisations of ‘security’ within the prostitution debate are raced, spaced and gendered. Juxtaposing the representations in the debate with the lived experiences of prostitution migrants in this case study can broaden our current understandings of security to less hegemonic narratives, voices generally unheard in the debate, and thereby ‘ground’ our understanding of what (more) security can be.

When discussing prostitution of foreign women in western European countries a fear-ridden discourse on human trafficking is generally invoked, causing a confusing dichotomization of the debate into two possible positions: whether the sex worker is working voluntarily for her own account (which, according to some, is a nonexistent position within the sex industry), or she is forced to do prostitution work – whether by (assumed) large human trafficking networks and/or by local conditions of extreme poverty. My claim that this debate is severely flawed becomes readily clear in the case described above. After all, we might ask, where does Yena stand between the extreme poles of ‘voluntary prostitution’ versus ‘forced human trafficking’? What do common concepts and dichotomies of ‘insecurity/security’, ‘safety/danger’ and ‘coercion/free will’ – which are all invoked in the discourse on prostitution migration – really mean to her and to so many others working in this sector of the contemporary informal labour market? And are such dualities at all productive in our empirical thinking about human security or should we, particularly in fluid late modernity, search for concepts that allow more ambiguity, liminality and drift to enter into our analyses?

Let us look a bit closer at current representations of prostitution and migration. Both phenomena are generally perceived as insecure states of being in
contemporary Europe. Labour migrants are disproportionately present in that part of the labour market where human rights are violated and securities least guaranteed. Those coming from socio-economically deprived countries often find occupancy in the lowest echelons of the (guest country’s) economy. They do informal, dangerous and difficult work local inhabitants refuse to do for the salary provided, where exploitative working conditions are more common and housing conditions often poor. According to Jock Young (1999), late modern western societies are typically exclusive and bulimic in nature, encapsulating and swallowing up large amounts of culturally diverse people without allowing them to fully participate in society – hence, in a structural, socio-economic sense, ‘vomiting up’ these groups. According to Zygmunt Bauman (2004) this leads to the creation of ‘wasted lives’. Certain groups of people – migrants in western European cities being counted amongst them – are excluded from contemporary consumerist reality to live at the margins of western societies. The concept of the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 2005) is often invoked in this line of thought; whereas in former times state intervention still tried to socio-economically integrate the underclass, including migrants, nowadays the latter are isolated from society, and deprived of their basic human rights in order to neutralise the ‘threat’ they pose. In sum, migrants are not only perceived as a security threat to Western societies, they are moreover treated in ways that make their position more precarious and insecure than it already was.

Prostitution migrants, then – the concept here referring to those who (temporarily) migrate in order to work in the sex industry outside of their country of origin – epitomize this image of insecurity. They are pictured as having left their natal grounds solely because of socio-economic deprivation and lack of opportunities for future improvement: a ‘no other choice’ scenario. Particularly since the early 2000s, when prostitution migration became equated with the concept of human trafficking, the association of sex work on the one hand, and exploitation, risk and the end-stop of a poor but ‘normal’ life on the other hand has become an almost natural and self-proclaimed truth (see also: Agustín 2007; Ditmore 2005; Doezema 1999; Sanghera 2005). Popular discourse assumes that ‘no one can willingly and freely choose this kind of work’, thereby positioning migrant sex work as ultimate recourse and a point of no return. This is illustrated in the work of Rutvica Andrijasevic (2007), who made a visual analysis of anti-trafficking campaign images, launched by (international) NGOs, mostly of western European origin (such as the International Organization for Migration). According to her, campaign posters reveal that ‘the introduction of the theme of forced prostitution abruptly interrupts the characters’ narrative of hopeful migration and implies that for the [...] female characters forced prostitution represent(s) the end-stop on their migratory journey’ (Andrijasevic 2007: 30).

Several ethnographic studies on the international sex industry (within, as well as outside of Europe), however, have shown cracks and fissures in this hegemonic picture (see also: Oude Breuil et al. 2011: 40-43). Although, indeed, the most common reason to engage in sex work is an economic one, several studies have shown that transnational sex work can be a matter of social (status) mobility rather than actual survival (Bott 2006; Brennan 2003: 155; Corrin 2005), a search
for adventure, or a ‘way out’ of a life bounded by social rules and dependency (Agustín 2005 and 2007; Bott 2006; Corrin 2005; Europol 2006). Whereas some scientific studies emphasise the innocence and naiveté of women from economically deprived countries ending up in the sex industry (Ebbe and Das 2008) this is not (sufficiently) substantiated by ethnographic fieldwork. Some studies found that many women in prostitution migration were well aware of the kind of work awaiting them in the West or were already working in prostitution in their home countries (Agustín 2007; Aronowitz 2009; Janssen 2007). Seeing all women who (temporarily) migrate to work in the Western prostitution industry as victims of human trafficking, unaware of what awaits them, is thus a matter of assuming insecurities without looking further at their lived experiences and the huge variety of circumstances women can be in and motivations they can have.

This chapter therefore questions the insecurities commonly assumed and tries to elaborate on the meaning of security for the women concerned. As mentioned, I will revisit common dichotomies and unquestioned assumptions implicit in this hegemonic picture, such as ‘free choice’ versus ‘coercion’, ‘the safe home’ versus ‘the dangerous outside’ (or the dangers of ‘being away’), the ‘careless’ versus ‘caretaking’ positions street-based sex workers take, and prostitution migration as an ‘involuntary, non-negotiable, isolating end-stop’ versus a possible new way to belong to and in society. I will look into prostitution migrants’ ways of providing for their own security, strengthening feelings of community and belonging and thereby safeguarding the idealised ‘homes’ they left behind. This, I hope, will contribute to a more nuanced way of seeing prostitution migration in Europe, one that will lead us away from the trap of framing this phenomenon only in terms of ‘human trafficking’, all the while keeping the lid on the Pandora’s box of enforcement instruments to fight (western) European insecurities by further marginalising (eastern and central) European ways of securing a decent life for oneself.

**Raced and gendered stories of care: renegotiating the ‘proper’ place**

Prostitution is tightly linked to notions of danger, deviance, and the ‘proper’ place that people (more particularly, here: women) are supposed to inhabit in the social fabric, and that is not a recent fact. Ever since ‘home’ and ‘the family’ became central normative concepts in modern ideas of an ordered society, life in and on the streets – especially for women and children – was seen as ‘out of order’, ‘sordid’, ‘improper’ and a threat to society. Women’s identities were tied to the home; they were the ones responsible for social reproduction and care (Donzelot 1979; see also: Agustín 2005). Women who sold sex were consequently seen as deviant, dangerous to society and in danger themselves when out on the street. Modern devices to contain this danger are nicely illustrated in Charles Bernheimer’s (1997: 8-34) description of the 19th century French hygiene inspector and member of the Public Health Council Alexandre Parent-Duchâtelet. The hygienist thought out prostitution policies which, in their techniques,
strongly resembled his former hygiene work on the sewers of Paris; prostitution, after all, being ‘another kind of sewer, a place of biological decomposition and morbid decay’ (Bernheimer 1997: 15). Prostitution as an embodied sewer (so to speak) threatened Parisian citizens with ‘the virulence of the illness transmitted by female sewers, by the vaginal filth of fallen women [...]’ (Corbin in: Bernheimer 1997: 16). Prostitutes, thus, were seen as ‘out of order’, a necessary evil that should be controlled in order to prevent it from contaminating (literally, in the sense of the spread of syphilis, as well as symbolically) orderly Parisian citizens.

The ‘proper’ place of women (and children), then, was in the home – ‘home’ not only being normatively prescribed as the place where ‘sound’ sexuality and reproduction should take place, but also affectively tied to notions of security, safety, belonging and comfort (Erickson 1993). According to contemporary scholars on prostitution migration these (early) modern, western European concepts are still in place (although sometimes fragmented) and are echoed in contemporary discourse on migration, in particular labour migration of sex workers (Agustín 2005; 2007; Andrijasevic 2007). Rutvica Andrijasevic, for example, states in her research on anti-trafficking campaigns that

> ‘the representational strategies used in the campaigns [...] encourage women to stay at home, and result in an eroticized and voyeuristic spectacle of women’s bodies. [...] This type of representation restages the familiar scenario where female bodies are portrayed as passive objects of male violence and are positioned within the spaces of the home and the nation’ (Andrijasevic 2007: 26).

Andrijasevic pushes the argument a step further, linking gender inequalities within prostitution migration to ‘race’ and national inequalities within Europe (see also: Doezema 1999). According to her, counter-trafficking campaigns make use of stereotyped eastern European masculinities and femininities. Traffickers, for example, are represented whether as ‘mafiosi’ pimp types, adorned with dollars and golden jewellery, referring to western European fear of the spread of the Russian Mafia, or as impersonalized networks of control over female bodies (Andrijasevic 2007: 34). Prostitution migrants are solely represented as victimized women who are helpless and voiceless, and they are immobilized visually on campaign posters by hooks and cords, suggesting death. This representation, according to Andrijasevic, reveals ‘a sense of anxiety over the boundaries of a political community being modified by women’s migration, economic ‘transition’ and European integration’ (Andrijasevic 2007: 40).

In other words: the western European struggle to achieve a sense of security – in its classical sense: security from dangers posed by the mobile ‘evils’ lurking on the borders of the European community – needs eastern European migrant women to be symbolically immobilized, stabilized in traditional and familiar gendered and raced categories. Implicit in this representation, I would add to Andrijasevic’ analysis, is the idea that immobilizing eastern European women is not only in the best interest of western European citizens but also that of the women themselves. After all they are assumed to be most safe from the dangers
of evil, criminal networks when in the sacred and protected space of home. The concept of ‘home’, then, encapsulates and conflates two senses of security: on the one hand being securely ‘fixed’ in an ascribed and gendered social position, status and role (which I will call here ‘social/status security’); on the other hand being securely tied to a raced physical place or territory. Both radiate the same message: when at home, nothing bad can happen to you, you are being taken care of, there are no worries for you there.

But is it that simple? Is being fixed in a familiar social position and physical place (which, we note, one often did not choose) really the safest way one can have it? Or to turn the question around: is migrating temporarily in order to do prostitution work necessarily an insecure and endangering endeavour, ridden by evil, criminal networks, and characterised by unfamiliarity, isolation, the end of a secure social existence and future within a local community? A closer look at the lived realities of the Bulgarian prostitution migrants in Marseille informs us that it is not, for three reasons. First of all, the role of large, international trafficking networks in this case seems smaller than commonly assumed, and, moreover, these networks may not be so ‘foreign’ and ‘unfamiliar’ as supposed. Secondly, ‘home’ is for many women not that safe and secure. Thirdly, leaving home does not necessarily end every possibility of upholding and rebuilding local and familial ties and reconfiguring structures of social belonging.

To start with the first, according to most women in this case-study, coming to Marseille to do street-based sex work was a conscious and well thought through choice, not a move forced by recruiters of large trafficking networks. Although a minority of the women spoken to might have been ‘lured away by evil networks’ – Francesca, for example, stated that she thought she would get a job as a grape picker in France – the majority were not. The general story is rather: a female acquaintance from the same village – often a family member or neighbour – told her about the sex work in Marseille and the large sums of money that could be earned, and convinced her that this was a good opportunity to earn a decent income, care for her family and invest in her future. Of course, we can simply discard the respondents’ interpretations of their own life histories and replace them with a supposed superior, outsiders’ reading of the situation as ‘being tricked by a trafficking recruiter’. But that would be disrespectful, denying them any agency and good sense – qualities they in fact demonstrated abundantly during the many years the fieldwork took place. Moreover, such a reading of facts would ignore the fact that their coming to Marseille, rather than being effected through the vehicle of foreign, evil networks positioned outside the ‘safe home’, was often made possible by rather local and even familial social networks. The association of ‘being away’ with dangerous foreign networks is thus, at the least, not in conformity with what we see in the majority of cases here.

Not only were their decisions not necessarily forced by criminal networks, they were seldom solely informed by economic deprivation (and, thus, ‘forced by poverty’) either – as the hegemonic ‘no-other-choice-scenario’ would have it. Rather, many women’s stories reveal a wish or need to escape the defined social position and role they had ‘back home’. True, most of them say their decision
to leave was motivated by a wish to care (financially) for their families. That is reflected, for example, in the ways they talk about and act towards their (often temporary) Marseille boyfriends; although appreciating the comfort of having someone in Marseille to count on, they will easily discard this ‘luxury’ if the boyfriend prevents them from earning money or is unwilling to care financially for their Bulgarian families:

I ask Ronda why she left the Netherlands and her boyfriend over there. ‘I did not want it anymore. X. [name boyfriend, BOB] is... selfish. Egoist. He did not want to take care of my family in Bulgaria. [...] So I left him’ (From: interview Ronda, June 2009).

At the same time, however, as we already saw in Yena’s story at the beginning of this contribution, a look at their expenditure – the things they buy for their families, as well as their spending on clothing, telephones and so on in Marseille – reveal that ‘prostitution as economic survival’ is far from the whole story. In line with other ethnographic studies this research shows that prostitution migration can enhance women’s social status in the village of origin or in their families. Ronda, for example, has worked for several years in Marseille to provide for her family back home, including her two children. Her younger brother cannot fulfil this role, as he has been jobless for quite some time. By sending money back home, her position in the family rises to being the family breadwinner. She is not an exception to the rule; the same story goes for many other women encountered, with a recurrent narrative presented by women who are the youngest sibling, with at least one older brother. Francesca, for example, explained that being the youngest child and only daughter in her family she was strictly supervised and constrained in her choices and actions by her older brothers. Going to France not only improved her status as a breadwinner, but also freed her from what she experienced as restrictive social (family) control. Physical distance plays an important role here. Working in Europe rather than in Bulgaria has a great advantage: it allows these women to ‘save face’ vis-à-vis their local communities. In Bulgaria, Francesca worked in a bar, experiencing great difficulty in hiding her work – which was considered ‘improper’ since working in a bar was often equated with doing sex work – from her family and neighbours. The distance between France and Bulgaria, and hence the relative invisibility of sex work for her social network back home, helps Francesca and other women interviewed, to construct and maintain an image of being a ‘decent’ daughter, doing honourable work in France to help out the family. Even though we might question the ‘fact’ claimed by the women that their families have ‘no idea’ what kind of work they are doing in France (since Bulgarian prostitution migrants in western European cities generally come from only about ten Bulgarian villages and towns – a pattern of ordinary chain labour migration – which diminishes the chance that local community members really have ‘no clue’ as to what is going on), it becomes clear from their conversations that they uphold this ‘fact’ or public secret the best they can. Ana and Isa, for example, laughingly told me that they took a picture in the hotel they stayed in,
holding the vacuum cleaner of the hotel’s janitor. They sent the picture to their
family in order to make the claim of doing a ‘cleaning job’ in France ever more
convincing. When the women return to Bulgaria for festivities or holidays, they
undertake a complete metamorphosis in order to sustain the respectable image:
the clothes they wear when working the streets are left in the hotel in Marseille,
piercings are taken out and dyed hair is returned to its original colour.
From these insiders’ accounts, we see an alternative picture emerging: prostitu-
tion migration may be experienced as a way of escaping a fixed and ascribed
social role ‘back home’ – one that is supposed to be ‘safe’ from criminal dangers
and socially ‘secure’. By going to France these women find a way of replacing
this fixed role not only with physical mobility, but (implicitly) social mobility
as well, which they believe can help them on their return to achieve a better
position in the social fabric. This expected betterment should be seen not only
in economic terms; many women prefer to point out the independence and
higher social status they gain as a breadwinner as the benefits of their stay in
Marseille. Rather than being voiceless victims of criminal networks and condi-
tions beyond their control, the women consciously exercise strategies of (in)vis-
ibility (see also: Oude Breuil 2009), making their sex work visible or otherwise
when and to whom it is needed, in order to preserve this (achieved, rather than
ascribed) social status. Moreover, the hegemonic story of falling prey to evil,
foreign criminal networks (as also pictured in the campaign posters analysed
by Andrijasevic) is not so very central to their experiences; if a pimp relation
or exploitative ‘organization’ was involved, this was most often a rather small-
scale, local or family relation.
This latter fact signifies the important observation that ‘homeliness’ and ‘the
familiar’ cannot be unproblematically equated with ‘security’ – the gendered
and raced norm of ‘home’ is obviously not always the most appropriate and
secure place for (eastern European) women to be. In other words, and as made
clear in previous work (Oude Breuil 2008), home is not only where the heart
is but can also be a place of hurt. This is clearly illustrated by the case of Lisa.
I got to know Lisa almost at the beginning of the fieldwork in Marseille and was
able to follow her street prostitution ‘career’ during several years. Although at
first she worked under the supervision of a woman called Nora, who offered
her a ‘protected’ place in her group of girls – all the while forcing Lisa to give
her part of her earnings, which were then transferred to a local, criminal net-
work in Bulgaria, with time Lisa got to know her way around Marseille and
left this group. She told Nora that she no longer was willing to pay, as ‘she had
paid her enough’ and did not need the group’s protection anymore. Nora was
understandably not happy with the situation, but Lisa did manage to start to
work ‘independently’ with another group of girls (who all assured me, inde-
pendently, that they worked for their own account, and whose working condi-
tions over the years did not show any sign of this being untrue) on a different
part of the street. When I asked Lisa how it could be that Nora (and the ‘Mafia
network’ behind her) was willing to let her go, Lisa commented that this had to
do with her father’s important social position in her local town. As an exception to the rule he knew about the work his daughter was doing in France, and he had informed Nora’s people in the town that if they did not leave his daughter alone they would get into trouble with him. An obvious case of the protection homely ties could offer...? We relinquished that interpretation quite soon. Lisa got pregnant and decided to keep the baby with her in Marseille. Although French social workers were sceptical of this situation, Lisa arranged her work in such way that it kept them satisfied to the extent that they saw no need to arrange for foster care. This situation went well for quite a while – Lisa felt comforted with her baby close by. Until, one night, we found Lisa working in a miserable state. We automatically expected the Bulgarian pimping network to be responsible, but that was not the case. Lisa told us that her father had come to Marseille and taken her baby, threatening Lisa that if she were to stop sending money back home he would put the baby ‘out on the street’.

This and other examples of unsafe home conditions of the women in this study show most clearly that the equation of ‘homeliness’, ‘familiarity’, ‘locality’ and (physical or territorial, as well as social) ‘immobility’ with security confuses matters more than it clarifies them. According to Rutvica Andrijasevic (2007, see also: Agustin 2007; Oude Breuil and Siegel 2013) the current normative representation of prostitution migration to Western Europe ignores women’s autonomous migration as efforts to improve their lives; any agency is denied in their stereotypical depiction as ‘victims of trafficking’. On the matter of their experienced (social and status) security we can add that current, negative operationalisation of security – focused on keeping eastern European women in their proper and safe place as ‘threatening others’: their eastern European homes – deny the fact that this ascribed ‘proper place’ is frequently far from safe; they may rather experience prostitution migration as a way of ensuring a secure social position and bettering their status and role in the social fabric. In this case study the women make choices that are not so much confronting traditional feminine, domestic roles – after all, their wish to take care of their families ties in with this role – as negotiating the ways and means to fulfil these roles. By doing so, prostitution migrants trespass the spatial and symbolic boundaries of the raced and gendered order: they leave the (gendered) ‘safe home’ to fulfil their caretaking roles, exerting agency and enlarging their autonomy, and thereby change the (for many) unthreatening, familiar and raced European ‘ethnoscape’ (Appadurai 2008). They employ strategies carefully thought through which allow them to exert their ‘capacity to care’ for family members back home, and while doing so enhance their social position. These strategies can be seen as assertive ways of trying to secure an imagined better life in Bulgaria. In other words: prostitution migrants in Marseille renegotiate their ‘proper’ and ‘secure’ place – as women and as Bulgarian nationals – precisely by going away from home. Whether their efforts will eventually pay off is a different matter. But to see prostitution migration solely in a debilitating, immobilizing and disempowering way is certainly not the whole story here.
Spaced stories of imagined security: being here, longing for there

Whereas we can conclude from the above that for Bulgarian prostitution migrants, taking care of their dear ones at home may mean, paradoxically enough, *taking distance* from that same home, that is only part of the story. Although the women may physically leave home, in their minds and actions they stay in close touch. In other words: leaving home and going abroad is combined with strategies of remembering and rebuilding the homes left behind.

As mentioned above, traditional ideas about ‘home’ imply associations with a territory, a fixed community and events and routines that are known and familiar (Erickson 1993; Hannerz 2002). As the stories on prostitution migration presented here show, these associations might need some revision in contemporary fluid late modernity. This was brought home to me most clearly at the start of the fieldwork when I pondered on how the women would remember their families and what means they had to deal with homesickness. When asking them about this, I suggested that they might use photographs brought from home and hang them in the hotel rooms they occupied. How caught up was I in fixed notions of home-building, believing that ‘home’ always needed a physical place: a wall to pin a picture on, a bed to throw your belongings on or a room to ‘make your own’. Mobility rather incites mobile, fluid, digital ways of remembering, I learned, when my respondents surprisingly laughed at me, pulled out their mobile phones, clicked on the photo gallery and showed me their whole family ‘in there’. My suggestion of ‘building homes’ in their hotel rooms was swiftly cast aside: ‘Mais non, nous sommes ici en passage!’ (‘no, we are here on passage’) and ‘ce n’est pas éternelle’ (‘it is not forever’) – their choice of words showing that they perceived their being in Marseille as something ephemeral, in place and time. Their mobile existence demands mobile solutions. Contemporary communication technology allows for that fluidity; digital ways of storytelling turned out to be an important technique to sustain family ties, be comforted and achieve a feeling of security and social belonging.

So too are mental processes of home building. Physical movement implies the materiality of transport vehicles, physical and visible borders and barriers, communication techniques and friction (Tsing 2005). But mind-work and imagination are unconstrained by material tools and techniques. Actively remembering home and investing in keeping these memories alive take up a considerable amount of time in the lived realities of Bulgarian prostitution migrants in Marseille. The digital ways of storytelling mentioned above allowed for sharing memories and feelings about family members, proudly showing the houses being built in Bulgarian towns from the money earned, and the way these were decorated, clothes bought and brought over for their children (and how good they looked on them), festivities celebrated together, and so on. When returning home most women took a bag full of presents for all family members, and one of their biggest outgoings was on daily telephone calls with their dear ones in Bulgaria.

Moreover a considerable amount of time was spent on imagining the lives they would have after quitting prostitution in Marseille and definitively return-
ing home. The fact that most of these imaginations would very possibly never become reality did not stop them from fantasising about it. We might interpret this as merely signs of homesickness, dealing with the hardships of being away and wishful thinking. But imagining home – the way you left it, as well as the way you would like it to become – can be perceived as more than that. As Yen Le Espiritu (2003) has convincingly shown in her study on Filipino migrants in the United States, imagination can be seen as an active strategy to (re)create belonging to one’s community and social cohesiveness, and as a political act of resisting the subordinate position migrants have in the ‘guest country’. I believe the same argument goes for the importance of imagination for the women in this study. In the first place, imagining home helps them stay in touch with their families, community and culture, thereby consolidating their feelings of security, comfort and belonging, while at the same time making their eventual, definitive return possible. Secondly, since the imagined home always was an improvement on the home left behind, imagination also served as an ambition, a goal that created physical and social movement. Thirdly, as in Espiritu’s study, we can argue that the social places these women occupy in their communities – which they invest in and enhance by using the strategies mentioned above – help them deal with the subordinate and often ‘invisible’ positions they have in Marseille. To call this an active and conscious act of resistance may go too far, all the more since the women themselves would not call it such. But we can safely claim that by attaching meaning to these transnational bonds the women invest in a valued sense of self that is part of a community, making them ‘belong’, and as such contest or counter ascribed subordinate identities as stigmatized migrants and prostitutes.

Notwithstanding the positive and reassuring effects of lively imaginations of ‘home back home’ we cannot ignore the displacement and homelessness Bulgarian prostitution migrants actually experience when doing sex work in Marseille. Being ‘en passage’ means finding oneself, to a certain extent, in a liminal phase: one is no longer fully part of the social structure back home, and not (yet) part of that of the host country. This liminality is reflected in the simultaneous (in)visibility of their lives in Marseille, a visibility/invisibility that offers them the opportunity to do this work, at the same time putting them at risk (see: Oude Breuil 2009). So on the one hand the women have to be visible in order to attract clients. They ensure this visibility by carefully choosing the right location to ply their trade, dressing up in particular ways, making inviting gestures to clients, emphasising their attractiveness and hiding their ‘lesser assets’ by carefully playing with the nocturnal artificial light. On the other hand, they have to remain as invisible and undisturbing vis-à-vis the neighbourhood, local police and aggressive young men of Marseille’s banlieus, cruising at night for ‘easy targets’. They therefore take great care to clean up preservatives and tissues, make sure they do not make a lot of noise, and choose locations where they can quickly draw back into the shadows. These conscious tactics reveal a core element of a situation of liminality: being ‘betwixt and between’; simultaneously belonging and not belonging. The women are socially only marginally integrated in Marseille: their social networks are limited to bar and hotel own-
ers, taxi drivers, social workers and (ex) clients and they experience social exclusion and stigmatization, sometimes leading to actual aggression and violence directed towards them in the streets. This situation is not well captured by only referring to social insecurity and exclusion. The notion of ‘differential inclusion’ (Espiritu 2003) or Young’s idea of ‘social bulimia’ (1999) do a better job explaining what is going on here: prostitution migrants are included in society up to a certain level – welcomed for the work they do, which clearly satisfies a need – but this inclusion being limited to a narrow role as stigmatized sex workers. They are tolerated to ‘be there’ but are simultaneously not recognized as full members of society – or of the European social landscape, to put it in a broader sense. This condition allows for a selective gaze: a simultaneous visibility (when one needs their services) and invisibility (when one is bothered by their presence). Their not being fully visible and recognized in the French social fabric makes it possible for the French public and political landscape to at least partially deny their lived experiences. Indeed, in sustaining this imagination of autonomous prostitution migration as forced trafficking by evil criminal networks, women’s bodies are ‘[…] a site where anxieties about the changing European landscape are played out and where it is possible to detect a yearning for a return to a familiar and reassuring race and gender order in Europe’ (Andrijasevic 2007: 27). Current hegemonic imaginations of prostitution migration in Europe suit territorial, national (here: French) needs for security, but cause a general misunderstanding of what security might mean seen from a position of mobility and liminality.

Concluding remarks

Security, according to the stories presented here, is not so much about staying put in a fixed and familiar space called home, and defending this local space against dangerous outsiders, as current ‘negative’ conceptualizations of security and enforcement would have it. The realities of prostitution migration in Marseille reveal that for the women concerned, it is rather about finding ways to sustain or improve the capacity to care for those held dear, to build or rebuild and reimagine the ‘homes’ left behind and to invest in transnational family bonds (or ‘human connection’) and feelings of belonging – despite, and precisely through, being in a state of ‘passage’. This position of liminality and being in-between, moreover, is not only debilitating and a matter of victimhood. It can simultaneously serve as an opportunity to perform and profit from this kind of work in the partial invisibility that may preserve and enhance one’s social position – in the ‘guest’ country as well as in the country of origin. Prostitution migrants thus carefully orchestrate their own invisibility or otherwise so as to position themselves in the best way possible. These counter hegemonic narratives of individuals generally assumed to be triply ‘insecured’ – as migrants, as women and as prostitutes – signify crucial flaws in the current use of the concept of security, namely a limiting spaced, ‘raced’ and gendered use. To start with the last two, current conceptualizations
of security – at least as far as the discourse on prostitution and trafficking is concerned – are built on traditional, fixed, stereotypical gender and ethnic notions, depicting eastern European men as evil perpetrators of trafficking and active threats to citizens’ security, and eastern European women as mainly victims. Both perpetrators and victims are immobilized, discursively as well as in enforcement measures and policies resulting from these social constructions. While the representation of perpetrators leads western European law enforcement to legitimize ever more stringent and repressive investigation measures (Oude Breuil et al. 2011), the conflating of prostitution migration and victimization of sex trafficking encourages the confining of eastern European women to the (national) domestic sphere which is assumed to be, for them, ‘the safest place to be’ – notwithstanding their message that they often do not experience it as such. In this way, common notions of security mainly reflect the needs and wishes of some privileged European citizens, and are rooted in (‘raced’) notions of insecurity and fear of such privileges eventually being lost.

Moreover, current hegemonic understanding of security in the public representation of human trafficking is ‘spaced’ in the sense that it is associated with territoriality, fixity and boundedness. Whereas the phenomena of prostitution migration and human trafficking are characterized precisely by transnationality, fluidity and mobility, the security debate surrounding it is inspired by a neoconservative politics focused on ‘law and order’ – most often interpreted in national and territorialised ways – and thereby still upholds (the remnants of) the myth of a sovereign nation-state (Garland 2001). Prostitution migrants’ interpretations of security, on the other hand, include more positive and dynamic, mobile notions of care, solidarity, belonging and home-being, all of which are shaped and expressed in deterritorialised, digital or mind-worked ways. Notwithstanding our traditional associations of home and belonging with fixity, territory, roots, locality and community, the above stories show how such notions can very well exist in lives that are temporarily ‘at drift’ and characterized by states of liminality. Criminological debate would do well to pay more attention to the possibility of what I would call here ‘fluid security’. The capacity to care, to build or rebuild homes and to reconfigure social bonds and hierarchies obviously not only thrives in fixity but can also be found ‘en passage’. For some it may even demand that condition.

References


**Notes**

1 All names of prostitution migrants in this contribution are fictional, in order to protect respondents’ identities.

2 This (ethnographic) fieldwork included regular informal and more formal conversations with Bulgarian prostitution migrants, nightly observations in Marseille’s street based sex scene, participant observation episodes in some of the women’s daily activities (hospital visits, visiting them in their hotel, drinking coffee on their favourite terraces and so on) and expert interviews (with social workers, policy makers, lawyers, a judge, a politician, members of Marseille’s vice squad etcetera). These research methods were complemented by desk research, the analysis of some police files on prostitution cases and two (local and national) media analyses.

3 ‘Prostitution migration’ and ‘human (sex) trafficking’ are used here in combination, but not interchangeably. Both phenomena are clearly distinguished here, prostitution migration being perceived as a specific form of labour migration in which (phases of) exploitation may, but do not necessarily, occur. Prostitution migration is primarily a strategy to improve one’s living. Human trafficking, by definition, refers to (here: sexual) exploitation in which coercion is used in more or less direct and repressive ways. The European Framework Decision on combating trafficking in human beings (19 July 2002, PbEGL 203), defines human trafficking as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.’

4 But note that at this time many working-class women were actually working outside the home. Middle-class women made a whole new occupation out of protecting these ‘wayward, [...] unruly, disorderly’ (Agustín 2005: 73) lower-class women, leading to the rise of the social and early-times ‘social work’.

5 In line with other ethnographic studies, several women in this case study had already worked as sex workers in Bulgaria before they came to Marseille as prostitution migrants.

6 Nora would be called, in the French jargon, a ‘première fille’: a middle-woman who would control the group of girls working for a Bulgarian group/network of (mainly) men, collecting their money and sending it back to Bulgaria. Her position can be seen as in-between: on the one hand, she works or has worked as a prostitution migrant herself, handing in her money to the network at hand (and thus, according to the hegemonic discourse, could be considered a ‘victim’ of human trafficking or exploitation of sex work). On the other hand she had a partner relationship with one of the men in this network and, therefore would benefit directly herself from the earnings of the other girls.

7 This is not only apparent from this research on prostitution migration, but has become clear in ethnographic studies on migrants in general (see, for example: Espiritu 2003; Ong 1999).
‘There are few terms in today’s political and cultural lexicon as severely overworked, as multifunctional or potentially ambiguous as security’ (Hamilton 2014: 7).

Introduction

If one were to peruse the books and articles produced by the field of criminology, say, 25 years ago one would be unlikely to encounter the term security. Save perhaps for the occasional reference to national security, criminologists largely got by without it. At that time, the word security seldom occurred in official discourse which was routinely organized around concerns with ‘public order’ and ‘disorder’ (Brake and Hale 1991). Security did not therefore feature as an object of enquiry. Nor was it a category of criminological analysis – the focal concerns of that period lay in the mapping and critique of social control (Cohen 1985). The essays brought together in this volume are a further sign of just how much things have changed; an indicator of how security has climbed the agenda of criminological research and reflection. In this brief essay, I want to outline the contours of the criminological (and, to some extent, wider social scientific) debate about security and, in particular, to tease out three contrasting dispositions towards security that have structured analysis and discussion. I term these: the will to restrain, to resist and replace, and to recover and reinterpret. By doing this, I shall be better able to situate the ‘unexplored thoughts’ about positive security that this book has raised for consideration.

It is worth recalling that this changing orientation within criminology was already underway prior to the events of 9/11. During the 1990s, ‘the pursuit of security’ emerged as one way of making sense of the heightened place that crime control had assumed in the everyday routines and consciousness of citizens and the new emotiveness and volatility in media discourse and political competition (Zedner 2000). It was also mobilised to understand the commercial policing practices that were resurfacing in the face of public anxieties and demands for order (Loader 1997). But there is equally little doubt that 9/11 helped bring security radically to the forefront of social relations and the practices of state institutions – not least because it collapsed the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security, the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ (Loader and Percy 2012). The result is that ‘security’ has become a ubiquitous and promiscuous notion within contemporary social life, one now attached to a capacious range.
of objects. Hence: home security, homeland security, food security, energy security, supply-chain security, cyber security, bio-security, neighbourhood security, national security, human security, global security and so on. This has served to bring security to prominence in criminology’s efforts to make sense of, and intervene in, the governance of crime. The result has been a proliferation of academic products – new courses, masters’ degrees, handbooks, articles, special issues and monographs – not only in criminology but also across the social and political sciences (e.g., Burgess 2010; Goold and Zedner 2006). Indeed, it is now possible to lose sight of the number and range of qualifiers that one or other social scientist (me included, I should add) has placed before security as it has, by turns, been civilized, commodified, constructed, consumed, designed, gendered, governed, imagined, re-thought, written, etc., etc.

Restraining security

For the most part criminological and socio-legal analysis has displayed a sceptical disposition towards ‘security’, understood in various dimensions as an object (rather than category) of analysis. The focus of this work has been on what Marc Schuilenburg and Ronald van Steden (this volume) call ‘negative security’ – security understood as protection against danger in terms of ‘fighting’, ‘combating’, ‘tackling’, ‘controlling’ and ‘preventing’. As such, criminological interest in security has for the most part been driven by a politics of fear rather than hope, by a defensive determination to limit the damage that security seeking can do in – and to – liberal democracies. The dominant concern has been a liberal one – to restrain what are considered to be the powerful tendencies of security practices to become pervasive and ride roughshod over other social values and priorities.

This has been evident in a number of ways. Lucia Zedner, for example, has argued that security ought to be conceptualised as a means to an end – not as an end in itself or an intrinsic good – and has alerted us to its capacity to act as a ‘trump’ in political debate and policy formation (Zedner 2009). Once we think of security as an act of constant striving rather than a stable condition of being – ‘more within us as a yearning than without us as a fact’ (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 99) – one can focus serious attention, Zedner argues, on the risk of having ‘too much security’ (Zedner 2003) – protection brought at the expense of other goals and values, or by colonizing social life, or by vesting excessive power and faith in the coercive capacities of government. Similar concerns have informed attempts to theorize the relationship between liberty and security. Several authors have highlighted the rhetorical appeal and analytical limitations of the image of ‘balance’ in this regard, urging us to ask whose liberties and whose security are placed on the metaphorical scales, or pointing out that in real politics the notion of balance does little or no work in protecting liberty from the encroachments of security (Loader 2007; Waldron 2010: ch. 2).

A related strand of analysis has scrutinized the claim of a ‘right to security’ that is often mobilized in public discourse – the idea that citizens have a basic enti-
tlement to live in peace and tranquillity. Liora Lazarus has set out the dangers of this contention – one that risks turning security into the right that erodes rights, as well as thinking carefully about whether and under what conditions it may be desirable to afford legal remedies to citizens if governments fail to take reasonable steps to protect them from violence (Lazarus 2007; 2012). We might note, finally, the literature on ‘securitisation’ developed within international relations (Buzan et al. 1998; Pram Gad and Lund Petersen 2011; see also: Crawford this volume). The argument here is that security is not a thing (whether a right, or good, or state of being) but a speech-act – one way of naming and framing social issues.¹ To ‘securitise’ is to raise a claim about existential threat which demands that the issue at stake is lifted from normal politics and treated with exceptional measures. The analytic task of this body of work on security has been to identify the conditions under which ‘securitising moves’ succeed or fail. There is a close – but largely unnoticed – parallel here with the study of moral panics (Cohen 2002), as well as with recent research on the ways in which ‘crime’ has restructured the practice and reach of local and national government (Crawford 1997; Simon 2007). In each case, the animating concern has been to call attention to – and thereby curtail – security’s power to damage or destroy the institutions and values it is mobilized to defend.

Resisting security

The second orientation I want to consider radicalises the liberal worry about the power and reach of security institutions. In so doing, it situates ‘security’ as part of a penal lexicon (alongside ‘crime’, ‘punishment’, ‘victim’, ‘offender’) and argues that the task of critical social science is to resist and replace it (Hillyard et al. 2004; Hulsman 1986). It is in this spirit that Neocleous and Rigakos (2011: 15-22) have issued and sought to garner support for an ‘anti-security’ declaration. On this view, to think security is to be inescapably trapped in a statist paradigm – under the long shadow of Hobbes. It is to tether oneself to a view of political community founded on fear of enemies and protection from mortal danger (see also: Dillon 1996). Security, it is argued, is not an innate desire, or a legitimate demand of citizens, still less a basic human need or ingredient of a better or good society. Rather, it is a ‘mode of governing, a political technology’ (Neocleous 2008: 4), that treats people ‘not as human beings, but as objects to be administered’. Security is a fetish the logic of which has come to saturate the social and political landscape. It is reproduced by the practices of state actors promising – and endlessly failing – to maximise security, by a security industry whose ‘solutions’ generate dependent customers, and by ‘security intellectuals’ who either actively come running to the service of state authorities or else work with the idea of security in ways that fail to recognize its necessary political closures and effects. The ensuing intellectual/political task, Neocleous contends, is to ‘intervene against the forms of domination and exploitation that take place under the label of security’ (Neocleous 2008: 159). This, in turn, means
abandoning the idea and logic of security, since ‘it is so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and the reactionary should be pressed to give it up’ (Neocleous 2008: 185). What is called for instead is another kind of politics ‘centred on a different conception of the good’ (Neocleous 2008: 186). We are enjoined to find a way of thinking about the possibilities of political community free of the constraints that security imposes.

There is in the ‘anti-security’ position a loud-and-clear warning about the dangers of security, its implication in illiberal state projects, and its ready availability as an emotive resource for authoritarian politics. This perspective offers a powerful reminder of the importance of sustaining a critical reflexivity towards the claims and practices that are marshalled under the security banner. It is nonetheless a partial, provocatively one-sided account of the idea of security and of the state-security nexus, one that in the end fails to convince. In part this flows from a declaratory style which tends to favour assertion over close engagement with competing positions: Neocleous, for example, clearly thinks there is a singular ‘statist political imaginary’ which it is wrong-headed to adopt (Neocleous 2008: 186), without fully explicating what that might mean, or giving serious attention to alternative framings (cf. Loader and Walker 2007). Neocleous and Rigakos also display a curious tendency to essentialise security: to state that it can only be this, or do that, or have these kinds of effects. This overlooks the polysemic and radically ambiguous nature of the term, upon which the ‘anti-security’ perspective imposes its own form of closure. One detects here – in the readiness to parcel-up and dispatch security rather than engage with its range of meanings – an instance of critical criminology’s long search for a purified conceptual vocabulary, free of state contamination. One encounters, finally, a frustrating under-specification of the ‘new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security’ (Neocleous 2008: 186). It is as if the critique of security is so vital, or appealing, or all-consuming that it gives rise to a prolonged deferral of any serious explication of the alternative political possibilities in whose way security is supposed to stand.

Recovering security

The ‘liberal restraint’ and ‘anti-security’ positions both supply good reasons for remaining steadfastly sceptical of the claims pressed in the name of security, and attest to the importance of engaging in close empirical investigation of the state and commercial institutions which purport to be protecting citizens from harm. It is clear that the authors gathered together in this book share these inclinations. But these sceptical orientations should not colonize the intellectual space, nor do they exhaust the possibilities for engaging with security. We also need to make room for an orientation which combines security scepticism with the practice of critical reconstruction, with seeking to recover and reinterpret the possible meanings and unredeemed promise of security, with exploring
the conditions of possibility for humans to be secure without being pacified (cf. Neocleous and Rigakos 2011). Some work along these lines has been undertaken in recent years (e.g., Loader and Walker 2007; Waldron 2010: ch. 5; Wood and Shearing 2007). This has resulted in an important recognition of security’s unavoidable mix of objective and subjective dimensions; in competing conceptualizations of security as a communal or public good; in ongoing debate about the relationship of the security to the state; and in the beginnings of an exploration of how security relates to notions such as trust, well-being and belonging. It may turn out that this exploration of the good of security is an intellectual and political cul-de-sac; a way of thinking foist upon scholarship by the preoccupations and anxieties of our times. In my view, however, we are some distance away from being able to come to a judgement as to whether or not this is so. In the meantime, there is work still to be done.

I take this collection to be engaging in just this kind of ‘unexplored’ work – a collective effort at identifying ‘lines of flight’ (O’Malley 2010: ch. 4) along which an alternative security politics might seek to travel. This is accomplished in a number of ways. Partly it is about the creation of a multi-disciplinary conversation in which criminology is joined by, *inter alia*, anthropology, philosophy, and urban planning and design. It has to do with the mobilisation of new literatures and discourses, not all of them immediately obvious, such as socio-biology, anarchism and religious thought (Schuilenburg and Van Steden, this volume). There is much to be learned from Adam Crawford’s critical dissection of the idea of security and his sketching of a research agenda organized around the positive notion of ‘sustainable security’. Simon Hallsworth and David James provide an intriguing and suggestive reworking of the ‘gardening’ metaphor made famous by Zygmunt Bauman’s (1989) *Modernity and the Holocaust* in ways that render it supportive of security understood as an inclusive ethic of care rather than exclusionary forms of ‘weeding’. Phil Carney and Deanna Dadusc offer a glimpse of what they call – following Foucault – counter-security (not, they insist, anti-security) which connects it to new forms of civic life, ethics and obligations. Though drawn from a US perspective to the positive attributes of safety over and above security, Karen Franck nonetheless reminds us of the vital importance of localities and that security is about horizontal relations between individuals and groups before it is a relation of citizens to political authorities.

One is further struck, especially in the latter half of the volume, by the way in which new readings of security are taken to require an engagement with the use, meaning and management of public spaces. This shines out of Oscar Verkaaik’s sympathetic exploration of the importance of cultivating habits (and hence of being able to cultivate habits) to feelings of security. Te-Sheng Huang discovers and describes some inclusive, civic uses of privately-owned public spaces in New York City in ways that qualify some of the gloomier variants of the ‘mass private property’ thesis – albeit that users enjoy spaces that are offered to them as a kind of corporate gift, rather than being in a position to actively shape the rules that govern their usage. Brenda Oude Breuil’s ethnography of Bulgarian sex workers in Marseille does a good job of challenging ‘hegemonic’
critical discourses on trafficking, offering a closely observed account of what safety, status and belonging mean to women who, she claims, are doing their best to exercise the capacity to care.

Concluding remarks

Reading these various unexplored thoughts on security prompted two wider thoughts of my own, on which I shall end. First, I am struck by how the topic of security engenders what one might call the pull of critique. By this I mean that even when invited to think about positive security, several contributors first found it necessary to clear the ground by specifying what is problematic or hazardous about any treatment of this term. I don’t intend this as a criticism – though it does mean that certain authors (Crawford, and Carney and Dadusc, for instance) do not really ‘get to’ their positive rearticulations of security until close to the end of their contributions. The pull of critique may simply tell us something about the inescapably ambiguous properties of the idea of security – properties that invite us to combine critique and reconstruction in ways that are not so obviously felt – or necessary – when the concept under discussion is, say, justice, or dignity, or solidarity. I do however think that the project of positive security may require us on occasions simply to take the plunge – and start analysis at the point where several of the current chapters end.

Secondly, there appears to be a standing temptation when thinking positively about security of making it ‘stand in’ for the preferred value or values with which one is proposing to bring security into closer alignment, whether that be trust, human connectedness, solidarity, diversity and so forth. The problem here is one of associating these cognate values with security in ways that collapse the former into the latter (so that security comes to mean, say, inclusion or diversity), and of effacing hard choices and value trade-offs by too readily assuming that ‘all good things go together’ (Hirschman 1991: 151). Guarding against this mistake emphatically does not entail reducing security to the narrow question of protection from harm – what Jeremy Waldron (2010: 117) calls a ‘pure safety conception’ of security. But Waldron is right to argue that we cannot rid security entirely of its reference to physical safety. In other words, one cannot adequately grasp the meaning and import of the good of security unless we retain the element of risk of and protection from criminal harm, in order then to research and theorize the relation of that risk to wider questions of belonging, equity, rights and democratic engagement. To think positively about security is to investigate the institutional arrangements under which all members of a political community are able to live together confidently with risk (Loader and Walker 2007: chs. 6-8). It is to think about how all members of a given community (and in a mobile, inter-connected world one has to widen the operative criteria for conceptualizing ‘membership’) can be afforded equal access to the conditions necessary to pursue their individual and collective projects. It is to examine the mix of protective and social resources that are able in
any given setting to foster and sustain confident belonging, and the capacities that states, markets and communities can (or cannot) bring to building security understood in these terms.

The democratic hope carried by the idea of security is the promise of equal protection. Such a promise is constitutive of modern liberal political communities – however much they fail to deliver on it. Given this, the promise of security continues to offer a resource for immanent critique that can and should unsettle (and catalyse change in) societies marked by deep economic and social inequalities. This is the unredeemed radical potential of an ideal we should be very careful not to dismiss as inescapably illiberal or unavoidably conservative.

References


**Notes**

1 The idea that we should give up on any attempt to develop a general theory, or even definition, of security (with all the attendant risks of reification) in favour of an approach that seeks to grasp the meanings and effects of different security practices in situ, has been promoted by Mariana Valverde (2011, see also: Ranasinghe 2013). The close investigation of multiple meanings is also the stated purpose of John Hamilton’s (2014) recent philology of security. The posthumous publication of Michel Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in the late 1970s has been influential in this turn to conceptualising ‘security’ as a power relation to be studied in concrete fields and practices (Foucault 2008; 2009).

2 There is no escaping the fact, however, that even a ‘temperate’ gardener does things to a garden. This, it seems to me, places certain limits on this metaphor in helping to illuminate a conception of security which is dialogical rather than monological.
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